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PRIVATIZATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS'
REAGAN, CLINTON AND THE THEORY/ACTION PARADOX
SEPTEMBER 2001
PETER FAIRMAN, B.A., EARLHAM COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lewis Mainzer
Unlike the vast majority of privatization studies that examine efforts at the state
and local levels, this dissertation focuses on national privatization policy by examining
the actions of the Reagan and Clinton administrations. The paper begins with a review of
the political and academic movements toward privatization that have occurred during the
last thirty years. The volume then explores the small amount of privatization that took
place during Reagan’s time in office, despite his own forceful statements for privatization
and public anti-government sentiment during his presidency. The Reagan administration
seemed unaware of the political ramifications of its primary privatization effort, the
attempted sale of numerous United States public lands, apparently believing that its
anti-government ideology alone would bring political success.
By contrast, the Clinton administration chose not to turn the privatization question
into one of “big versus small” government, and instead sold the privatization-friendly
Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act as a politically neutral management
reform, thereby achieving what it wanted on the legislation. While there are potential
implementation pitfalls in the law, the FAIR Act established a process that encouraged
IV
political debate regarding government’s legitimate flinctions. The volume concludes that
such dialogue is the only path to a political understanding regarding the privatization
issue.
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CHAPTER 1
AN OVERVIEW AND BRIEF HISTORY
The soaring popularity of privatization is one of the most striking political
phenomena of the past two decades and is a major part of the success of an ideology
which preaches the need for a smaller, more efficient government. The question of public
sector size and range of function seemed settled after the New Deal era when opposition
to larger government was noted more for its sincerity than its success. But beginning in
the late 1960s, suspicion of government swelled, even as citizens continued to expect the
same level of public sector services. Policymakers have responded to these contradictory
political factors by privatizing an array of functions in an effort to reconcile big
government practice with small government theory.
Along with privatization’s increased use has been a plethora of scholarly writings
on the topic. Most of these works, however, focus either on taking a position on the
issue ^ or on describing the privatization movement in general.^ Very few efforts have
been made to examine the politics of privatization and even fewer have explored its
political implications at the national level. The dearth of literature on national
privatization politics^ has left unanswered a most interesting question; what political.
' See, for example, E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham
House, 1987); Stuart Butler, ed.. The Privatization Option: A Strategy to Shrink the Size ofGovernment
(Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1985); Passing the Bucks: The Contracting Out ofPublic
Services (n.p.: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 1983); and
Ronald Moe, “Exploring the Limits of Privatization,” Public Administration Review 47 (1987): 453-460.
^See, for example, Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn, eds.. Privatization and the Welfare State (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); Ira Sharkansky, Wither the State: Politics and Public Enterprise in
Three Countries (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1979); and Mimi Abramovitz, “Privatization
of the Welfare State: A Review,” Social Work 31 (1987): 257-264.
^Of the studies published concerning national government privatization efforts, one of the best is Fred
Smith, “Privatization at the Federal Level,” Proceedings ofthe Academy ofPolitical Science 36 (1987):
179-189.
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constitutional and social factors have kept privatization from riding the waves of politieal
culture and pubhc opinion that would seem to suggest a great predilection to privatize?
What is Privatization*?
Before beginning exploration into the privatization movement, it is necessary to
clarify the term. Explanations of the word have varied from the simple to the complex.
One of the sparsest definitions comes from Stuart Butler, who has described it as “the
shifting of government functions into the private sector.”^ While straightforward and in
accord with a meaning the term may well evoke, this definition is somewhat misleading,
for m many instances, the private entity only partially takes over responsibility for
performance of the given function. More useful is George Gordon’s definition;
a trend or tendency in provision of government services for governments either to
join with private sector enterprises or to yield responsibility outright to such
enterprises, for provision of services previously managed and financed by a public
entity or entities.
^
This nicely suggests a range between all or nothing, a necessary element in any subtle
understanding of the term “privatization.” In seeking to understand the dialogue about
privatization, one should be aware of the important distinction between a service’s
provision and its production. It is often assumed that privatization means the government
automatically removing itself completely from responsibility for a government function.
Ted Kolderie was one of the first to point out that “observers fail to distinguish between
the primary policy decision of government to provide a service and the secondary
decision to produce a service. Either function or both may be ‘turned over’ to private
parties.”^ Kolderie expresses a common fear that if the private entity is responsible for
‘^Butler, The Privatization Option, vii.
^George Gordon, Public Administration in America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1 992), 547.
^Ted Kolderie, “Two Different Concepts of Privatization,” Public Administration Review 46 (1986): 285.
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both provision and production, “the objective of social equity may be put seriously at
risk.”v While others would dispute that, both sides of the debate base some of their
arguments on Kolderie’s distinction.
The most common type of privatization, usually referred to as “contracting out,” is
defined by privatization guru E.S. Savas in Privatization: The Key to Better Government
as “an award of monopoly privileges to a private firm to supply a particular service,
usually with price regulation by a government agency.”* However, there are other types
of privatization about which the reader should be aware. Savas explores many different
levels of involvement by the private sector in producing services. For example, three
other arrangements less commonly thought of as privatization are: (a) grants, in which the
government provides financial assistance to a private entity performing a service, (b)
vouchers, in which consumers are subsidized and are allowed generally free rein to spend
the funds as they wish for the service, and (c) franchise agreements, which yield
monopoly rights to the private sector body to produce the given function. As Savas
points out, privatization is not always the government turning over a service to the private
sector. Indeed, the opposite sometimes occurs, in what is called ^^govemment vending,”
in which a government sells its services to a private entity. One example would be a
sports arena paying the local police department to provide extra security for an event.^
n
Kolderie considers the activities of “policy making, deciding, buying, requiring, regulating, franchising,
financing, subsidizing” as provision and those of “operating, delivering, running, doing, selling,
administering” as ones which qualify as acts of production. That is as close as Kolderie comes to defining
these two terms, but our understanding of them is enhanced by the Random House Webster 's Dictionary,
which defines “to provide” as “to stipulate beforehand...to take measures with due foresight [or] to supply
means of support.” “To produce,” on the other hand, is interpreted as “to make or manufacture,” or “to bear
or yield.” The key difference seems to be that provision is the arrangement of a service and production is
the actual performance of it. Sol Steinmetz, ed... Random House Webster's Dictionary (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1993), 285, 527.
^Savas, Privatization, 75.
^For a more detailed exploration of these various arrangements, see E.S. Savas, Privatizing the Public
Sector. How to Shrink Government (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1982), 53-75.
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Each of these arrangements brings up its own set of policy questions. When
citizens are given vouchers, will the basis of people’s market choices be what
policymakers want them to be? Should government grants go only to the private entity
best suited for a given service? This study will not examine such issues in detail. The
important point is that the term “privatization” really represents a variety of different
arrangements, each of them a manifestation of the movement away from full
governmental provision and production of a service.
Ihe Case for Privatization
Some of the motives for privatization are purely practical. Since the number and
complexity of the tasks government does has grown, it naturally has to depend on the
private sector for expertise. The responsibilities have not only become more numerous,
but also much more complex. Programs often get at least partially privatized because
some goods and services are not available in the public sector, and the technology age
sometimes yields situations in which private sector involvement is mandatory. But even
in 1980, well before the computer age, Dwight Waldo wrote of “administrative overload,”
as he pondered whether the federal government could really handle all the responsibilities
it had undertaken,^® and indeed, no organization could possess the technical prowess
necessary to fulfill all the demands that have been placed on government.
There are a number of other practical reasons that make privatizing an attractive
option in certain cases. Since the political grounding for projects often makes them
difficult to stop once they are started, a fixed date in a contract is sometimes an effective
way to ensure that a project can be halted if that is deemed necessary. Contracting out the
^^Dwight Waldo, The Enterprise ofPublic Administration: A Summary View (Novato, Calif.: Chandler and
Sharp Publishers Inc., 1980), 186-7.
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construction of a building often prevents the government from having to pay its entire
cost at the time it is built. In such cases, the firm borrows the money and then includes
the cost of the mortgage payments in the rent it charges the government.!'
While pnvatization is in one sense a purely practical response to the realities of
governing, there has been growing political and academic support for the practice,
especially in the last fifteen years. Some of the argument for privatization centers around
what its advocates believe to be the irreplaceable benefits of competition. Privatization
proponents claim that since government agencies are often not subject to competition for
either the provision or production of a service, the incentive to perform a service well (or
face the penalty of going out of business) is missing, thus decreasing the quality of their
product. Its advocates predict that privatization will introduce a much stronger element
of accountability and reduce corrupt political deals by injecting the signals of the market
into the process. Privatization’s backers maintain that only the force of the marketplace
gives an organization the motivation to strive for excellence in service.
Even the threat of privatization encourages efficiency, according to privatization
advocates. Only if it is in danger of losing its funding source will a government agency
be compelled to find the latest technology, upgrade its service or make other
improvements. Privatization advocates point to alleged improvements in performance
that have occurred whenever the agency was forced to quantify and compare its efficiency
to a potential private sector producer. In addition, the purchasing rules, civil service laws
and other forms of regulation which can hinder government operations are much reduced
in the private sector, enabling a greater amount of innovation and creativity to take place.
The idea that government harms efficiency is certainly not unique to the late
twentieth century. A large part ofAdam Smith’s The Wealth ofNations attempts to make
the case that European commerce flourished despite governmental economic
^
^ Sharkansky, Wither the State, 1 20.
5
ni.smanagen.en, Bu, .he privatization movement goes beyond charges of governmental
mcompetence. According to privatization supporters, doing a job efficiently and
correctly is not only difficult, bu, undesirable for government officials. The hear, ofthe
privatization argument lies in the fervent belief held by many that most people in
government care only about obtaining as much power and money as possible for
themselves and the agency for whom they work. Since a government entity is often
rewarded for mismanagement by being given more money if it cannot do a job within its
current fiscal constraints, the theory goes, public sector employees have a disincentive to
be effective. Public choice theory, the primary theoretical foundation for this belief, will
be examined in chapter two. But one must be aware at this volume’s beginning of the
critical impact that the theory has had on the privatization debate.
The increased acceptance among both the political right and left of the belief that
most government employees are only interested in their own self-interest has been a
godsend for the privatization movement. The allegedly corrupt, or at least self-serving,
nature of government necessitates that it be reduced, and privatization has been seen as a
valuable tool for that purpose. Cynicism about government has also helped privatization
advocates on the public relations front, as it has been the assumption ofmany persons
concerned with the issue that the only reason public sector unions argue against it is
because they are afraid that the jobs of their members will be lost. While there is an
element of truth in this observation, fi-equently overlooked is the potential financial gain
private sector producers receive when a decision is made to privatize. Some participants
from both sides of the debate, then, are no doubt seeking to advance money or job
1
2
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations (Indianapolis, Ind.:
Bobbs-Merill Company, 1961), 153.
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interests. But there are serious arguments for and against (or in a shaded area) about the
privatization issue, arguments in no way undermined by pointing to self-interested
motives.
Ibe Case Against Privati/atinn
Privatization's opponents doubt the premise that government is less efficient than
the private sector, saying that most or all of the evidence of the government’s
incompetence is anecdotal, and that similar stories could be told from the business world.
One of the more passionate arguments for government is offered by Charles Goodsell:
American bureaucracy by no means works perfectly. Any large, immensely
complex and far-flmg set of institutions will be riddled with individual instances
ot inefficiency, maladministration, arrogance, and even abuse of power. But m
this country, these deficiencies are particularized rather than generalized, occur
within tolerable ranges of proportionate incidence, and are minor compared to
many bureaucracies of the world. In fact, most nations would do almost anything
to possess an equivalent social asset.
Even assuming that government is more inefficient than the private sector, some
doubt that privatization will give us more for less money. Once again, much of the
argument goes back to the provider/producer distinction. Privatization’s opponents
suspect that being only the provider is more trouble than it is worth, insisting that
oversight of a service’s producers is a more arduous and costly duty than privatization’s
advocates claim. For some scholars, much depends on the kind of function that is
privatized. If a private company is picking up trash, it is relatively easy to observe
whether it has been done properly. But if health care, prison management, or certain
1
3
Charles T. Goodsell, The Casefor Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic (Chatham, N.J.:
Chatham House Publishers, 1994), xi-xii.
^"^For example, see David R. Morgan and Robert E. England, “The Two Faces of Privatization,” Public
Administration Review 48 (1988): 979-87.
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other policy areas are privatized, using meaningful program evaluation tools to monitor
the producer will he much more of a challenge, since performance in these areas is harder
to define and quantify.
Unlike government, the private sector’s predominant interest is making money,
and that difference in aims causes privatization’s opponents to fear that a private
company will do only what is easy and profitable rather than what is good policy. The
costs of preventing that are seen by opponents to be potentially prohibitive. Linda
Lampkin, director of research for the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) argues, “[With privatization] the government must
develop the bids...prepare the contracts [and] monitor those contracts. It may even have to
hire some people to do that job, actually increasing employment.”! 5 And should anything
go wrong with the contract, it is the government entity, not the private producer, that
usually takes the blame. Many people remember that NASA was the government agency
associated with the Challenger disaster in 1986, but very few recall that Morton Thiokol
was the company which built the rocket booster responsible for the accident. At the very
least, contract monitoring is a challenge requiring capable administrative machinery.
Privatization opponents would call it nonsensical to denigrate government, but then
expect it to be efficient and trustworthy enough to monitor a contract effectively.
Privatization is no fiscal solution, its opponents say, not only due to the challenges
presented in managing the contracts, but also due to the political problems arising fi-om
having yet another set of claimants looking for favorable government treatment. Some
point to the military-industrial complex as an example of the heavy use of contracting out
that has resulted in “lowballing” (the intentional submitting of a low estimate to the
government with the intent to raise the actual price subsequently), favoritism, corruption,
and other forms of manipulation of the political process by private companies looking to
^
^Richard L. Worsnop, “Privatization: The Issues,” Congressional Quarterly Researcher 2 (1992): 981
.
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oma,n government funds. Privatization foes wonder if a similar dynamic will not take
place if the government is heavily privatized in other policy areas. Opponents contend
that too much contracting out will leave the public sector too dependent on the private
sector for certain products and services, in some cases because only one or two private
sector producers possess the necessary technical expertise, thus
.mdercutting the
competition at the heart of the privatization theory.
Even if government saves money through privatizing, opponents claim that the
nonfmancial costs of the private sector taking over some of the government’s tasks would
be too high. Having a private sector entity implementing policy places one more barrier
between the voters and the laws that affect them. In addition, the business world is far
less subject to public pressure to serve goals such as racial equity or individual procedural
rights than a government agency. The procedural regulations government must follow, so
often the object of derision, ensure that citizens are fairly treated and well served. A1
Bihk, president of the AFL-CIO's public employee department speaks of privatization’s
costs to workers when he asserts:
The private sector has no magic wand. Their ‘savings’ are achieved
through paying substandard wages, inadequate benefits, creative
accounting methods and a host of other questionable business practices
that earn profits simply by cutting comers on quality and placing a large
burden on their employees.’^
Bilik’s words illustrate a fundamental argument of opponents: the claim that there is a
danger of sacrificing equity and other worthy aims in the name of efficiency, should
private companies perform functions traditionally done by government. Their case rests
on the conviction, widely accepted until the 1960s, that government is a noble and
*^Ibid., 980.
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effective actor ably serving the public interest. TTte degree to which that description of
government is accurate is the central question around which the privatization issue
revolves.
A^Brief History of Privatiyatinn
While the current fervor over privatization makes it seem as if the practice is new,
government has used private interests to achieve public purposes since the largely private
sector ventures which discovered the American hemisphere. When the United States was
still under British rule, colonial overseers often granted subsidies to those able to supply
food, shelter and medical care to the poor at the lowest price,>’ and during the
Revolutionary War, the long standing practice of using military contractors for defense
was established when private warships were employed in the fight against the British.'*
A steady line of private involvement in government policy implementation can be traced
from this country’s beginning to the present. Even the post New Deal era, a period
mostly associated with a vastly expanded governmental presence, had the private sector
as the essential ingredient in virtually every major government initiative.'^
Before the twentieth century, private entities, whether church, business or
voluntary agency, were largely seen as the principal actors on most issues. As odd as it
would sound today to many citizens distrustful of government’s motives, the reason the
public sector began to be employed more at the twentieth century’s beginning was in
order to alleviate concerns about the shortcomings of the private sector. At the local
level, government began to take more responsibility for municipal duties such as
sanitation and fire protection. Just as importantly, the industrial revolution created for the
^
^Abramovitz, “Privatization of the Welfare State,” 257.
^
^John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed.. The Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
^^World War II, the Great Society and the Journey to the moon are a few of the more notable examples.
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first time a beliefamong some that the national government should act to mitigate
capitalism's more undesirable effects through
“trust-husting,” food regulation, railroad
regulation, and other varieties of political, economic and social reform .20
The 1920s saw a renewed belief in private enterprise, and with it people's enthusiasm
for government action cooled in the midst of a booming economy. But the Great
Depression and its misery yielded a new era of national government intervention to rescue
millions of Americans from abject poverty. The New Deal encouraged a faith in national
government action that has never completely left us. It is no coincidence that while
multiple presidential commissions during the first half of the 20th century were similar to
later ones in calling for more efficiency in government, they were very different from
later efforts in their belief that government could be the source of the increased efficiency.
With the pressing needs of the Great Depression and World War II in the past,
there was a slight shift toward private sector provision in the early 1950s, and a 1955
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) bulletin ordered, “The federal government will not cany on
any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such a product
or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels.”2i
Although this policy was confirmed in another BOB document two years later, it was
followed sporadically at most, as the bulletins were a tiny pebble against the rushing
waters of the vibrant welfare state .22 The end of the Eisenhower years saw another BOB
20For examples of Progressive reform efforts, see H. Landon Warner, ed., Reforming American Life (New
York: Pitman Publishers, 1971).
^bim McIntyre, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget. House Subcommittee on Employee
Ethics and Utilization, Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service, Contracting Out ofJobs and
Services, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 28 March 1977, 18.
President Eisenhower was generally not supportive of the national government’s expanded role, but felt
powerless to stop it. Iwan Morgan, Eisenhower Versus the Spenders: The Eisenhower Administration, the
Democrats and the Budget (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
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bulletin issued saying for the first ti,.e that contracting out should not occur when
“procurement front commercial sources involved higher costs.”B But this directive was
also tgnored, and privatization, when it was discussed at all, was castigated.
Nowhere is the marginalization of the privatization idea better illustrated than in
the case of Barry Goldwater’s idea to privatize the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
Goldwater had been an avid opponent of the expanding national government and had
excoriated Eisenhower for his seeming acquiescence to the welfare stale. In keeping with
h.s ideological predilections, presumed Republican presidential hopeful Goldwater
suggested in 1963 that part of the TVA be sold. Tlte TVA, created during the New Deal
and for many a great example of government being a positive actor for the public good,«
had started to lose its luster for the same reasons government had, as it was increasingly
seen as inefficient and authoritarian. The slight drop in the TVA’s prestige did not
prevent Goldwater from being verbally pummeled for his proposal from politicians of all
stripes. President Kennedy cheerfully made political fodder out of the controversy,
joking m a press conference that it would not be fair to attack Senator Goldwater because
he “had a busy week selling TVA.”« Lyndon Johnson used the issue repeatedly on the
stump during the 1964 election, grouping the proposal with Goldwater’s supposed desires
to “abandon education...make social security voluntaiy...forget our farm programs...these
are the most radical proposals that have ever been made to the American people. By
1 985 TVA would be described by the liberal magazine The Nation as a “bureaucratic
monster with an atomic appetite no more accessible than its private counterparts,”27 and
^^Worsnop, “Privatization,” 984.
A good exploration of the idealism behind the TVA’s creation is Walter Creese, TVA 's Public Planning:
The Vision, The Reality (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1 990).
John F. Kennedy, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1964), 828.
^^Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965), 1440.
^^Editorial, “The Big Sellout,” The Nation, 1 1 January 1986, 4.
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ideas to privatize it were embraced Rut in
• t in what was a microcosm of the political history
of the privatization movement, any notion in the 1960s of selling the TVA was
resoundingly rejected.
Although the drubbing Goldwater took in the 1964 election seemed to settle the
privatization question, it would be only two years before the issue returned to the national
government, and this time the results were lasting and profound. Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 is not what first comes to mind when reviewing the
Lyndon Johnson presidency, but it is undoubtedly the single most important document in
United States privatization history. For the first time, the United States government
issued a detailed procedural policy to encourage competition between the public and
private sectors regarding a given ftmction. The circular also attempted for the first time
to define what should properly be considered a government or commercial function.
Although the document was attacked by conservatives as too skewed toward government,
and the policy was not followed the vast majority of the time,2* Circular A-76 established
the parameters of fiiture government debate about privatization and laid important
groundwork for later action.
With the exception of the sale of the Federal National Mortgage Association in
1 967, there were no major privatization efforts by the national government from the late
1960s to the 1980s. Despite its new presence in policy debates, even minor privatization
efforts were still a rarity, and compliance with Circular A-76 was haphazard.
Significantly, however, privatization slowly emerged as a viable alternative to traditional
government production, and by the end of the 1970s, a perception existed in many minds
that government had grown too big. Even the leader of the Democratic Party, President
28 •Jim McIntyre noted that the Congressional Commission on Government Procurement concluded in its
December 1972 report, “We believe that a new approach and stronger implementation of the program is
needed to achieve consistent and timely govemmentwide [^/c] application of the policies set forth in
Circular A-76.” House Subcommittee on Employee Ethics and Utilization, Contracting Out ofJobs and
Services, 19.
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J.mn,y Carter, appeared ,o be no automatic supporter of govemnrent action, saying
“When the government must perfom, a function, it should do it efficiently. Wherever
free competition would do a better job of serving the public, the government should stay
OUt.”29
Jimmy Carter, though proud of his emphasis on efficient management, was unable
to convince the voters that he was the one who could reduce government. Ronald
Reagan. Carter’s successor, had a convincing election victoty. impeccable conservative
credentials and impressive political skills, all of which produced great anticipation in the
hearts of privatization advocates and he got off to a fast start in fulfilling their hopes.
Early in his administration, the National Consumer Cooperative Bank was privatized, a
major presidential commission was established to examine privatization (The President’s
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, commonly known as the Grace Commission) and
an ambitious program to sell public lands was announced. But these three steps would
prove to be symbolic of Reagan’s failure on the privatization front. Much to their
dismay, all that privatization backers had to remember Reagan by at the end of his term
were outright failures such as the collapse of the effort to privatize public lands, minor
government downsizing initiatives that received halfhearted administration support, and
ignored recommendations of marginalized presidential commissions.
While the fiscal pressure of the 1990s led to an abundance of privatization at the
state and local level, that flurry of activity never spread to the national government. One
of the most puzzling parts of the privatization movement is that with the exception of
vigorous privatization efforts in 1996;3o it has not really affected the national government.
Adding to this mystery is that privatization, rather than being a policy fad, seems
^^Ibid., 20.
30During 1996, the Naval Petroleum Reserve, the Alaska Power Administration and the United States
Enrichment Corporation were all privatized.
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to be a response to several political and cultural elements of the United States that one
would think would produce vigorous privatization efforts at every level of government.
Erivatization: A Reflection of the PnPty
Privatization is a manifestation ofmany important elements of American politics.
First on the list is citizens’ disillusionment with politics and government. The end of the
Cold War saw the decline of anti-communism as an organizing political force. One could
make a strong case that suspicion and cynicism about government has taken its place.
Indeed, many of the major policy debates of the last decade, such as education, health
care, and crime, have as a major component a discussion of whether a plan is pro big
govemment.3i Even Democratic President Bill Clinton, a professedly pragmatic
moderate, had as the theme of his 1996 State of the Union Address, “The Era of Big
Government is Over.”32
The recent rise in distrust of government is augmented by our political tradition,
which generally has discouraged dependence on government or other forces except the
free market to achieve desired policy outcomes. As John J. Corson observed twenty-five
years ago, the assumption in the United States is that:
between an all encompassing government which can perform a vast and
increasing range of services within its own offices...and a smaller government that
performs those services with the aid and through a large number of enterprises in
the private sector, the preference of democratic peoples is necessarily the latter.33
'I 1
Such a debate is less surprising when discussing legislation like President’s Clinton’s 1994 health care
reform bill or President Bush’s 2001 tax cut plan. But anti-government rhetorical strategies can occur in
surprising places. For example, one contention made against the Clinton omnibus crime bill in 1994 was
that the government should not operate “midnight” basketball leagues to combat juvenile crime. This
seemingly benevolent enough scheme was condemned by some as dangerous federal government intrusion.
^^“Clinton Aims for the Center, Praises GOP Themes,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 54 (1996):
258.
'I'l
Background paper by John J. Corson, prepared for the Anglo-American Conference on Accountability,
held at Williamsburg, Va., September 1971. Cited in Bruce L.R. Smith, The New Political Economy (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 13.
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This attribute seems to be an important factor in privatization’s rise, as Americans tend to
prefer the free market to government and admire rugged individuals who are able to
survive on their own. Furthermore, nongovernmental entities have usually been seen as
superior for providing services to those who cannot survive without help. It is an easy
jump to privatization from values like these.
Despite the American affection for the Horatio Alger model that says capitalism
always rewards hard work and determination,3^ it would be simple-minded to assert that
there is an American ideology, uniform and unchanging, of free enterprise and devil take
the losers. Another seemingly permanent aspect of the American ethos that has a bearing
on the privatization debate has emerged in the last sixty years. Since the Great
Depression, there has been an assumption made increasingly by Americans that it is
government’s job to provide for the well-being of its citizens and that people have a
“right” to a great many services from the public sector. Americans thus are caught
between two opposing creeds. According to Ralph Kramer:
At one pole is a cluster of ideas associated with Social Darwinism, laissez-faire,
individualism, free enterprise, and a distrust of government. At the other is the
American creed of humanistic liberalism and a belief in progress and in
governmental intervention to achieve security and equality.35
The privatization movement responds to this ideological contradiction by
seemingly allowing Americans to follow their belief in Lockean liberalism by limiting
government, while not asking them to give up the services of twentieth century liberalism
on which they have come to depend or to which they think they are properly entitled. The
same president who made “The Era of Big Government is Over” his theme in 1996 made
^^See Richard Weiss, The American Myths ofSuccess: From Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale
(New York: Basic Books, 1969).
^^Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California
Press, 1981), 72.
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central to his 1998 State of the Union speech the phrase, “Save Social Security First.”»
One of the primary reasons that studying the privatization phenomenon is so usefttl. then,
is that it illustrates citizens’ ambivalent attitudes about how big a role government should
play in the polity.
Two other important political trends are highlighted by privatization’s emergence.
One IS the declining influence of certain constituencies that have traditionally been in
favor of a larger role for government. Ethnic minorities which came to see the federal
government as a protector in the post-World War H era have in the last twenty years lost
some of their ability and, in some cases, desire to demand services from government
effectively, and surely that is encouraging to privatization advocates. But perhaps the
best example of such a constituency is unions. Although there has recently been a slight
upsurge in unions’ popularity, generally the trend for them over the last thirty years has
been towards a greatly diminished standing with the public. The decline in union power
is at least suggested by the fact that membership in labor unions has dropped from 24.8%
of the labor force in 1956 to 14.5% forty years later.3^
A final element of modem day American politics of which the privatization
phenomenon is evidence is the trend toward emphasizing efficiency as the chief criterion
in defining quality work. From the “Reinventing Government” movement of President
Clinton’s first term to President George W. Bush’s call for a top-to-bottom review of the
Pentagon, all the most powerful sections of the political spectmm have made efficiency
the mantra for what will again make government worthy of our trust. Efficiency was, of
course, one of the rallying cries of the Progressive movement.^s Unlike that era, however,
^°“Clinton Stresses Accomplishments, Calls State of the Union Strong,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
R^ort, 56(1998); 251.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States: I960 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1960), 233, table 298, and U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
the United States: 1997 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 440, table 688.
^^For a study of Progressivism’s emphasis on efficiency, see Martin Schiesl, The Politics ofEfficiency
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977).
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today’s sentiment calls for more involvement by the private sector, for citizens today feel
that there is no better way to ensure “business-like efficiency” than to have business
perform the service. In sum, citizen distrust of government, American preference for the
free market in general while maintaining a commitment to government provision of
certain services to citizens, the declining power of groups supporting more active
domestic government and a renewed emphasis on efficiency as the key value in judging
government all support the privatization movement.
Privatization and the Academy
Privatization also reflects certain elements of scholarship. Public choice theory,
with its inherent suspicion toward government, is easily the most powerful academic
catalyst for the privatization movement. But there are other academic schools that have
aided privatization’s rise in less recognized and sometimes surprising ways. The new
public administration movement, for example, came from the political left, but at times
sounded as suspicious of government as the public choice school on the Right. American
public administration theory has, ever since its origins as a self-conscious study a century
ago, used a politics/administration dichotomy which, though not originally intended,
seems to invite the substitution of a different “neutral” instrument for agencies of public
administration. While the list is long of major academic figures who have strongly
dissented from this vision of the politician and administrator’s proper roles,^9 the
dichotomy is often assumed by political actors to be a self-evident truth, with the private
sector recently emerging as a primary source for these neutral, supposedly more efficient
instruments.
19See for example Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University ofAlabama
Press, 1949), and Norton Long, “Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review 9 (1949):
257-64. A good summary of the scholarship behind this argument is James Fesler, “Public Administration
and the Social Sciences: 1946-1960,” in Frederick Mosher, ed.., American Public Administration: Past
Present and Future (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University ofAlabama Press, 1975), 97-141.
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Privatization has also established itself as the one of the latest managerial
solutions which scholars and those outside the academy embrace as the “magic pill” that
will make all the tough decisions about spending priorities for us while simultaneously
making citizens feel less disillusioned with their government. Of course, that is a great
deal to expect from any reform measure. Sociologist James Finckenauer believes that
similarly unfair hopes were placed in the “Scared Straight” program of the early 1980s,
which attempted to discourage young offenders from continuing a life of crime by taking
them to visit prison inmates. Finckenauer described what he called at the time “the
panacea phenomenon:”
First, a certain approach is posed as a cure-all or becomes viewed and promoted as
a cure-all. ..It may be promoted and sold as the all-encompassing solution to
the.. .problem..
.Unfortunately, the approach, no matter what it is, almost always
fails to.. .live up to the frequently unrealistic or unsound expectations raised by the
sales pitch. As this failure slowly becomes apparent, frustration sets in; but then
the search for the next panacea...begins anew.'^®
Some have argued that the privatization phenomenon is facing such a fate. Others would
dispute that point, but privatization is nevertheless a good example of the twentieth
century penchant for trying to solve political problems, such as a lack of faith in
government, with managerial solutions. We need only mention such examples as the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems (PPBS) and Management by Objectives
(MBO) initiatives, reforms promising more than they could deliver, which have led some
scholars to be skeptical about all governmental management fads."** Many public
administration scholars have furthered this managerial solution tendency by embracing
privatization in recent years, joining in the cynicism about governmental bureaucracy.
^^James O. Finckenauer, Scared Straight! and the Panacea Phenomenon (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1982), 5.
See Fred A. Kramer, “The Panacea Phenomenon and the Fate of Total Quality Management in the Public
Sector,” Business and the Contemporary World 6 (1994): 141-9.
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Privatization’s connection with scholarship is one illustration of the fact that
however defective arguments surrounding the privatization debate may be at one moment
or another, they are centered on political issues which are far from trivial. In fact, the
privatization question recalls certain issues from the most important periods of the
American political experience. We have already noted the concern for efficiency which
runs through both progressivism and the arguments of privatization’s present-day
supporters. As another example, during the country’s founding era, two theories of
government emerged that have been in tension ever since. These two philosophies have
helped to lay the foundation for the beliefs of both sides of the privatization issue.
The first is usually associated with Alexander Hamilton and stresses the necessity
of a strong central government and sense of nationhood. Since citizens often cannot be
trusted to act responsibly, the theory goes, a powerful government, albeit one ultimately
responsible to the people, is mandatory. Thomas Jefferson is considered the father of the
second school of thought, which is much more suspicious of governmental power.'’^
Hamiltonian/ Jeffersonian dilemma revolves around a question directly relevant to the
privatization debate: what can be considered the appropriate level ofpower for
government? Indeed, even the names of these two framers are regularly invoked when
debating this question. During a 1994 Senate debate. Senator Robert Graham (D-FL)
argued for a measure cutting $94 billion in federal government spending over a five year
period by saying “President Jefferson felt it was unethical for one generation to use a
future generation’s income to finance its current spending.”'^^ Senator Robert
Lynton K. Caldwell, The Administrative Theories ofHamilton and Jefferson: Their Contribution to
Thought on Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).
^^Richard E. Cohen, “Jeffersonian Ideals, Harsh Realities,” National Journal 26 (1994): 435.
20
Byrd’s (D-WV) response to Graham was instructive. Reminding the senator that the
Jefferson administration endorsed $15 million of deficit spending during the Louisiana
Purchase, Byrd asked, “Why did Jefferson say one thing but do another?”^^
Byrd’s question illustrates well how the Hamiltonian/Jeffersonian dilemma has
frequently necessitated a governmental balancing act. To be sure. Senator Graham’s call
to cut billions from the government’s books strikes a chord among many. But Senator
Byrd reminds us that while being Jeffersonian about federal spending is popular in theory,
the philosophy’s namesake violated his own doctrine many times because he realized the
necessity and frequent popularity of strong government action. Privatization tries to
respond to this dilemma by giving citizens services while reducing the public sector role.
Privatization and the Modem Day
Privatization is important to study for reasons old and new. It raises issues with
which democratic governments are continually struggling. How much government is too
much? How much efficiency, if any, should be sacrificed for equity’s sake? Can a third
party delivering services ever be as neutral as some like to think? But the privatization
phenomenon also points to very recent trends which are vital for anyone wanting to know
the state of today’s politics. As suggested earlier (and discussed in greater detail in
chapter three), respect for government and almost every other political institution has
declined in the last twenty-five years, as has the political power of those who frequently
argue on government’s behalf. These developments have been helped along by a
tradition which has always been somewhat suspicious of government. At the same time,
however, due to a competing political tradition and the perception that policy problems
are growing greater and more complex by the day, Americans frequently call for
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government action to address many of the challenges of our time. Think, for example, of
the remarkable expansion of governmental responsibility for purity of air, water, and land
in recent decades.
In this simultaneous call for more and less government lies much of the reason for
privatization’s emergence in political dialogue. Due to the dual political traditions of
Hamiltonianism and Jeffersonianism, recent political trends, the perceived mushrooming
of policy problems, and the inherent difficulty of the issue. United States citizens are
simply unsure as to the proper level of government involvement. Privatization seemingly
provides citizens with a unique opportunity to answer the big versus small government
question both ways, allowing them to reduce the size of the public sector while keeping
much of what it does. No definitive pronouncements will be made in this volume about
whether privatization is sound policy. But the fact that calling for privatization is often
smart politics is clear.
One might notice that this volume has begun by calling attention to the political
success of the ideology of privatization and by asserting that callingfor privatization is
often smart politics. Those words were chosen carefully. While neither president in this
study suffered politically for endorsing privatization in the abstract, controversies
frequently arose at the national level when substantial privatization plans were put into
practice. The reasons for this fact strike at the heart of everything this volume is about.
Privatization is frequently seen as one of the best ways in politics for citizens seemingly
to have their programmatic cake and eat it too, as they keep all the services their
Hamiltonian hearts love while believing they reduced government to levels any
Jeffersonian would embrace.
When private companies perform more simple functions, the compromise
between Hamiltonianism and Jeffersonianism can be a political and policy success. But
the attempt to find a middle ground between our dual political traditions potentially has
high political costs when privatizing more complex duties. For example, Ronald Reagan
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found out that proposals to privatize public lands brought other values besides efficiency
into play, and having a larger number of differing value priorities among participants
naturally created a greater amount of controversy. Reagan’s political problems were
worsened by the fact that he was working at the national level. Unlike state and local
governments where the other political branches are sometimes unable to contest the
executive’s policies, in the national government the political institutions almost always
have the capability to provide vigorous opposition. State and local governments can also
be the site of domination by a given interest. At the national level, however, there tend to
be a greater variety of powerful constituencies involved in policy decisions.
The Reagan administration did not adequately convey its concern for those
competing values and different interests. But those failings should not mask the inherent
difficulty of privatizing major policy functions at the national level. Once it enters the
national realm, privatization quickly becomes a much more partisan, ideological, and
controversial issue, making supporting it in practice often a risky proposition. Those
risks are substantially reduced when, as was begun in the Clinton administration, lines are
carefully drawn, with appropriate input from all affected parties, between what are
governmental and commercial functions. That is the only possible path to dealing with
each relevant interest and fully addressing policy values which frequently contradict each
other.
Sophisticated political understanding requires a realization of what privatization
can and cannot do. While privatization may well have a role to play in ensuring that
government gets the most for its dollar, it will not automatically produce clear decisions
about spending priorities, nor will it automatically make citizens feel less disillusioned
with their government. One also cannot take subtle, complex issues like health care and
lands management and equate them with filling in potholes or stapling forms, treating the
given policy as a managerial problem needing only technical solutions. Neither
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privatization nor any other managerial change can serve as the substitute for the careful
deliberation, subtlety in approach and dialogue between interested parties that governance
requires.
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CHAPTER 2
THE THEORY OF PRIVATIZATION
One can discern a number of different explanations for the privatization
movement, including basic American cultural tendencies of hundreds of years,
contemporary political events and major scholarship from the political right and left.
Although the issue’s roots grew earlier, those in and out of the academy began to discuss
the privatization question in the late 1960s, a time of political discontent and discord.
The impact on our nation’s politics will be discussed in chapter three, but important to
note here is the marked increase in distrust toward government and all other institutions, a
phenomenon that was felt in the academy. It is not a surprise that this was the time when
some scholars, disillusioned with the national government, began to consider having
entities outside the public sector address social problems.
Most of the 1960s was marked by calls for sweeping action by the national
government on an array of issues. The decade’s middle saw liberal Democrat Lyndon
Johnson wallop conservative Republican Barry Goldwater at the polls and undertake an
enormous increase in national government spending under the umbrella title the “Great
Society.” In keeping with the politics of the day, much of the scholarship at the time
concerned itself with creating the political conditions for social change led by an activist
president. Richard Neustadt, one of the first and most significant advocates of this
movement, summarized the predominant academic attitude when he characterized the
primaiy aim of his famous book Presidential Power as illuminating “what a President can
do., .to carry his own choices through that maze of personalities and institutions called the
government of the United States.”’
1 Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), v.
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Even in a time of electoral misfortune at the national level and general rejection in
the academy, the conservative movement was advancing ideas that would make it highly
popular only a decade and a half later. During the New Deal era, though conservative
opposition was always present and sometimes effective, such an outcome would have
seemed improbable. Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats were seen as using national
government action to tackle the two biggest American challenges of the twentieth
century: the Great Depression and World War H. These experiences had led most people
in both parties to accept the national government as a powerful policy actor. Even
Dwight Eisenhower, who greatly worried about the negative consequences that could
come from the national government’s expansion, knew it was political suicide to attempt
anything more than minor reform of the new social welfare state.2
The conservative movement was undeniably marginalized at that time, but the
ideas that would capture many minds beginning in the late 1960s were already being
offered in the form of intellectual treatises arguing the inherent inferiority of bureaucratic
government. “The strait jacket of bureaucratic organization paralyzes the individual’s
initiative,” warned Ludwig von Mises, “while within the capitalist market society an
innovator still has a chance to succeed.”^ Against the backdrop ofNazi Germany,
Friedrich von Hayek warned that the consequences of the socialism which he felt to be a
part of the current American and British political fabric could be of the most dire sort:
“Few are ready to recognize that the rise of fascism and nazism was not a reaction against
the socialist trends of the preceding period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies.”^
2Morgan, Eisenhower Versus the Spenders, 1 6.
^Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 124.
^Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 3-4.
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Over the next twcnly-livc years. Hunkers like William I', liuckley, Richard
Weaver, and Russell Kirk created a cogeut, cohereui philosophy suspicious of
govern,ueui involve,ueul.5 Cireatly aided by the triun.ph of the Goldwater wing within
the Republican party and the success ol'lhe Naliom,! Review, an intellectual outlet for
their ideas, their philosophy rose out of political obscurity. According to E.J. Dionne,
Hy the early 1960s, conscrvatisn, had a working philo.sophy and a growing following.”^
Although ,t would lake another decade to happen, this antigovernment ideology, helped
along by the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal and a host of other events in and out of
government, became a powerful political force in and out of the academy.
PiLvalizatioiLEmergcs in Scholafsliipi. The Os
I he emergence of antigovernment thought in the political mainstream during the
1980s led to privatization for the first time being a substantial focus of discussion among
policy thinkers. But as one might expect, the issue was not suddenly born at that time.
I he idea had been quietly proposed by some thinkers beginning in the mid-1960s. In
1965, Richard Cornuelle published Reclaiming, the American Dream, which called for
government to at least partially remove itself from the task of trying to solve social
problems. Voluntarism through what Cornuelle called the “independent sector” (clubs,
churches, community organizations, and so on) would perform some of the tasks
previously done by the public sector. Significantly, Cornuelle did not say that
commercial enterprises should fill the gap. But his belief in the power of a people
unfettered by government intervention to “do much more of the country’s serious
business, with more efficiency, precision, and understanding” is clear.”^ Comuelle’s idea.
Sec William Buckley, Up From Liberalism (New York: McDowell Press, 1959); Richard Weaver, Ideas
Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); and Russell Kirk, The Conservative
Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 1953).
Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 169.
^Richard Cornuelle, Reclaiming the American Dream (New York: Random House, 1965), xv.
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of course, was hardly new, as he himself notes that the United States has used the
“independent sector” for these purposes since the nation’s birth. But his book is
noteworthy for the fact that even at a time wlien Democratic liberalism caiTied the
political day, the discontent with government and resulting desire to have other entities
take its policy place were well on their way to political prosperity.
The debate went a step further in 1969 when privatization was explicitly set forth
m scholarship for the first time in The Age ofDiscontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing
Society by Peter Drucker. Drucker was prophetic in his assertion that what we know
today as the “information age,” the “knowledge economy,” and the “global economy”
were all well on their way. The title of Drncker’s book aptly described the era we were
entering m the late 1960s, as does his observation that “the one thing that is certain so far
is that it will be a period of great change.”*^ fhe author was convinced that government
would not be able to handle the policy challenges presented by the new age with wisdom
or responsibility. As a result, private business was for the first time in the privatization
scholarship presented as a valuable resource in the conduct of public policy.
1 he private sector is, according to Drucker, more flexible, more open to
innovation and more in tune with the quality of its service due to the awareness of a
bottom line.” By contrast, “the best we can get from government in the welfare state is
competent mediocrity. More often we do not even get that; we get incompetence such as
we would not tolerate in an insurance company While there are certain costly policy
functions which only the public sector would be willing to perform, for the most part
government should only be “the conductor in the orchestra of institutions.”'® Other
institutions, such as universities and hospitals, should also be involved in the achievement
8
Peter Dmckcr, The Age oj Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society (New York: Harper and
Row, 1969), 10.
‘^lbid.,218.
'^Ibid., 234-5.
28
of policy objectives. But private business is, according to Drucker, uniquely qualified to
take on the challenges of the new age, since “of all social institutions, it is the only one
created for the express purpose of making and managing change.”i' Drucker’s reasoning
IS that pnvate firms are more open to innovation, less encumbered by civil service
regulations, and more m touch with how well they are doing relative to the bottom line. It
would still be a decade before Drucker’s ideas began to take hold. But what is
noteworthy about these arguments is their resemblance to current ones. Drucker’s book
was the first to offer a scholarly defense of the privatization idea, one which would be
used with great success over the next thirty years by a multitude of conservative thinkers.
The Debate Picks Up Steam: The 1
Despite further decline in government s standing with the public during the
1970s, 12 it would not be until a decade later that privatization moved from being an
abstract academic notion of a few to a budgetary and management tool of cities and
states. Surveys during the 1980s found that about 80% of cities were using privatization
in some form, primarily because it was seen by many as having the potential of providing
higher quality service at less cost.i^ The degree to which privatization provided cheaper
and better quality service for state and local government was a matter of intense debate.
But while its policy ramifications were unclear, its political effect was not. Privatization
was thrust into the spotlight as a possible solution to an allegedly overbearing and
inefficient national government. No longer did the debate involve simply nuts and bolts
service delivery questions. Now it was a political and ideological war fought by those
aiming to reduce government.
Ibid., 236.
1
9
This phenomenon is explored in chapter three.
'
^Jeffrey D. Greene, “How Much Privatization? A Research Note Examining the Use of Privatization by
Cities in 1982 and \992," Policy Studies Journal 24 (1996): 634.
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The privatization movement seemed to find the perfect president tvith whom to
work in the person of Ronald Reagan. In 1981, the newly inaugurated president stood on
the United States Capitol steps and proclaimed that “Government is not the solution to
our problem. Government is the problem.>"4 The moment represented an exhilarating
victory for the conservatives who had been in political exile three decades before.
Reagan had articulated his campaign message as well as any candidate for the nation’s
highest office ever had, and that message was bedrock conservative. His nomination
acceptance speech at the 1980 Republican convention sounded in part as if it had been
composed by Hayek or Mises: “Government is never more dangerous than when our
desire to have it help us blinds us to its great power to harm us.”>5
Reagan’s devotion to the anti-government cause naturally led him to appoint in
office a great many people from within and outside the academy who shared his vision.
None would have more influence on the privatization debate than Health and Human
Services appointee E.S. Savas. Like Reagan, Savas had been arguing for government
reduction for years. As early as 1971, Savas had appeared in the mainstream Harper’s
Magazine with a piece excoriating most local governments as places where “staffs are
automatically tempted to exercise...monopoly power for their own parochial advantages”
and where “instead of a merit system, there is a seniority system. Promotions occur
incestuously from within, based on examinations that attempt but fail to measure
performance.’’^^
Savas ’s scholarly breakthrough came with Privatizing the Public Sector: How to
Shrink the Government. The title said it all. This was not a book about having the private
sector take over a few marginal governmental duties in the name of efficiency. This was
^
^Ronald Reagan, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
General Printing Office, 1 982), 1
.
^
^“Reagan: Time To Recapture Our Destiny,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 38 (1980): 37B.
^
^E.S. Savas, “Municipal Monopoly,” Harper 's Magazine, December 1971, 54.
30
part of a broad, ideologically based effort to “reconside|r) the respective roles and
responsibilities of govern,,,ent, the individual, the fatnily, volunta^, associations, private
finns, and the marketplace.’’^ Privatization was no mere management technique. In
Savas’s mind, it was a way to “check the growth of government and to reduce
unwarranted and unwanted dependence on government,” thereby preventing a path in
winch “a large and powerful governn,cnt...displace[s] and swampls|...other institutions
hke family, church and voluntary group associations.”'* Like Reagan, Savas clearly did
not shrink from an ideological nght. But while Savas did not suffer from a deficiency of
conviction, he lacked political acumen. Like many others in the administration who
worked on this issue, he hurt the cause with a stridency that led many people to grow
iincomfortahle with the Reagan team’s seeming readiness to reduce government in policy
areas seen as needing public sector involvement.
ITie conservative ideologues’ failure led to a discussion in the middle of the
decade about how to mitigate the issue’s political weaknesses. The most prominent voice
on this score was another Reagan administration member, Stuart Butler, who left
government before writing Privatizing Federal Spending in 1985. Butler’s central
strategy was to beat the anti-privatization special interests at their own game by
encouraging those who would gain from the privatized area to lobby for the cause. His
proposal to privatize public lands, ignored by the administration he left, is illustrative of
his main argument. Instead of simply counting on the public to become convinced
eventually of privatization’s merits, Butler suggested giving land to environmental
groups. This would, in his view, satisfy them enough to keep them quiet and perhaps
even get them to lobby for privatization, enabling policymakers to deal with the rest of
the land in the most economically efficient way.
1
7
Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector, 6.
«Ibid.,4.
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Butler’s book did not make as much of a splash as Savas’s, but it was significant
in that it was one of the first from a conservative viewpoint to recognize that the
argument for privatization, no matter how sound or well-intentioned, will die on the vine
unless it is nurtured politically. TTie Reagan administration could well have listened to
Butler more since it never was able to sell privatization in any meaningful way. While
the administration was far from politically smooth in its privatization efforts, the larger
reason for the policy’s political failure lay in people’s ultimate reluctance to have
government reduce its presence. As we will see In chapter four, the Reagan team’s
political skills were wanting on the issue of privatizing public lands. This was a primary
target for Reagan, but people did not feel comfortable selling public lands to the highest
bidder.
Elivatization and the Progressive.s: A Partial Frbn
Public resistance to pursuing meaningful privatization suggested a new strategy
for privatizers. No longer would as much political and scholarly energy be expended
questioning government’s role. While this argument would remain a key part of
conservatism, it would be de-emphasized, and in its place would be an emphasis on
bemoaning the public sector’s inefficiencies. While this had been a part of the reasoning
of Reagan ideologues in the 1980s, drawn from it was a conclusion which was more
tailored to those from the middle and left of the political spectrum. The new thinking did
not question the value of government action in the abstract, but rather asserted that until
the public sector could curtail its wasteful and inefficient practices, privatization was one
of the strategies to ensure better management of taxpayer money.
Perhaps the most popular government management book of the 1990s,
Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming America by
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, asserts explicitly:
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Anwrica’s crisis of confidence in govennnent has lurned books aboiil nublicpolicy into a growlh indnsiry. Most deal with whM government should dl Thisbook IS d,fferenb..,ts snbject is not what they do, bu, how they operate We havenew goals, yes, but our governments cannot seem to achieve them. The centralfailure of government today is one of means, not ends."^^
Not only did this new emphasis on good management change the discussion from
the controversial notion that government was inherently harmful, it also recalled a classic
theme from twentieth century American political thought: government was in desperate
need of a sounder, more frugal management of taxpayer money. The privatization
movement is hardly the first time the government has been charged with inefficiency. For
example, Woodrow Wilson, Frederick Taylor, Theodore Roosevelt or almost any other
Progressive thinker one can name were all concerned with instilling better management
of time and money. To that end. Progressives saw much merit in employing outside
experts to provide efficient, nonpartisan, ethically run services. Samuel Hays captures the
flavor of Progress!vism well in his study of conservation policy during this era:
Since resource matters were basically technical in nature, conservationists argued
technicians rather than legislators, should deal with them... Pressure group action,’
logrolling in Congress, or partisan debate could not guarantee rational or scientific
decisions. Amid such jockeying for advantage with the resulting compromise,
concern for efficiency would disappear.20
Even after the Progressives’ political power had faded, the professed need for
better and more efficient management and the belief in the power of the expert to achieve
it never left public administration scholarship. It is tempting to recall the privatization
movement’s call for better management and more efficiency and then to assume that
^
^David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinvenling Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is
Transforming America (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1992), xxi.
^^Saniuel P. Mays, Conservation and the Gospel ofEfficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement,
1890-1920 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 3.
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privatization is a mere repeat of Progressivism. But there is a crucial difference between
the two movements regarding how to achieve these goals. Unlike Progressivism, the
recent movement equates efficiency with smaller, decentralized government. Limited
government and decentralized government have gone together for the privatization
movement from the star,. Drucker's primaiy reason for proposing privatization in his
landmark 1969 text was that centralized, bureaucratic institutions seemed to him to be
unable to deal with the challenges presented by the rapidly changing society. Similarly,
Vincent Ostrom, in the landmark The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration argued
vigorously against centralization: “Overlapping jurisdictions of widely different scales are
necessary conditions for maintaining a stable political order that can advance human
welfare under rapidly changing conditions.”2>
That reasoning would seem very strange to Progressives, whose response to their
quickly changing world was the centralized administration so feared by many today.
Few, for example, would call Progressive Tlieodore Roosevelt an advocate of
decentralized government. “The betterment which we seek must be accomplished,”
Roosevelt consistently argued, “mainly through the national government . ”22 For
Roosevelt and most other Progressives, it was the business world just as much as narrow
partisanship that was corrupting American life, a point most privatizers would
undoubtedly contest. It is almost impossible to imagine Richard Comuelle, Ronald
Reagan or E.S. Savas writing as Lincoln Steffens did in the Progressive tract The Shame
ofthe Cities^ The commercial spirit is the spirit of profit, not patriotism; of credit, not
humor; of individual gain, not national prosperity; of trade and dickering, not
21 •
Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of
Alabama Press, 1973), 99.
22
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism (New York: The Outlook Company, 1910), 27-8.
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principle.-’^s The respective values of politics and business are different, many
Progressives felt, and thus an efficient and centralized govenrmental burearreraey was the
polity s best hope for achieving justice.
The Idea that American governmental bureaucracy can be a positive actor in
citizens’ lives began with the Progressives and stayed with the study of government well
after the Progressives had peaked. The rise of anti-government scholarship makes it easy
to overlook the century long academic tradition of acceptance and admiration of
governmental administration. Leonard D. White, for example, was a Republican, but his
work reflected a deep respect for civil servants. No one lacking genuine admiration for
the government official would write, “The primary value of a high prestige attaching to
public employment is that it predisposes young men and women of the greatest promise
to seek a permanent connection in government circles.”^-' White’s words seem even more
antiquated when he writes, “The fact that college graduates looking forward to public
employment commonly turn their eyes to the federal government is a recognition of the
relatively high prestige enjoyed by it compared with city or state positions.’’“
This belief in government among many scholars was given new impetus when the
national government grew in power in response to what most felt to be the genuine need
growing from the Great Depression and World War n. The enlarged national government
presence was a catalyst for a vigorous expansion in public administration programs and,
more importantly, an awareness that the public administrator was a significant political
actor who should be viewed as a legitimate part of the democratic political process.^
23 •
Lincoln Steffens, The Shame ofthe Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips and Company, 1902), 7.
Leonard D. White, Further Contributions to the Prestige Value ofPublic Employment (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1932), 87.
25ibid.
^”See, for example, Appleby, Policy and Administration.
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Well into the 1960s. the notion that government, if managed effectively, could be a
powerful source of positive and even noble action on behalf of its citizenry won over
most students of government.
Leaving the
During the last 30 years, there has been a major philosophical movement away
from the Progressive faith in bureaucratic government. Its source comes from the great
call for economic efficiency that has occurred during that time. Public choice theory,
unquestionably the intellectual cornerstone of the privatization movement, has at its core
the assumption that government has proven to be an inefficient and self-serving guardian
of people’s interests. This observation, combined with the privatizers’ belief in the
natural superiority of the free market, has led followers of public choice theory to seek
out the private sector for delivery of many programs and services.
The public choice movement is in great contrast to theories which see
policymakers as concerned with the public interest. Bureaucrats, the public choice
ideology goes, are only concerned with their own self-interest, and so will pursue a bigger
agency budget any way they can, including squandering resources so they can justify
having to obtain more. They are able to get away with this behavior not only because
they have expertise in the given policy area, but also due to politicians’ interest in not
upsetting the constituencies who have come to depend upon the given funding or
service.2'7
Another key part of the public choice philosophy is offered by Mancur Olson,
who, in his landmark work The Logic ofCollective Action, asserted that interest groups
can successfully demand ever growing slices of the budgetary pie because of the
27 • •William A. Niskanen Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Inc.,
1971 ).
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phenomenon of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.2* A given interest is willing to
make great sacrifices to obtain the policy outcome it wants. An individual citizen, by
contrast, will rarely feel enough of an economic pinch to take action against that
interest.29 This enables well organized interests to carry the political day, even if they are
far from being in the majority. A perfect illustration of such logic is by E.S. Savas:
bigger the government, the greater the force for even bigger government.
Budgets will expand, resultmg m the appointment of more officials and the hiring
of more workers. These will go to work at once to enlarge their budgets, do less
work hire still more workers, obtain better-than-average raises, and vote for more
spending programs, while encouraging their constituencies and beneficiaries to do
the same. The forecast seems ominous: Sooner or later everyone will be working
for govemment.30 ^
The political alliance, or “iron triangle” between bureaucrats, interest groups, and
politicians, was widely discussed in the late 1950s and early 1960s,3i and William
Niskanen wrote as early as 1971 that perhaps competition was one of the remedies to stop
it. Niskanen was speaking primarily of agencies competing with each other, rather than
with the private sector, but the principle behind public choice theory has been the same
ever since: whether it is through a contract with government that must be renewed or
28Mancur Olson, The Logic ofCollective Action: Public Goods and the Theory ofGroups (Canibridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
^^Some other scholars have discussed and expanded upon this phenomenon. See, for example, William
Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory ofDemocracy and the Theory of
Social Choice (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982) and Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before
Congress (1929; reprint New York: Russell and Russell, 1967).
^^Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector, 25-6.
^^This symbiotic relationship was first discussed by Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the
Public Interest (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1 936). Many of the people who articulated the iron triangle
theory during the period of its greatest influence (the late 1950s to the early 1970s) came fi-om the liberal
part of the political spectrum. See for example Douglass Cater, Power in Washington (New York: Vintage
Books, 1964.) Ironically, the theory has since been used by public choice theorists to support what most
would call conservative political causes. This is a good example of the fact that over the last thirty years,
even though each critique is devoted to different failures, liberals have often helped the conservative cause
by being almost as willing as those from the right to criticize government.
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through competition with other potential providers, an organization will be compelled to
provide efficient, quality service only if it is continually at risk of losing its money source
Few would entirely disagree with the goal of efficiency, but no school holds it on
a higher pedestal than public choice theory. Economist William Niskanen summarized
the primary objective of public choice theorists when he wrote, "The primary purpose of
analysis and better accounts is to identify more efficient combinations of production
processes for the same public service.”3^ For public choice theory and the privatization
movement that stems from it, efficiency has been the primary criterion by which an
organization’s work is to be judged. At bottom, then, the argument for privatization
revolves around a simple series of assertions: economics is the basis for decisions made
in the business sector, politics is behind most ofwhat happens in the public sector, and
economics has proven to be the more efficient and rational of the two.33 Rational
decision making, it is asserted, is the test of an efficient organization and efficiency is the
test of good provision of services to the public.
The New Public Administration Movement
Public choice theory, largely a product of thinkers who align themselves with the
political right, has been far and away the primary catalyst for the increasing suspicion
toward bureaucracy within the academy. One should not assume, however, that all of
government’s critics have been politically conservative. Another school, the New Public
Administration (NPA) movement, was much less influential than public choice theory,
but no less vociferous in some of its attacks on government bureaucracy.
While there had been other strands of scholarship during the twentieth century
which did not view government officials through rose colored glasses, many of those
19
Emphasis added. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, 209.
^^One of the best examples of this philosophy is found in Mises, Bureaucracy.
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movements still saw government as a beacon of hope to all those seeking redress. Tire
behavioral revolution, for example, had at its foundation a belief that government was
just another political actor, no more motivated by the public good than any other, and thus
worthy of our attention only in the context of studying the political process. But along
with that view was the expectation that government responds to those in need. One of the
best known studies of interest group behavior, The Governmental Process by David
Truman, was an argument against what Truman referred to as the “uncontrolled anger” of
those who “view with alarm the threats to the international security and internal stability
of the American system”34 that allegedly resulted from interest group activity. In
Truman’s mind, latent interests formed naturally, petitioned the government and more
often than not, had their concerns addressed.
The belief that those truly in need were being helped by government was
dismissed m the late 1960s in a scathing critique of bureaucracy which arose from the
political left in the form of the NPA movement. Government was excoriated as “a key
medium through which the middle class maintains its advantaged position vis a vis the
lower class.. .serv[ing]to maintain and reinforce patterns that are associated with the
culture of poverty.”35 In the definitive NPA text, Toward a New Public Administration,
movement founder H. George Frederickson, outlined this school of thought’s viewpoint:
Pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favor of established stable
bureaucracies and their specialized minority clientele...and against those
minorities who lack political and economic resources. The continuation of
widespread unemployment, poverty, disease, ignorance, and hopelessness is the
^^David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf Inc., 1951), 12, 528.
^
^Gideon Sjoberg et al., “Bureaucracy and the Lower Class,” Sociology and Social Research 50 (1966):
325. See also Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas ofthe Individual in Public Services
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), and Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the
Poor: The Functions ofPublic Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971).
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result. I his condition is morally reprehensible and if left
fundamental, if long-range, threat to the viability of this
system.36
unchanged constitutes
or any other political
a
NPA advocates were of the belief that government had not only failed us, but had
been overbearing in the process, “relying explicitly on coercive hierarchical control.-tt
Just as had occurred with public choice theory, the conviction held by NPA scholars that
the national government had become coercive led to calls for decentralization.
Frederickson summarized the NPA’s organizational philosophy in a 1997 retrospective as
“decentralization, flatter hierarchies, funding projects, contracting out and systems of
co-production or public-private partnerships.”3s
By itself, this quote resembles public choice theory to the letter. Crucial to
understanding the NPA movement, however, is an awareness of the difference in the kind
of decentralization advocated. Public choice theory sought to decentralize the
government almost out of operation, leaving the public sector to handle only the most
inherently governmental functions. But when the NPA movement spoke of control by
private entities, it more often than not meant putting power into the hands of ordinary
citizens, with a vigorous and capable public administration intact.
The hope among the NPA school is that the interaction between a younger, more
progressive class of administrators and the people they are serving will add more
normative values such as social equity to the list of primary governmental goals. This
would not only begin to help those whose concerns were previously ignored by
government, but would give public administration a renewed relevance to political
George Frederickson, “Toward a New Public Administration,” in Frank Marini, ed.. Toward a New
Public Administration: The Minnowhrook Perspective (Scranton, Penn.: Chandler Publishing Company,
1971),311.
^7Mary Timney Bailey and Richard T. Mayer, Public Management in an Interconnected World: Essays in
the Minnowbrook Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 133.
George Frederickson, “Comparing the Reinventing Government Movement with the New Public
Administration,” Public Administration Review 56, no. 3 (1996): 267.
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scientists and young college graduates more of an incentive to consider a career in
government service - NPA’s ultimate vision, a respected class of public administrators
bearing much discretion to cany out progressive policies on behalf of an engaged
citizenry, could not be more different than the future the public choice school imagined.
Unlike the NPA movement, public choice theoiy held that government was
mheremly inefficient and self-seeking and thus could never be reformed in a way that
could earn citizens’ trust. One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that in the
process of describing the problem, the NPA rhetoric came close to echoing the public
choice school on the Right. The other primary founder of the NPA school, Frank Marini,
described one of the assertions made by some of the participants at a landmark NPA
conference tn 1968: “A sort of goal displacement was typical of public organizations,
with the perpetuation of the organization assuming a more important position than
performing the chent-onented functions for which many public organizations had been
created.”"® Though they probably would have felt out of place ideologically at the
conference, William Niskanen or E.S. Savas could have just as easily made that assertion.
The NPA movement disappeared from the radar screen before it could address the
contradictions in its philosophy. It is possible that the tension between calling for more
active government and castigating it at almost every turn might have been resolved over
time. But before that could happen, the NPA school’s chief contribution was to obscure
the difference in its long-term goals from that of public choice theoiy by echoing the
3nti
-government sentiments of their colleagues on the Right, thus giving any interested
observer all the more reason to distrust government.
39The 1 962 Committee on Political Science as a Discipline did not include public administration as one of
political science’s subfields, and, in 1967, public administration was no longer an organizing category at the
annual American Political Science Association meeting. See Ralph Chandler and Jack Plano, Public
Administration Dictionary: Second Edition (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1988), 25-6.
^^Marini, Toward a New Public Administration, 352.
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IMArRuments Public rhmVp
Antigoverament theories rose steadily in popularity among the Right and Left
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The criticism ofgovernment coming from the Left went
largely uncontested, since those from the other side of the political aisle were not prone to
defend government. Just as significantly, those who still believed in government failed to
enunciate a clear, coherent theory around which to unite, causing scholars like Robert
Reich to wonder whether a “new public philosophy” could be found against consemtism
that was at once adequate to reality and emotionally compelling.’’^!
No school has successfully rallied government’s supporters around a theory
encouraging a rebirth of trust in bureaucracy. But no one should assume that there have
not been some thinkers who have tried. Some scholars, in fact, have directly challenged
the most basic assumptions of public choice thinkers. One of the public choice tenets
particularly relevant to this study that has been vigorously criticized is the notion that
privatization is a pathway toward giving citizens more control over government. In Down
from Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity ofPrivatization and Empowerment, Joel Handler
warns readers not to be fooled: privatization is not the objective managerial panacea or
the neutral, scientific quest for efficiency it is sometimes portrayed to be. It is, in his
view, an exercise in hardball politics that has at its core a struggle for power and
resources between the relevant interest groups and stakeholders.
What is especially distressing to Handler is that the struggle takes place among
actors with unequal resources and that privatization worsens such inequities by radically
decentralizing service delivery. Such arrangements have been defended by some
scholars. For example, Vincent Ostrom argues that providing taxpayers with a wide
variety of potential public and private sector providers would yield efficiency in
41 Robert Reich, “Toward a New Public Philosophy,” Atlantic Monthly, May 1 985, 79.
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govem^en, and empowennen. for .he ci.ize„ry« is Handler's belief, Urough, ,ha. such
a mynad of overlapping constituencies is confusing and alienating to those who lack the
resources to negotiate them. Although he is no. the only person to note the connection
between overlapping service delivery entities and citizen disillusionment,43 Handler is
one of the more eloquent a. picking apart some of the central assumptions of the public
choice school.
Some scholars have gone even further than Handler by boldly embracing
government and encouraging others to do the same. John Rohr, Charles Goodsell, Gary
Wamsley and others surmised the problem not to be an inefficient bureaucracy, but rather
an unrespected one. “If direct performance measures can be accepted at face value,”
Charles Goodsell wrote in his polemic The Casefor Bureaucracy, “several of these
measures reveal surprisingly high proportions of success. Unmistakably, the indicators
we have say that bureaucracy works most of the time.”^^ Not only was an active
bureaucracy believed by some to be underrated, it was viewed by many as essential in
addressing the problems of the modem day. One group of scholars in the early 1980s
released “The Blacksburg Manifesto,” a piece that argued that “our political dialogue
must shift from whether’ there ought to be a public administration to what the role of the
Public Administration and the Public Administrator should be.”45 Not surprisingly, these
scholars did not completely turn back the tide toward a scholarship fi'iendlier to
"^^Vincent Ostrom, Intellectual Crisis.
Clinton administration Office of Management and Budget Director Alice Rivlin argues strongly for
greater delineation in policy responsibilities between the federal and state governments, one primary reason
being her belief that “the blurring of state and federal roles contributes to cynicism about politics.” Alice
M. Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream, The Economy, the States and the Federal Government
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), 16.
,
The Casefor Bureaucracy, 1 40.
^^Gary Wamsley et al., “Public Administration and the Governance Process: Shifting the Public Dialogue,”
in Gary Wamsley et al.. Refounding Public Administration (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), 51.
(Washington
^^Goodsell.
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goven^en,. Bu. they did receive a substantial amount of attention and, perhaps
importantly, tried to give their pro-govemment side the coherent message it had
lacked.
most
long
k There A Public Tnterp^t*^
The arguments of those opposed to public choice theoiy are reminders that the
objections to privatization have gone beyond the nuts and bolts variety to extend to the
ideological and philosophical. Steven Rathgeb Smith has gone so far as to state,
’’Privatization is at the center of the ongoing debate on the shape of the state and the
proper boundaries between the individual, the community, and the state.”« One of the
more important philosophical questions surrounding the privatization debate is whether
there is something special and even noble about the public and the public interest. For
those who feel that there should be a notion present in the polity of a “public interest’’ or
common good, the loss of a commitment to the common good is the terrible price that
privatization extracts. To believe otherwise, according to this school, is to deny the
historical differentiation between public and private. Aristotle wrote that “man is by
nature an animal intended to live in a polis. He who is without a polis...is either a poor
sort of being, or a being higher than man.’’« The idea that public institutions are where
you develop virtue and search for the common good has been carried forth to the modem
day.
One of the more interesting understandings of the “public interest” is in Alexis de
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. One could point to isolated passages of
Democracy in America, Tocqueville’s most famous work, and dismiss the book as simply
Steven Rathgeb Smith, review of The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means, by John
Donahue, Political Science Quarterly 1 06 ( 1 99 1 ): 1 75.
"^^Aristotle, “The Theory of the Household,” in The Politics ofAristotle, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1 946), 5.
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the nostalgic writings of an apologist for the status quo. But such a conclusion ignores
Tocqueville’s genuine concern with the public interest. It is certainly true that stability is
essential to Tocqueville's philosophy. He complains in Democracy in America that the
language of the democratic age “is in as much confusion as society” and refers with
disdain to the “disease” of instability in American industry.^ But his interest in stability
only scratches the surface of what are his primary concerns.
The democratic age seems to offer a great deal of stability in many important
respects. The problem for Tocqueville lies in the sources and kinds of stability present, as
he believes many of them to be injurious to the public interest. For example, materialism,
according to Tocqueville, is a natural byproduct of a democratic system, and thus leads to
stability. Someone making money from the system in place will not be anxious to
overturn it. Despite its being a force for the status quo, however, Tocqueville is bothered
greatly by materialism, fearing that the challenge of achieving prosperity and enjoying its
monetary rewards may cause people to be apathetic toward the public interest. If that
happens, the conditions are ripe for a leader to emerge who promises prosperity provided
he receives authority unencumbered by democratic procedures. A society would then be
destined to undergo the centralization of governmental power Tocqueville fears. It is
clear, then, that Tocqueville values the notion of a public interest immensely, and all his
fears of the democratic age are driven by that concern. It is a concern that philosophers
from Augustine to Machiavelli to Rousseau to Montesquieu have shared. Given that
philosophical and historical understanding, supporters of the public interest concept ask,
why should we now assume that the terms “private“ and “public” are neutral and that one
could be substituted for another?
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Tl,e answer ,o ,ha, question in the minds of those on the other side is that the
concept of a public interest agreed to by political actors with the counby's best interest at
head ,s an
.llus.on, and. some would say, a dangerous one a, that. Utilitarian thinkers
such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mil, believed that commtmity welfare is simply
the sum of mterests ofanyone in the polity. Bentham is best known for the utility
principle, which held that “an action may be said to be conformable to the principle of
u,ihty...when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater
than any it has to diminish it.”« while the greatest amount of happiness could well be
produced at the expense of an unfortunate few, Bentham believes that it is not the place
of government to intervene on behalfof a suffering minority. As one scholar put it, his
primaty interest was in “a removal of hindrances to the increase of the happiness of the
greatest possible number of citizens.” not in “what would generally be thought of as
positive interference with the freedom of the individual.”5o
It is not surprising that Bentham advocates policy decisions made as much as
possible through majority rule. In his view, government is a collection of individuals
who, hke eveiyone else, are out for their own happiness. The state, therefore, rather than
being trusted to be a positive presence in people’s lives, should be a political cash register
whtch records people’s demands, crunches the numbers, and issues a policy decision
based solely on a happiness quotient. Like most philosophical movements, utilitarianism
is not monolithic. Not every utilitarian would argue as vigorously as Bentham against the
tdea of a common good. However, essential to utilitarian thought is the belief that
government action should always be viewed with a suspicious eye, as utilitarians tend to
reject abstract notions of the common good, suspicious of their vague claims.
"^^Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles and Morals ofLegislation, ed. Laurence LaFleur
^New York; Hafner Publishing Company, 1948), 3.
Frederick Copleston, A History ofPhilosophy, vol. 8 (Paramus, N.J.; Newman Press, 1966), 14-5.
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Some theorists who have questioned the notion of a public interest feel that any
attempt to define such a concept is not only difficult (a point on which most would agree)
but also unwise and even dangerous. Henry David Thoreau, the nineteenth century
American transcendentalist. claimed that automatically supporting what others deem is
.he “public interest” stifles the radical individualism so central to his philosophy. “The
only obligation I have a right to assume ” Thoreau wrote in his famous essay “Civil
Disobedience,” “is to do at any time what I think right.”5i
For Thoreau, an attachment to anything other than one’s own conscience can
mean submission to immoral institutions such as slavery. Any plea from gove.mment that
a particular policy is in the public interest would carry no weight with Thoreau, for he has
little or no faith in the state to do what is wise (“Most governments are usually, and all
governments are sometimes, inexpedient.”) or what is moral (“The government itself is
equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it.”n).
Individual choice free from institutional constraint was Thoreau’s aim, and it is thus no
accident that in the last thirty years, as respect for institutions has declined, Thoreau has
become increasingly popular.
To some, philosophical debates about the notion of a public interest may seem
irrelevant to the daily political struggles surrounding privatization. One should
remember, however, the contrast between Thoreau’s unyielding lack of trust in
government and Aristotle’s adoration of public service. Those are two radically different
views, and they lead to an important point: the debate about whether a society should
consciously aim for the satisfaction of a public interest” often revolves around what the
privatization debate revolves around - i.e. the level of trust and respect felt for
government. If the state is, as Bentham and Thoreau believe, just one more collection of
Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience and Other Essays (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1993),
2 .
^^Ibid., 1.
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md,v.duals o«. for .heir own interest, however disguised in the language of a shared
larger good, then trusting then, to act in the public interest would be foolhardy and the
best solution may be to keep as many duties as possible in private hands. But if our
leaders are (or a. leas, may reasonably be held to be) genuinely interested in the welfare
of the populace and qualified to address those needs, plaeing more trust in the public
sector to do what is right is appropriate. No definitive proclamations can be made for
e.ther side, but it can be said with certainty that while privatization is very much a current
concern, it strikes at the hear, of debates that have been going on for centuries.
The Search for
Many participants in the privatization debate feel comfortable with a “practical
middle ground” that privatization is good policy if genuine competition occurs. John
Donahue, one of the better known spokesmen for this viewpoint, lays out definite
conditions under which successful privatization is more likely to occur: “The more
prectsely a task can be specified in advance and its performance evaluated after the fact,
the more certainly contractors can be made to compete...the stronger becomes the case for
employing profit seekers rather than civil servants.”53
Whether this is the correct view, most people, academics or not, now feel that if
the correct managerial conditions are met, the private sector has as much or more to
contribute to achieving policy goals than government. This position is intimidating even
to many of privatization’s most vehement opponents who, significantly, now often object
to privatization only on the grounds that it will not yield meaningful competition, leaving
aside the basic question of its merits.
53John Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic Books
1989), 79-80.
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One factor in privatization’s success has been the evolution in the conception of
privatization from ideological weapon to practical management tool. Even E.S. Savas,
who was the embodiment of the aggressive ideological approach taken by the Reagan
’
administration in the 1980s, softened his approach in his 2000 volume, going so far as to
include a section on the arguments against privatization.54
Despite the shift, one still has to wonder why, given the vast increase in
anti-government sentiment, privatization has only rarely been a significant part of the
national governmental agenda. We will see in the next chapter that the answer lies in
people’s ambivalence about how much they like government action. Citizens do not
know whether to believe Rohr or Drucker, Goodsell or Savas, Reagan or Roosevelt.
Privatization’s supporters respond to people’s contradictory feelings by steering dialogue
away from politically dangerous subjects like government reduction and toward safer
topics like greater management efficiency. While Reagan emphasized the former goal
and got almost nowhere with privatization, Clinton put his focus on the latter and
achieved much of what he wanted on the issue.
Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000).
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CHAPTER 3
PRIVATIZATION’S POLITICAL ROOTS
The evolution toward privatization in the academy has been matched by several
political and societal trends that have compelled almost evety part of the political
spectrum to become more suspicious and cynical about government and thus more
willing to embrace its reduction. Politics and scholarship favorable to privatization have
had an undeniable impact, as the last thirty years have seen the private sector increasingly
viewed as a superior service provider to a degree one could not have imagined just a few
decades ago. Nevertheless, there do seem to be limits to what the public will tolerate
exposing to the vagaries of the business world. The one major privatization idea
proposed by George W. Bush early in his administration, the partial privatization of social
security, was the subject of fierce political attack, so much so that President Bush has
remained largely silent early in his term. A president considered by most to have taken a
markedly aggressive conservative approach during his first few months in office merely
appointed a commission when it came to the social security issue, an indicator of the
controversy his administration feared would result from a proposal to privatize.
The case studies of privatization efforts during the Reagan and Clinton years will
give us a better understanding ofwhy Americans have only stuck a toe in the
privatization waters despite the fact that political, academic and social factors seem to
indicate they would dive in. But before our exploration into the Reagan and Clinton
efforts, it is first important to understand fully what have been the factors behind
privatization’s rise outside the academy.
The privatization phenomenon, an anti-state movement, seems to be rooted in the
great increase in governmental responsibilities which has occurred in the twentieth
century. If the first response to vastly enlarged social and economic responsibilities was
to develop the modem American “state,” notably a governmental bureaucracy, the second
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seems to be devolution of state responsibilities to “private” organizations. Perhaps no
development in the national government this centu^ is more significant than growth in its
stze. ftmcfions, services and power over citizens. Louis Galambos informs us that during
the nineteenth century, the national government
“performed only a narrow range of
ftrnctions; it collected veo- little income and employed a minuscule percentage of the
work force.”' It was not until the Great Depression of the 1930’s that the national
government took a proactive role in the economic health of its citizens. Since then each
decade has brought with it new challenges to which the national government felt
compelled to respond. World War II. the Cold War, the civil rights movement and many
other events in the last sixty years have all given the national government more to do. As
a percentage of the gross domestic product, spending by the national government grew
from 3.4% in 1930 to 22.9% in 1 985,^ even though that year was the midpoint of a vety
conservative administration.
As noted m chapter one, this expansion of governmental responsibilities
combined with the technology age has necessitated the public sector having to turn to the
business world more for production of goods and services. But the ramifications of
government expansion have gone beyond the practical into the political and ideological.
Governmental growth has led to a great fear of its overexpansion, and policymakers often
believe that turning duties over to the private sector will result in better, cheaper delivery
of services. We have seen that this theory has gained greater acceptance in the last thirty
years in academic circles. Yet to be explored, however, are the many elements of public
opinion which help to make privatization a politically wise option.
^ Louis Galambos, The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies Since World War II (Baltimore-
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 987), 6.
By 1999, this figure had gone below 19 percent for the first time since 1974. Executive Office of the
President of the United States, Historical Tables: Budget ofthe United States Government, FY200I
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000).
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Inefficiency: The I
Many elements of public opinion suggest a predisposition to depend on the private
sector for deliver, of goods and services. Over the years, Americans have consistently
expressed great admiration for the free enterprise system. One poll done every year from
1975 to 1983, for example, found over 90% consistently agreeing that “we must be ready
to make sacrifices if necessary to preserve the free ente^rrise system,“3 and there has been
no sign of this admiration changing.
Partially because Americans hold capitalism in such high regard, they often feel
more comfortable with the private sector administering government programs. But it is
not an unqualified admiration of the business world that causes many people to choose
the private sector over the public for the delivery of services. In fact, many who like
capitalism are not nearly so taken with business as an institution, especially large
corporations. Small businesses remain the embodiment of the kind of capitalism
Americans hold dear. 59% in one 2000 poll expressed either “a great deal or quite a bit
of confidence” in “small business” and an additional 27% had at least “some
confidence.”^ By contrast, in a periodic survey from 1973 to 1999 assessing people’s
confidence m a variety of American institutions, “big business” always finished among
the bottom, with only 20-30% saying they had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of
confidence in it.^
Despite all the negative feelings about big business there still seems to be a
widespread belief that the private sector can better perform public services than
government can. In 1981 Ralph Kramer wrote, “The public more readily accepts
3 • •Cited in Seymour Lipset 3nd William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor and Government
in the Public Mind (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987X 285.
'^NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, Conn, [www.ropercenter.uconn.edu]
^George Gallup Jr., Gallup Poll Monthly 383 (1997): 24.
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government funding and standard setting if nongovernmental organizations deliver the
public goods and services,- and that sentiment has not changed significantly among the
public since that time. A large reason is the tremendous cynicism and suspicion prevalent
among overwhelming numbers of the population about government’s ability to act with
any semblance of efficiency.
Businesses are often perceived as being less hampered by regulations and civil
service rules that hurt entrepreneurial spirit, able to pay lower wages and benefits, and
generally more cognizant of a “bottom line” that compels them either to be efficient or
cease to exist. By contrast, it is believed that government has no similar incentive, and in
fact, has a motivation to be inefficient, since that will bring more money to an agency.
Surveys consistently reveal a decisive lack of confidence in governmental efficiency. An
overwhelming 80% in one 1996 poll described the government as “wasteft.1 and
inefficient,”7 and the number in a semiannual poll saying that “people in government
waste a lot of tax money” rose from 43% in 1958 to 61% forty years later, reaching a high
of 78% m 1980.* It is little wonder, given those numbers, that the private sector is often
seen as the better choice for program administration and service delivery.
This general lack of faith in governmental efficiency (many would see that as a
contradiction in terms) is bad news for government in an age in which public policy
problems are increasingly seen as being questions which can be solved simply by
administering government with more efficiency. No public figure embodied this idea
more in the last decade than presidential candidate Ross Perot. A self-made millionaire
^Ralph Kramer, Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press
1981), 73.
^Richard Morin and Dan Gelz, “Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and Institutions,” Washington Post,
28 January 1996, sec. A, p. 1.
Umversity of Michigan National Election Studies, online database, table 5A.3. [www.umich.edu/~nes/]
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from Texas, Pero, used his own brand of homespun rhetoric to advocate the use of what
he felt to be “common sense” approaches to policy problems which would use objectivity
and efficiency as guides.
Good management without concern for politics (because the answers to
management questions were, in his view, beyond debate) was for Perot the key to
effective government. Perot's words from his closing statement in one of the 1992
presidential debates captured his philosophy well:
If the Aniencan people want to do it and not talk about it, then I’m one personhey ou^t to consider. If they Just want to keep slow dancing and talk about itnd not do it, I m not your man. 1 am results oriented. I am action oriented. Ibuilt my businesses getting things done in two months that
ten months to do.^
my competitors took
Perot s rather eccentric behavior caught up with his presidential candidacy. But his
fervent belief that getting government away from the politicians and in the hands of
experts in order to run it like a business struck a resonant chord with many voters,
enabling Perot to receive 19% of the vote in 1992, an impressive total for any United
States third party presidential candidate.io In this “age of the ascendancy of the expert
and.. .decline of the traditional politician as chief architect of policy,”” there is a
corresponding move toward criteria in evaluating policy which emphasizes values
traditionally more associated with the private sector, such as efficiency, productivity and
rationality. What better way to run a government than to move away from what many
^William J. Clinton, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1993), 1843.
^
^Rhodes Cook, “Clinton Picks the GOP Lock on the Electoral College,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 50(1992): 3549.
^
^ Bruce L.R. Smith, New Political Economy, 38.
^
^Gordon, Public Administration, 528. As Gordon notes, those are three key values represented in
Frederick Taylor’s work that are representative of the Progressive Era.
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the perfect instrument to fulfilling that vision.
Ironically, in an age in which scientific inquiry is looked upon positively as a
process .ha, helps se. us free from politically motivated decisions, people also like instant
aeon. But what is often no. realized by those who advocate quicker action is that the
very structure of our govenrmen, makes that extremely difficult to achieve. Since the
United States Constitution is designed specifically to prevent people in power from acting
with undue haste, the public sector has and always will have a difficult time responding to
citizens’ frustration at government’s pace. However much the public distrusts
corporations, they are a, leas, free of government’s commitment to separation of powers,
checks and balances, federalism and similar constitutional elements that seem ill suited to
fostering the sort of efficiency claimed for the business world.
Public Suspicion of Govemm(;‘nf
In 1 974, Arthur Miller wrote of a distrust of government among Americans that
greatly increased “the potential for revolutionary alteration of the political and social
system.”'3 Although right-wing militia groups who frequently advocate the overthrow of
the United States government have Increasingly made the news in the last decade, there is
little sentiment for a radical change of our political system among the general public. In
one 1987 poll, more than 9 out of 1 0 respondents agreed that “whatever its faults may be,
the American form of government is still the best for us,”>4 and 68% in an early 2001
1
3
Arthur Miller, “Political Issues and Trust in Government;' American Political Science Review 68 H974V
951-72.
Stephen Craig, The Malevolent Leaders: Popular Discontent in America (Qoulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1993), 3-4.
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survey pronounced themselves either “very or somewhat satisfied" with our system of
government, .5 a solid number considering the poll was taken a month after an extremely
divisive presidential election which put key parts of the Constitution in the spotlight.
Despite their sanguine attitude about the basic constitutional order, however,
Americans tend to be highly cynical about the government that works within that system.
In 1981, conservative columnist George Will warned against “indiscriminate skepticism
about the competence, even the motives of government,” assuming that “government
cannot do anything right anyway.-^ Today, people are if anything more cynical about
government’s motives and the results of its work. Indeed, the change occurring in the last
forty years m the confidence Americans have in government is striking. In 1964, 76%
agreed that “you can tnist the government to do the right thing just about always (or) most
of the time.” By 1995, the percentage expressing that sentiment had plummeted to
40%. 17
Manifestations of the great distrust felt by many toward government are
everywhere m our culture. As one political observer has noted, “From the Leno and
Letterman monologues to...the titles ofnew books like Tell Newt to Shut Up!’ by two
Washington Post writers... cynicism about politics descends on the public like a fog.”i8
Many popular movies from the 1990’s have had a distinctively anti-government
viewpoint. Popular films such as JFK, Clear and Present Danger and Independence Day
featured a government conspiracy as a key part of their respective stories. TTiis
anti-government slant has even been present in more lighthearted fare. The comedy Dave
featured Kevin Kline as an average man succeeding when he is forced to play the
president, the message being that a lack of experience, far from being harmful to one’s
j
^Gallup Organization, Princeton, N.J. [www.gallup.eom/poll/releases/pr010202asp]
“GOP Finds Fed Not All Bad,” Bloomington Pantograph, 26 March 1981, sec. A, p. 10. Cited in
Gordon, Public Administration, 531.
17 -
'University of Michigan National Election Studies, table 5A.1.
'^Peter S. Canellos, “A Disdain for Politics Becomes Political Vogue,” Boston Globe, 9 October 1996 sec
A, p. 1.
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chances of achievement in government, enhances them because
corrupt ways of the nation’s capitol. By contrast, with occasional
one is not tainted by the
exceptions like the
1 990s TV hit The West Wing, it would be difficult to find corresponding elements of
popular culture which convey respect or affection for government. Whether popular
culture reflects or shapes public attitudes, it seems reasonable to presume some harmony
between the two when both distrust government.
Causes of Decline in Government’^; Popnian'ty
The two most common complaints about government are that the people in it
frequently act dishonestly and, when its intentions are good, it is too poorly managed to
make a positive difference anyway. What has left many citizens so convinced that
government cannot handle efficiently the tasks it is given? The causes are many.
Certainly, the United States is not the only country which has experienced a decline of
respect for its government. Britain, for example, experienced some of the same public
opinion trends during the 1980’s and privatized extensively during that time. It is also
significant that one of the largest “big government” plans ever implemented, communism,
crumbled around the world during the last fifteen years.
While these recent global phenomena have affected public attitudes, some of the
most convincing explanations for the rise in public cynicism about government are based
on events in this country. In the last thirty years, we have witnessed the emergence of
what many refer to as the entitlement society.” The increased use of entitlements within
that tirne^^ has served to weaken govenmient in the public eye. Entitlements are usually
ftinded every year virtually automatically, and everyone meeting the criteria for the given
program receives its benefits. As citizens become used to the benefit, a “what-have-you-
^^For an exploration of the increased use of entitlements in the United States budget, see Aaron Wildavsky,
The New Politics ofthe Budgetary Process (Boston, Mass.: Scott, Foresman Publishers, 1988).
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small political benefit relative to the
atitude and thus only a
money spent .20 C'itizens also tend to resent strongly
any attempt to reduce such programs,
governmenfs prestige. John Logue’s
welfare state are relevant here, fogue
putting into place a political cycle harmful to the
comments about recent political problems of the
argues convincingly that the welfare state has been:
a victim o I S success, mil ofils failures. II has s.iceeeded in banishing llie sneclcr
lint h is'l
‘ 77“"r" disabililytami old agetha I a haun ed past generations. Dm the abolilion of the threat has aholished llmlc.ir I engendered. I he colleelivc nieniory is short; political allegiance is oHcnbased on pa.st wiongs, rarely on past achievements.”^'
I Ins lack ol laith in the welfare
.stale shows itself in the words and actions of both parlies.
Democratic l-residei,l Dill Clinton led a “New Deinocral” niovcineni thronghoiil the
1 9>)()s to move Ins parly away from its association with New Deal-style hiireancracy and
anti-busine.ss rhetoric.
Mo.st striking about the “entitlement society” and postindustrialist age is that
liberals are as willing as conservatives to criticize government when it is seen as not
delivering the service to which they feel entitled, (ioing along with this anger is a lack of
faith, felt by many across the ideological spectrum, that working through political
channels brings satisfactory policy results. One respon.se to this cynicism during the last
twenty-five years has been to try to remove politics from the process as much as possible
by setting in place legal machinery that is designed to bring the desired policy
automatically.
20An inlerc.sting cxaminalion ot a .similar plicnomcnoii in I'urope is .lohn I.ogiic and liric Fanliorn, Welfare
Slates in Hard Times: Problems, Policy and Politics in Denmark and Sweden (Kent, Ohio; Kent I’opiilar
I’re.s.s, 1982).
John fogue, ‘The Welfare State: Victim ofils Success,” Daedalus 108 (1979): 85. (’iled in Ralph M.
Kramer, Voluntary Agencies, 272.
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Three out of the ten planks in the OOP’s electorally successful 1994 “Contract
With America” platform contained calls for amendments to the United States
Constitution,^^ all reflecting a distrust of politicians. Those three planks (proposing
automatic congressional term limits, a presidential line-item veto and a balanced budget
amendment) were all ways of keeping decisions out of the hands of the politicians and
bureaucrats whom Americans hold in such scorn. In addition to futfher weakening public
confidence in government by sending the message that it cannot be trusted to manage its
own affa.rs, such behavior has the effect of taking control of policy outcomes out of the
hands of the people who are frequently held responsible for them.
Philip K. Howard’s The Death ofCommon Sense accepts reluctantly the seeming
inevitability of big government. (Howard laments, “We know in our hearts that any
reduction will occur at the edges.”«) But he complains that when the government acts,
judgment ts foreclosed by...the belief that judgment has no place in the application of
law.’’^-! Missing from Howard’s analysis is the fact that measures which force the
government to run on automatic pilot lend themselves to situations in which the
government will end up looking stupid because officials are forbidden to exercise what
many would view as proper discretion. Public administrators are thus caught in an
impossible bind, as they are at once asked to be rule-bound and impartial, while
exercising flexible common sense.
Increasing the criticism leveled at the government is the fact that the “monopoly
of expertise” government used to have regarding many policies is gone. In an age in
which information can be shared around the country instantly, policymakers who go
against the wishes of a given interest can be attacked quickly and vigorously, forcing
22Theodore Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, American Government: Freedom and Power (New York: W.W.
Norton and Co., 2000), 409.
^^Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America (New York: Random
House, 1994), 8.
2%id., 18.
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them ,0 spend a great deal of time defending their decisions through the tnany access
points ,n our political systenr. The ability of citizens to participate in virtually all aspects
of govemtnent has drastically increased in the last thirty years. While most Americans
see this development as positive, it does have an impact on opinion about government.-
The time spent by governmental policymaking bodies defending their actions makes the
process move more slowly, frustrating citizens further.
The suspicion and cynicism many feel about government turns into sheer anger
when people do not feel that politicians are held accountable for their failings. Elections,
the primary way to reward or punish public officials for their behavior, are increasingly
seen as being inconsequential.- Only 45% agreed that “elections mak(e) the government
pay a great deal of attention to what the people think” in 1998, a drop from 65% in
1964.27 Tills perceived lack of accountability led to calls within the last twenty-five years
for greater citizen input into the political process.28 Ironically, however, the increased
participation by people often makes it much harder for the government to get anything
done. As one example, with the cameras on, the atmosphere that fosters cooperation
among policymakers is greatly hindered, as politicians worry about the constituents
watching them. This hurts chances for the compromises that often need to take place for
substantive policy change to occur.
Regardless of the political dynamics that surround it, the calls for greater
participation are resounding, and, many would say, what more powerful form of
participation exists than privatization? Government can never be open enough to the
people for it to earn our trust, the argument goes, and so only the signals of the market
25A good discussion of the various effects of increased democracy is Douglas Yates, Bureaucratic
Democracy. The Searchfor Democracy and Efficiency in American Government (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1 982).
^^Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shelter, Politics by Other Means (New York: Random House, 1990).
^
'University of Michigan National Election Studies, table 5C.3.
^®Such disillusionment historically has resulted in calls for more democracy. See Samuel Huntington,
American Politics: The Promise ofDisharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981).
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will provide true accountability As early as 1975, a decade after the Great Society’s
emphasis on giving increased political and administrative control to community based
groups, Bruce Smith wrote, “A partly alternative approach to obtaining public
accountability from the modem public sector would discoun, poliUcal ans.erabiUfy in
favor ofcommercial or objecive criieriar^o The ability of privatizers to instill in many
citizens a preference for market mechanisms over political controls as the prefemed path
to accountability greatly furthered their political objectives.
The Role of the Media
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that there has been a tremendous
increase in government’s responsibilities during this century. As more citizens have
come to depend on the government for services, there have been a greater number of
failures in government policy (along with the successes), and a highly cynical media
increasingly tends to focus on government’s mistakes. The waste dump not cleaned, the
health care not provided, the child not fully educated are often portrayed as ftirther
evidence of the government’s incompetence.
This dynamic has become more politically potent within the last twenty five years
as the American media has grown more cynical, hostile, and suspicious of those in
government. Certainly, the experiences of Watergate and Vietnam, in which the press
and everyone else was lied to, served to greatly enhance the skepticism the press feels
toward anything said by those in government. One of the first discoveries of this dynamic
29This thesis has been challenged by some scholars. For example, some have asserted that the
decentralization of service delivery inherent to privatization makes for less accountability, as the presence
of many providers complicates the policy delivery system and that the ability to identify who to praise or
blame under such a system is severely diminished. See Joel Handler, Down From Bureaucracy: The
Ambiguity ofPrivatization and Empowerment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). There is
also a significant literature from the political left urging participation that, while antibureaucratic in general,
has a distinctly anti-corporate business tone. See, for example, Daniel Hellinger and Dennis Judd, The
Democratic Facade (Pacific Grove, Calif: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991).
^^Emphasis added. Bruce L.R. Smith, New Political Economy, 40.
61
in the political science literature was in 1976 when Michael Robinson noted that “the
electronic media's penchant for negativity,” its
“predilection for violence and conflict'
and its anti-institutionalism greatly increased cynicism among the American electorate.^'
(Robinson also noted a similar phenomenon regarding other media forms.) As one
columnist noted, “In the post-Watergate, post-everything gate [s/c] culture, no reporter
wishes to appear insufficiently prosecutorial.”32
This attitude is partially responsible for the plethora of scandals that occupy the
media daily to the point where, in the words of one scholar, reporters believe “it’s all a
scam, everyone is looking out for his own narrow interest and the job of the reporter is to
reveal the scam.”» Chicago magazine gives an annual “Big Onion Award for Greed,
Sloth and Exceptional Idiocy by the People Whose Salaries You Pay” while American
staple Readers ' Digest joked, “You know you’re a bureaucrat if you count pencils, know
your retirement date and favor many rules to control employees.”34 in the Progressive
Era, muckrakers” were ruthless in their attacks on the corrupt ways of both the public
and private sectors. The media’s appetite for scandal is still voracious, but now only
government is caught in the journalistic crosshairs.
Other Societal Forces Contributing to Privatization’s Appe^il
Negative media coverage, political infighting and recent historical events such as
Watergate all have contributed to a tremendous distrust of politics and politicians. The
percentage of respondents who agreed with the strong statement that “quite a few of the
people running the government are crooked” rose from 24% in 1958 to 41% in 1998,
31 *Michael J. Robinson, “Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: the Case of Selling
for the Pentagon," American Political Science Review 70 (1976): 428.
William Glaberson, “The New Press Criticism: News as the Enemy of Hope,” New York Times, 9
October 1994, sec. 7, p. 1.
33lbid.
Cheryl Simrell King and Camilla Stiers, Government is Us: Public Administration in an Anti-
Government Era (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1998), 4.
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gcng as high as 52% in , 994.3s ,he sa.e year
-ha, one United States Senate candidate
came w.th.n a few hundred votes of winning by running on a piatform of “a government
that does nothing”36 But it is important to realize that government is certainly not alone
m its fall from public grace. On survey after survey from the mid-1960’s to the
mid-l970’s. skepticism and cynicism soared regarding one institution after another, and
they have yet to recover the public's trust. Polling expert Daniel Yankelovich observed
in 1977, “Within a ten to fifteen-year period, trust in institutions has plunged down and
down, from an almost consensual majority, two thirds or more, to minority segments of
the American public.”33 In one annual survey done from 1974 to 1999, there was a drop
in public confidence over that period in the case of thirteen of sixteen institutions. Two
of the other three saw an increase of only two percentage points, the military being the
only exception. 38
Analysts point squarely at the late 1960’s as the time when American faith in
major institutions died,3i and the prevailing view that “none of our national policies work,
none of our institutions respond, [and] none of our political organizations succeed”« has
not changed. There are many reasons for the new-found anti-institutional mood, but
certainly one of the primary reasons is the public’s increased desire since the late 1960’s
to be free from constraints imposed by large organizations or authority of any kind. This
IS encouraged by today’s less hierarchical personnel arrangements and a post-industrial
age in which people are less likely to feel part of an organization for a lifetime. The
modem job market forces many to move from one organization and even from one
35 • •
University of Michigan National Election Studies, table 5A.4.
^^Editorial, Tarred with a Brush Too Broad,” New York Times, 23 October 1994, sec. 5, p. 14.
Daniel Yankelovich, “Emerging Ethical Norms in Public and Private Life” (paper presented at Columbia
Umversity, New York City, 20 April 1977), 2-3. Cited in Lipset and Schneider, Confidence Gap, 15.
United States Department of Justice, Sourcebook ofCriminalJuslice Statistics: 1998 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 999), table 2. 1 5.
^^Lipset and Schneider, Confidence Gap, 3.
"^*^Robinson, “Public Affairs Television,” 409.
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occupation to another and are thus less likely to feel any sense ofloyalty. People are
encouraged to see themselves as existing only for themselves and not to benefit any
institution.
It is not a surprise that during this time conspiracy theories involving complex
plots by government, business, and other major institutions have hit a height. Certainly
all media outlets have been a forum for espousing such theories. Three major motion
pictures were released during a two month period in the spring of 1997 whose main plot
was a massive cover up of criminal activity at the White House.^i One of television’s
most popular shows during the 1 990’s, The X-Files, had as its primaiy aim trying to
package large numbers of seemingly unrelated historical events under one broad
conspiratorial umbrella. Yet the internet is probably the most common source of
conspiracy theories, and often they have no small impact on American politics. David
Broder reports that just after the death of White House aide Vincent Foster in 1993, the
stock market declined sharply after a rumor spread, largely through the internet, that
Foster had been secretly murdered by someone in the White House.42
In addition to these trends, there are many other recent occurrences contributing
indirectly to the rise in anti-government attitudes which furthers privatization’s
popularity. The complaint that political parties and the people in government have
become less civil toward each other is probably well founded. One Republican freshman
in 1995 who acknowledged that he was helped greatly in his election drive by “the
negative view of Congress also lamented the lack of civility in Congress, saying that he
became “involved in some real political scrimmages that really don’t help the process all
that much.”'’3 Certainly, leadership in both political parties as well as in Congress
The three movies were Murder at 1600, Absolute Power, and The Shadow Conspiracy. The advertising
slogan for the first movie was “The Address That Breaks All The Rules.”
"^^Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The American Way ofPolitics at the Breaking Point
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1 996), 277.
^David Broder, “Cure for Nation’s Cymcism Eludes Its Leaders,” Washington Post, 4 February 1996,
sec. A, p. 20.
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became more divided ideologically during the 1990s and the frequently hostile
atmosphere only worsened with the Monica Lewinsky scandal and the divisive 2000
presidential election. The “negative campaigning” of recent years is often an effective
election strategy, but, in the aggregate, alienates Americans from campaigns, parties, and
anything else having to do with government.
One can look outside of Washington D.C. and find plenty of examples of the lack
of civility and fair play for which people often fault government. Indeed, it seems clear
that our society has become more polarized. Traumatic political experiences of the last
twenty-five years such as Vietnam. Watergate, and the Civil Rights movement have
instilled a “politics of protest” into our society in which confi-ontation with political
opponents is frequently favored over negotiation and dialogue. As James D. Carroll has
noted, ‘[The national government] has become a microcosm of the conflicts and
differences that pervade society...As government becomes coextensive with society in
composition and function, it experiences the disorganization.
..of society itself.”'*'* And
not only does government frequently mirror society, but it is often expected to be the
mediator of all disparate voices and the solver of the most intractable problems. Its own
misdeeds, societal forces beyond its control and its vastly expanded mission have all
combined to cripple government’s chances at receiving anything but scorn from a good
portion of its citizenry.
Other Political Reasons to Privatize
There is no question that many policymakers would be inclined to privatization
even if it was not popular. Sharkansky points out, for example, that one political
motivation to privatize is “to reward certain persons for favors rendered in the past by
‘^'^James D. Carroll, “Putting Government’s House in Order,” Maxwell News and Notes (Syracuse
University) 13 (1978): 2. Cited in Gordon, Public Administration, 509.
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giving them a contract.- Policymakers also may privatize to be able to say they
maintained or cut the number ofgovernment employees while still enlarging a particular
program.^ One other political reason to privatize is to combat the influence of cedain
constituencies that tend to favor a greater role for government. One of these
constituencies is public sector unions. TTie level of union strength seems to be a key
factor in whether privatization emerges. Although the political weakness of public sector
unions is far from the only factor, it is no coincidence that one of the regions most
inclined to privatize has been the Sun Belt, one of the areas in which public sector unions
are least popular.^^
During the last thirty years, the labor movement has witnessed a tremendous
decline in popularity. Although data on the subject is not as voluminous as that regarding
public opinion toward government, certainly a drop-off in public support can be observed
beginning in the mid-1960’s. According to Lipset and Schneider, “approval [of labor
unions] declined continually from 71 percent in 1965, to 55 percent in 1981, while the
proportion disapproving rose from 19 to 35 percent.’MS Although there has been a slight
increase since the mid 1990’s in the popularity of unions,^9 the overall trend in public
esteem has been downward. This decline in popularity surely has been reflected in the
decrease in union membership which has occurred during the last forty years. In 1954,
34.7 percent of the work force belonged to a union. By 1999, that percentage was down
to 13.9.50
Ira Sharkansky, Wither the State? : Politics and Public Enterprise in Three Countries (Chatham, N J •
Chatham House Publishers, 1979) ,113
^^John McCormick et al., “Taking the Town Newsweek, 4 March 1991, 52-4.
'’^Lipset and Schneider, Confidence Gap, 39.
This is partially the result of renewed efforts by many of the unions to market themselves more
aggressively. One example of such efforts is the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) Union Summer Program to recruit college students for organized labor activities.
See Diane Lewis, “Youths Lead Movement,” Boston Sunday Globe, 20 May 2001
,
sec. H, p. 2.
Diane Lewis, “Labor ‘96: Unions Look to the Young,” Boston Globe, 2 September 1996, sec. A, p. I,
and United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract ofthe United
States: 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 446, table 7.14.
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TT^ere are many factors involved in the decline of public tn,st in unions. Media
emphasis on any comtption and political intrigue involving unions makes them seem in
the minds ofmany like any other institution, only interested in power. The only other
subject in the public eye regarding unions is any conflict occurring between labor and
management. Such an emphasis, according to labor expert Diane Schmidt, “promotes a
perception of unions as being dominated by aggressive behavior.” This negative
impression would tend to be more powerful in this day and age since “fewer people have
direct experience with unions, so “what they see in media sticks.”5' But it is not just the
media that causes a decline in public opinion towards unions. Unions in the public sector
suffer the additional burden of being government workers, and thus subject to being
viewed as overpaid and underworked. This perception certainly makes many people less
than sympathetic to the arguments of those who want to keep jobs in the hands of public
sector workers.
Despite their lack of popularity, unions have sometimes been able to fight
privatization’s emergence.52 Legal challenges have sometimes been effective,53 but more
so for the union cause have been some of the arguments unions have made against
contracting out. One of the more successful techniques has been to challenge the widely
held belief that private companies are more efficient. In Massachusetts and other states,
public employee unions have won legislation forbidding privatization unless cost-benefit
analysis shows there will be savings.54 The use of such analysis could prove to be one of
the more effective strategies employed by unions. But despite some successes.
Diane E. Schmidt, “Public Opinion and Media Coverage of Labor \5n\om,'' Journal ofLabor Research
24(1993): 163.
Not surprisingly, a review of the American Federation of Government Employees [www.afge.org] and
the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations [www.aflcio.org] web sites reveals
a much greater emphasis by the first union on preventing privatization, indicating that membership makeup
aUeast partially influences organizational agenda setting.
Katherine C. Naff, “Labor-Management Relations and Privatization: A Federal Perspective,” Public
Administration Review 51 (1991): 28.
^'^Don Aucoin, “Cellucci Aims for Labor Peace,” Boston Globe, 1 August 1997, sec. B, p. 4.
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government employees have lacked the poll,
.cal strength or public standing to stem the
general march toward privatization, partially because of a double standard among the
issue’s followers. Even though many privatization advocates are self-interested in titeir
motives as potential sellers of a given service, only unions have been tagged with the
label of arguing their side for their own benefit.
Pnvatization, An Attempt To Have Bi g Government on a Sm^ii RnHgpf
Murray Edelman wrote extensively on the important function symbols perform in
politics, asserting in his 1964 work The Symbolic Uses ofPolitics that “political forms
thus come to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to
reassure themselves.”55 Whether or not privatization qualifies as a “political form” in
Edelman’s language, it is surely used as a reassuring symbol to many, as it stands both for
programmatic liberalism and fiscal austerity. It is an understandable response to the
public ambivalence about whether big government is desirable. To be sure, the
widespread lack of trust towards government leads to calls for budget cutbacks and an
end to what many perceive to be an inordinate amount of government waste and
inefficiency. But George Gordon has been one of many observers to note “the tendencies
of many people to regard government...with hostility at the same time that they want
public agencies to satisfy their demands” and “to criticize the growth of bureaucracy...but
somehow they always seem to be referring to programs that benefit others - never to the
programs in which they are interested.”56
This simultaneous demand for less and more government action is well captured
by polling done in 1978 as public disapproval grew of President Carter and the national
government in general. Even though citizens felt by a 43% to 14% margin that
^^Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses ofPolitics (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 2.
^^Gordon, Public Administration, 512.
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“government in Washington is getting too powerfi.!,” 23% (the largest number in the
survey) described themselves as being strongly in favor of“a government insurance plan
whtch would cover all medical and hospital expenses.’- Just as is true today, citizens
had deep reservations about the size of the public sector, yet still expected it to carry a
heavy policy load.
The budgetaiy demands on government have only grown during the last thirty
years with the emergence of the “entitlement society.” As we have seen, entitlements are
brutal on budgets, since it takes huge amounts of spending (in the case of the United
States, now about 54%)5s off the negotiating table when it comes time for cutbacks. But
the budget only reveals part of government’s challenge. Also significant about today’s
demands is the fact that they are, in the minds of many observers, more complex and
harder to satisfy than ever. With the quantity, complexity, and uncertainty of policy
demands all on the rise, it often makes political (and often practical) sense for those in
government to turn the service over to someone else if only to get the problem off their
hands as much as possible.
The demands by citizens for greater amounts of public spending in a number of
areas clearly clash both with fiscal realities and with people’s general attitudes about big
government. Privatization responds to this ideological contradiction by enabling
Americans to follow their belief in limited government while still trying to maintain the
services on which they have come to depend. Furthering the privatization phenomenon is
the undeniable ignorance about the budget which exists among the American people. As
we have seen, one problem in reducing the budget deficit lies in the fact that what the
public considers to be “untouchable” expenditures consume a very large portion of the
budget. But worsening the situation is the fact that the few programs the public favors
^ 'University of Michigan National Election Studies, tables 4A.1 and 4A.3.
^The figure is 65 percent when interest on the national debt is added. Executive Office of the President of
the United States, A Citizen 's Guide to the Federal Budget: FY 2001 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2000), 1 0.
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cutfng take up a much smaller portion of .he budge, than i, realizes. One ,995 poll asked
people wha. percentage of the federal budge, is devoted to foreign aid. The median
response was 15% when in reality, the figure is 1%.5S Such ignorance enables public
officials to claim that the savings from attempted cost-cubing measures like privatization
will be the panacea that will eliminate the deficit while maintaining services at their
present level. The irony of such claims is that when the initiatives fail to meet the
unreasonable expectations we have set for them, disappointment sets in, farthering the
disillusionment many feel about government.
The Signs Point Toward Privati/atjon Rut
Public admiration of the private sector, the precipitous decline in regard for
government, greatly increased calls for accountability, the watchfal eye of a suspicious
media and a variety of societal trends have all combined to create a political juggernaut
that, along with scholarly trends, would seem to propel privatization into the national
policy mamstream. That has not happened, and a key reason is that citizens do not want
to have to choose among spending priorities. As a general idea, government reduction
receives raves from the public, but when put into practice, it receives a much colder
reception.
Any privatization beyond the trivial leads to conflicting policy aims, and citizens
become reticent to choose one goal over another. The Reagan administration’s political
salesmanship on the public lands issue was subpar, but the clashing policy goals of their
proposal naturally made it a tough sell. The successful legislative effort by President
Clinton and the 104th Congress to encourage dialogue about what are government or
commercial functions was a positive step, but the devil will be in the details as difficult
^^Barbara Crossette, “Foreign Aid Budget: Quick, How Much? Wrong,” New York Times, 27 February
1995, sec. A, p. 6.
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choices are made on tha, question. Regardiess of whether that legisiation eventualiy
resuits in commerciai functions being identified and privatized, privatization advocates
shouid feei encouraged. Tire pubiic dialogue has shifted to such a degree that few
Democrats, Republicans or independents are willing to defend the public sector in the
face of debates about spending reductions that focus not on whether to cut government,
but by how much. The growing demand for public services has put a brake to the
movement to strip government to the bone. But suspicion of the public sector, skillfully
argued in a burst of scholarly writing and widely embraced in political rhetoric, has
justified less government with great success.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REAGAN YEARS
If it were possible for conservative ideologues to go into a scientific laboratory
and create a president who would privatize, i, certainly seemed on January 20, 1981, that
they could not have found anyone better for the role than Ronald Reagan.
“Government
is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem,”' the new president
declared on his Inauguration Day. and those antigovemment beliefs combined with his
resounding election victory to give hope to privatization advocates that real change could
take place on the issue. To help his chances further, the country was becoming more
susprcrous of the public sector, and would thus presumably be more open to having
government do less and the private sector more.
Ronald Reagan was the national embodiment ofhow much more cynical about
government the country had become. In 1976, candidate Reagan had proposed investing
social security funds in stocks and bonds and was ridiculed for it. Four years later, he was
elected on an anti-government platform and, not long after, his idea for social security
was seriously discussed by Democrats and Republicans.^ Reagan did achieve some
privatization during his presidency, the sale of Conrail being the most notable example.
But there was clearly a gap between how much privatization conservatives expected
would happen during his tenure and how much was actually done. Public lands, the
primary policy area in which Reagan tried privatization, stayed largely in governmental
hands.
As with almost any political outcome, the reasons for Reagan’s failure on the
public lands question are many and complex. His general lack of attention to the issue.
^Ronald Reagan, Public Papers ofthe Presidents: 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1982), 1.
^Abramovitz, “Privatization,” 260.
72
Interior Secretary James Watt’s gift for alienating people of every political stripe, and the
general lack of political acuity among many of Reagan’s advisors handling the issue are
three of the explanations to be explored in this chapter. Beyond any of the
administration s shortcomings, however, the underlying and ever-present cause of trouble
for Reagan or any other privatizer is people’s deep-seated reluctance to privatize in any
way that significantly reduces government.
Good Economics. Bad Politics?
The natural tension between what in some minds is good policy and what is good
politics is manifested in the case of public lands. It is a terrific area in which to privatize
if one is a conservative economist. One expert on the subject has referred to public lands
as “perhaps the most socialized sector of the economy.”^ If one is a conservative
politician, however, the equation is quite different. So many other policy areas offer
more politically astute avenues to privatization. As privatization expert Jeffrey Henig so
aptly depicted the situation at the Reagan administration’s beginning, “Some, like public
housing and the United States Postal Service, had been regarded for many years as
dreadful failures...Others - like Conrail, National Airport, and federal utilities - had
constituencies that were geographically limited.”'^
Instead of choosing one of those issues, Reagan chose to attempt to privatize
public lands, a policy with a well-developed theoretical rationale but one with strong
support for the status quo from many policymakers at both the national and state levels as
well as fi-om several well organized and determined interest groups. It is often difficult to
sell extensive privatization, but public lands seemed like an issue in which this was
^Robert H. Nelson, Public Lands and Private Rights: The Failure ofScientific Management (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1995), 183.
"^Jeffrey Henig, “Privatization in the United States: Theory and Practice,” Political Science Quarterly 104
(1989); 665.
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particularly difficult. Environmentalists tend to be highly motivated to fight for their
cause, and western economic groups like ranchers and grazers were unlikely to want to
give up their preferential government treatment and have government sell to the highest
bidder the public land on which they depended, all for the sake of economic principle.
Making the path to public lands privatization even more difficult was the inherent
contradiction that stemmed from government officials trying to raise huge amounts of
revenue by ridding itself of land that was, by their own admission, less desirable (and
therefore less financially valuable) than much of the land remaining in federal hands.
The area m which Reagan chose to focus privatization efforts made his task tough
enough, but this chapter will make the case that by failing to appreciate the political
consequences of privatization, his administration made success on the issue impossible to
achieve. When it came to privatization, Reagan bore an unfortunate resemblance to
President Carter, reminding some observers of Carter’s elimination of water projects in
the name of economic efficiency while being seemingly unaware of the powerful western
economic interests and congressmen he would offend.^
A Brief History of Public Lands Policy
The public lands question had a long, complex, and controversial history in the
United States well before Reagan was even bom, and some of that long history worked
decidedly against the conservative Californian’s privatization agenda. One of the primary
doctrines that had guided public lands policy since the country’s founding was
“preemption,” the presumed right of a squatter or long-time occupant of a piece of land to
enjoy all the benefits of that property, sometimes even if he is unable to pay for it at fair
market value. Preemption rights had not been practiced with any sort of regularity during
^This comparison has also been made by C. Brant Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands: America's
Conservation Debate 1979-1984 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1989).
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the country’s early history. But that preemption existed at all suggests that adherence to
free market principles was not a consistent component of public lands policy, and that
historical reality would present a significant obstacle to Reagan’s privatization efforts.
The sale of public lands was considered to be a potentially major source of
revenue before the income tax was instituted, but that goal was realized only in fits and
starts. To be sure, a balancing act was necessary between obtaining revenue and
encouraging expansion. Soon after the Founding, Alexander Hamilton had noted, “In the
formation of a plan for the disposition of the vacant lands of the United States, there
appear to be two leading objects of consideration: one, the facility of advantageous
sales...the other the accommodation of individuals now inhabiting the western frontier.
Hamilton believed “the former...claims primary attention”^and there were periods
in American history in which revenue was recognized as the more important goal. In the
first seventy-five years of the country’s history, in fact, more than 15 million acres of
public land were sold to pay Revolutionary War debt, and during the 1830s, land sales
represented 26% of federal revenues.^ But that number is best seen as an aberration. The
general theme in public lands history, rather than being one of the federal government
consistently receiving revenue from land sales, is one in which the government often gave
land away outright (starting with land grants to Revolutionary War veterans) or allowed a
land’s settlers to buy it at or below market rate.
The legislative history of public lands policy is one that, according to one expert,
frequently “grant[ed] legitimacy to practice that had previously developed as practical
responses on the ground—sometimes outside the law—to immediate needs. Important to
realize is that in many cases, those practices were sanctioned by culture as much as or
^Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History ofthe Public Land Policies (Madison, Wis.: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1965), 2.
^Ibid.
^Nelson, Public Lands, 7.
^Ibid., 6.
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more than by law. Many in and out of the federal government had long thought that
strictly enforcing market rates upon western settlers would be impractical (given the
West’s vast expanse and distance from the capital) and unfair (given the hardships many
settlers endured.) Perhaps most importantly, charging settlers full price was seen as very
much against the spint behind the westward movement of the nation, an accomplishment
in which many Americans took great pride.
This westward expansion, while yielding sizable economic benefits, had
significant environmental costs, perhaps the most famous example being the virtual
disappearance of the buffalo. As a result, near the turn of the twentieth century the
federal government, led by Theodore Roosevelt, moved aggressively with a host of
different measures to protect the wildlife and the environment it inhabited. Land for
national parks began to be set aside during the 1 890s and the same was done for forest
reserves two decades later. These steps are aptly summarized in the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) web site as signaling] a shift in policy goals served by the public
lands. Instead of using them to promote settlement. Congress recognized that they should
be held in public ownership because of their other resource values.”‘o in contrast to the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many policymakers sought to make environmental
protection a key part of national public lands policy, believing that the national
government would use scientific objectivity to manage the lands’ development wisely and
efficiently.
The Sagebrush Rebellion
The newfound environmental aims, pursued through a centralized management
structure, planted seeds of resentment in the West. These seeds would eventually
blossom into the powerful and angry “Sagebrush Rebellion,” a movement of the 1 970s
^®U.S. Dept, of the Interior, Bureau of Land Managment website, www.blm.gov/nap/facts/index.htm.
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and 1 980s that sought more state control over public lands. Like almost any political
movement, the eauses of it were many. One author at the time of the rebellion lists
eleven separate complaints the West had about federal government treatment at the time,
citing everything from “pervasive federal environmental and preservation laws” to
“President Carter’s water project ‘hit list’” to “unfavorably skewed east-west rail rates.”"
The theme of all of the complaints was the beliefamong many in the West that the federal
government was increasingly overbearing toward the region and completely out of touch
with its political, cultural, economic, and geographic needs.
It seemed to the movement’s backers that federal restrictions on land use were
increasing by the day, major legislation pushed by President Carter restricting
development in over 100 million Alaskan acres being the latest evidence. Such laws
were taken as proof that Washington did not understand the West. To Sagebrush rebels,
the fact that over half of western land was owned by the federal government meant that,
in the words of Colorado governor Richard Lamm, “We cannot control our own
destiny.”i 2 The rebels had anecdotes to go with statistics. One story in a popular
magazine at the rebellion’s height featured photographs of a Wyoming couple looking
with sadness at their own home being gutted by a fire they set themselves, reportedly
because it was the only way they could comply with a government order to remove the
house from public land. >3 Interestingly, “Sagebrush Rebellion” was a title first used by
the press derisively, then adopted by the movement itself.’^ The decision was a smart
one, as the term manages to grab the listener and convey the anger behind the movement,
while also communicating the belief that a good lands policy was much more likely to be
found out west among the sagebrush plants than with the politicians in Washington.'^
^
^Richard Mollison, “Sagebrush Rebellion: Its Causes and Effects,” Environmental Comment 1 1 (1981):
11,5.
^2“West Senses Victory in Sagebrush Rebellion,” US News and World Report, 1 December 1980, 30.
^^Ibid.
^
“^C. Brant Short, Ronald Reagan, 1 4.
l^Ibid.
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Perhaps the single most important catalyst for the rebels was the 1976 Federal
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), an act designed “to provide for the
management, protection and development of the natural resource lands.’’'^ That purpose
seemed benevolent enough, but it was more the change the law represented that infuriated
many westerners. As one expert noted, the FLPMA “mandated for the first time that
federal lands be held publicly in perpetuity for the benefit of the entire nation.”’ ^ For
decades, the BLM had one primary goal; to please the western livestock industry. For the
first time, the BLM was required through law to conserve the land for multiple uses as fit
the “public interest.” This mandate meant the BLM had to balance many different policy
actors, including a rapidly growing environmental movement. Fairly or not, the BLM
acquired the reputation of being too prone to favor the environment over development.
The BLM’s perceived political clumsiness was the icing on the ideological cake to those
who considered the federal government to be ignorant of western needs. After the 1976
FLPMA and its implementation, it seemed as if there were no turning back for the
rebellion. All the economic and political forces came together, as the sagebrush
movement had the Bureau of Land Management on which to focus their suspicion and
enmity.
Sagebrush: The Political Battle
When one considers both the enormous amount of natural resources contained in
United States public lands, and the distrust of the federal government that has always
been a hallmark of western political culture, it is not surprising that political movements
similar to the Sagebrush Rebellion had occurred before. Between 1828 and 1833,
Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, and Missouri each made requests to Congress to
^^National Resource Lands Management Act, Public Law 94-579, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 21 October 1976.
^
^Edward Abrahams, “This Land is Your Land, For a Price: Unreal Estate,” New Republic, 3 January
1983, 15.
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cede all federal government lands to the states. Such tension had been present throughout
the nation’s history, but grew in the 1970s. During that decade, legislative and judicial
action to support the cause came fast and furious. Nevada got the legislative ball rolling
in 1979 by passing a bill claiming ownership of all public lands in the state not already
reserved or appropriated. Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming passed similar
laws the next year, California and Colorado vowed to study the question, and Hawaii
passed a resolution in support of the efforts. The United States Congress followed suit, as
members filed no less than sixty bills on the topic, mostly in the 96th Congress.'^
Despite all the activity and furor which surrounded it, it would be difficult to
make the case that the Sagebrush Rebellion achieved the aims of its organizers. None of
the states passing sagebrush legislation ever really pressed their case, and in fact, some of
the bills probably passed only because they were seen as symbolic. No major court
decision ever came down in the rebels’ favor, and out of the sixty bills introduced in
Congress between 1978-1 980, none got so much as a hearing or a vote out of committee.
In fact, no significant piece of rebellion legislation was ever passed by the United States
Congress.
Part of the rebels’ failure was due to powerful and effective arguments from the
other side. There was the belief among many that the loss of federal government control
over land could have potentially disastrous consequences. It was feared that a
constituency that was particularly strong in a given state would be allowed to run
roughshod over the public interest, such as by polluting the environment. There was also
a good case to be made that federal government involvement in western land affairs was
*
^The most well-known legislation, I'he Public Land Reform Act of 1981, was from the 97th Congress.
^^Christopher Kryza, Who Controls Public Lands? (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press,
1996), 94.
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not increasing as much as the rebels claimed. The federal share of the total acreage of
land in the United States had decreased slightly in the previous forty years, from 36 to
32%.20
Programs such as the Legacy of Parks, started by the federal government in the
latter part of the twentieth century, had spanned several decades and presidential
administrations and had resulted in the transfer of hundreds of thousands of acres from
the federal to state and local government. To some, westerners had no business
complaining about how hard the federal government had been on them, since as one
commentator stated, “The truth is that eleven western states receivedfree from the federal
government far more land than many of the eastern states ever had available to sell.”2’
Perhaps the main and most interesting reason for the rebellion’s demise was that even
some of the political actors from western states were against significant change. Western
governors were not fond of the states taking control if it meant new responsibilities along
with a loss of federal subsidies. Interest groups did not like the thought of having to form
new relationships and understandings with different policymakers in a new venue. Even
the constituencies primarily associated with the rebellion, such as ranchers, grazers and
other western economic interests, had second thoughts about the movement. Most
endorsed a loosening of regulations, but lost their enthusiasm for the cause once they
realized it could negatively affect their usage of the land. This cultural inclination toward
obtaining help from the federal government in spite of their distrust towards it was
reminiscent of the dual emotions governing opinions about privatization. The western
rebels detested the federal government, yet depended on it immensely.
^^nited States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics
(Washington D.C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1980), table 7, and U.S. Department of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract ofthe United States 1944-5 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1945), table 1024.
George Reiger, “Sagebrush Rebellion III,” Field and Stream, July 1985, 30.
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One of the more intriguing arguments made by rebellion opponents, if only for its
response, was that states would find that managing the land was beyond their capacity and
would begin privatizing them. Important to note is the response of the rebels, who
vehemently denied that would ever happen. Both sides feared that privatization would
hurt access to the lands by the smaller ranchers, grazers and other interests that had
depended on it for decades. This foreshadowed later tension between the privatizers in
the Reagan administration and westerners who feared that privatizing the land would shut
them out of it.
The rebels feared that the Reagan victory would take the steam out of their
rebellion, and that concern proved prophetic. As sometimes occurs with political
movements, partial success robbed it of its momentum. Just as had happened with some
nuclear freeze advocates after the signing of the IMF Treaty, some sagebrush activists lost
interest in the issue after the 1980 election, perhaps incorrectly concluding that the
problem as they defined it had dissipated enough to obviate any further need for political
action.
Privatizing Public Land: The Idea and Its Detractors
The idea of systematically privatizing public land gained some popularity at the
beginning of the twentieth century, partly as a reaction to what some saw as the
overreaching of Theodore Roosevelt and the national government in dealing with federal
lands. Just as they would argue at the century’s end, proponents claimed that
privatization would increase the tax base and help to make land use decisions more in
touch with the fi”ee market. But the idea never really took off, despite the
recommendations of the second Hoover Commission (which was much more ideological
than its predecessor) and a major political push by ranching and grazing interests in the
1940s. The privatization cause did gain some momentum when the agencies managing
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the land endured several instances ofbad press. In 1975, the Bureau of Land
Management estimated that “83% of its rangeland was in environmentally
‘unsatisfactory’ or worse condition because of overgrazing.”22
Some in academia used such statistics to argue against keeping land in
government hands. With increasing numbers dissatisfied with government control of
public lands, many thought along with Charles Schultze that it was time to stop leaving
decisions to the “command and control techniques of government bureaucracy” and to
creat[e] incentives so that public goals became private interests.”23 One public lands
authority, Marion Clawson, made the case in the highly regarded journal Science, made
the case that the country’s national forests were a “great national asset” that was “poorly
managed and unproductive,” largely due to the fact that “no charge is made for [their]
use.”24
Although Clawson really desired tougher, not less, governmental control of the
lands, such facts could only have helped the antigovemment ideology that rose in political
importance in the 1970s and 1980s and became an important component of the movement
to privatize public lands. One of the key intellectual foundations of this conservative
movement was privatization supporter William Tucker’s Progress and Privilege in which
he portrayed public lands as being grossly mismanaged by well-intentioned but misguided
federal bureaucrats.^^ Some of government’s actions, these scholars felt, were not even
well-intentioned. Why did President Reagan’s privatization of public lands have a hard
^^Frank J. Popper, “The Timely End of the Sagebrush Rebellion,” Public Interest 76 (1984): 66-7.
Roger Meiners and Bruce Yandle, Regulation and the Reagan Era (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1989), 140.
^‘^Marion Clawson, “The National Forests,” Science, 20 February 1976, 762, 767.
^^William Tucker, Progress and Privilege: America in the Age ofEnvironmentalism (Garden City, NY:
Anchor Press, 1 982).
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time getting started? Because bureaucrats, some said, hoard government assets in a
selfish attempt to retain their power over them. It was the belief of these scholars that
only privatization would cure this “cancer from within.”26
Nowhere did the antigovemment feeling manifest itself more than in the Grace
Commission, a body appointed by President Reagan with the stated mission of reducing
government waste. The commission’s report can be seen as tlie dogmatic embodiment of
the Reagan administration and the public choice movement which inspired it. Its primary
arguments were rooted in an intense, deep suspicion of government that would be a
hallmark of the Reagan years.
It was the commission’s view that there was not nearly enough competition in the
provision of government services to keep the public sector efficient. In fact, inefficient
management was often rewarded, as it frequently led to increased stafflevels and more
money for an agency.27 Part of the reason the report gave for agencies not being punished
for their mistakes was that they could always depend on intense political support from
interest groups that supported them. A large part of the answer for the commission was,
not surprisingly, to privatize. If the private sector produced more goods and services,
finally producers would be in place who would experience the rigors of competition and
thus be forced to be efficient or relinquish the rights of production. Just as many scholars
favoring privatization argue, the commission’s report made a distinction between
providing a service and producing it, asserting that while it was government’s job to make
sure that selected goods and services are provided, there was no reason why the public
sector should be presumed to be the appropriate producer. As with most presidential
commissions, not many of the report’s recommendations were implemented. The
commission’s importance lies not in its tangible effects on policy, however, but in its
^^Steve Hanke, “The Privatization Debate: An Insider’s View,” Cato Journal 2 (1982): 660-1.
^^President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, Report on Privatization (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983), vii.
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contribution to and symbolism of the anti-government ideology of the day, a belief system
that led to Ronald Reagan’s conviction that public lands should not be turned over to the
states, but rather privatized.
In addition to the ideological arguments surrounding the issue, there were multiple
debates about the policy effects of public lands privatization. The administration tried to
draw attention to the large financial gains that would be achieved through privatization, at
one pomt boasting that $4 billion annually could be raised through the sale of public
lands.28 The administration also asserted that neither the amount nor the quality of the
land being proposed for privatization was nearly as significant as environmentalists
feared. According to the administration, national parks and wilderness areas were
off-limits and, at first, only 5% of federal property would be sold.29
Proponents also claimed that the supposed negative effect on people’s enjoyment
and use of any land that was privatized was vastly overrated. Buyers were not necessarily
developers and, in fact, often were very interested in preserving the land and sometimes
were more capable of doing so than government. And what good was the land anyway if
people became so concerned with protecting it that they could not even use it for their
enjoyment and prosperity? In choosing between protecting the land and developing it,
candidate Reagan had made his priority clear in his speech accepting the Republican
presidential nomination, as he stated that efforts to use more natural resources for energy
development “must not be thwarted by a tiny minority opposed to economic growth
which often finds friendly ears in regulatory agencies for its obstructionist campaigns.”
Reagan felt it was necessary “to reaffirm that the economic prosperity of our people is a
fundamental part of our environment.”^®
28
29
Abrahams, “This Land,” 13.
Philip Shabecoff, “Watt Removes Agency’s Land From Sale Plan,” New York Times, 28 July 1983, sec.
p. 1.
“Reagan: ‘Time to Recapture Our Destiny,’” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 38 (1980): 2063-6.
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The opposition to the proposed privatization was predictable in some respects, but
very surprising in others. One of the opponents’ stronger arguments was their admonition
that even if the most rosy financial forecast of $4 billion a year from public land sales was
achieved, it was a drop in the fiscal bucket when it came to reducing the national debt. In
any case, the Congressional Budget Office said that expecting even half that amount was
optimistic. Opponents also pointed out that the administration was expecting that kind
of payback for what (by their own admission) was second-rate land. Some worried that
this was a recipe for creating an unacceptable decline in property prices, especially given
the recession occurring at the time.
As is typical of most sets of arguments against privatization, the quantitative
assertions made by opponents were less vital to their case than the more intangible points.
A large part of the argument the policy’s detractors made was simply that some things in
life are more important than economic efficiency. Is more efficiency worth ranchers
being kicked off the land their family had occupied for generations just so it can be sold
to the highest bidder? Is it worth it to have public lands exploited for their natural
resources? Privatization supporters claimed that neither of those unfavorable outcomes
would occur, and one can only assume they did not want them to happen. But opponents
feared that once the selling started, the government would be unable to stop the private
sector from undermining the public good for private gain.
In the end, the arguments of its opponents and the political ineptitude of its
proponents scuttled the public lands privatization movement. But before the battle was
over, the Reagan administration would anger not only its traditional adversaries, but many
supporters, including the Sagebrush rebels who had so enthusiastically supported his
candidacy.
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Keagan^sappoints the Rehek
At first glance, one would think that the Sagebrush Rebels and our fortieth
president would be a match made in heaven. Reagan did nothing before the election to
dissuade anyone from this notion. At a campaign stop in Idaho Falls, Idaho, that fall,
Reagan had proclaimed, “We can turn the Sagebrush Rebellion into the Sagebrush
Solution.”^. Shortly after the election. President Reagan again enthusiastically supported
the rebels, saying that his administration would work to “insure that the states have an
equitable share of public lands and their natural resources.”32 But after the euphoria of
November 1 980, strains in the union began to show. Almost immediately after the
election, rebels noticed that not only did the President-elect stop referring to the rebellion,
members of the new administration began to speak in glowing terms of a “Good
Neighbor” policy, in which the federal government would merely ease restrictions on land
usage, but still control it. The rebels’ euphoric post-election hopes were deflated, and the
rebels and Reagan were never on very good terms again.
The reason Reagan chose turning public lands over to the private sector instead of
the states is that few people in his administration who were heavily involved in the issue
favored the rebellion. Incoming Secretary of the Interior James Watt made it clear at his
confirmation hearing that he was no fan of the rebellion when he was asked if he
supported large land transfers from the federal government to the states. “I do not think
that is needed,” he said. “That is not the first order of priority, certainly. What we must
do is defuse the Sagebrush Rebellion.”^^ One of the primary autliorities on the issue.
Council of Economic Advisers member Steve Hanke, strongly favored privatization as
^^“West Senses Victory,” 30.
^^Judy Gibbs, “Reagan Sends Message of Support to Sagebrush Associated Press Wire,
November 1980.
^^Nelson, Public Lands, 177.
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well. One speech given by Hanke in 1981 to the Public Lands Council, a key group
supporting the rebellion, made clear his preference: “It makes no difference whether there
is federal or state control over public lands...The only way to improve the productivity
and efficiency of public lands is to privatize them.”" With those two key advisors more
fond of privatization than state government control, the rebels never had a chance.
The Privatization Push
With the question now decided within the administration, it was fiill steam ahead
on the privatization of public lands. 1981 had been spent deciding to pursue the policy,
and 1982 was seen as the time to get it done. In fact, a flurry of proposals for privatizing
other areas also took place, including proposals to turn Amtrak, Conrail, National
Weather Service satellites and a wide range of governmental assets over to the private
sector. As for public lands, the President formally endorsed the goal of privatizing them
in February 1982 in his Budget Message for FY 1983:
The administration proposes to undertake a concerted program to dispose of
unneeded federal property. Properties to be identified for disposal include assets
excess to the needs of federal agencies holding them, property of significantly
higher value in private rather than in public use, public lands that cannot be
efficiently managed due to the small size and location of the parcels, public lands
in urban or suburban areas that hinder local economic development and lands
acquired during the development of water resource facilities but no longer
necessary to the day to day operation of those facilities.^s
In April, Reagan proposed opening new tracts of public land to resource
development, saying that it would go a long way toward lessening America’s dependence
on foreign oil. That same month, Reagan invoked the Federal Real Property and
Abrahams, “This Land,” 18.
^
^Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Major Themes and Additional
Budget Details: FY 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 258-9.
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Administrative Services Act of 1 949 to establish a Property Review Board as part of the
Executive Office of the President. Reagan directed the Board to perform a central role in
ensuring that “real property holdings no longer essential to [government’s] activities and
responsibilities are promptly identified and released for appropriate disposition.’’^^ The
board became the formal body for handling the primary public lands program in the
Reagan administration, often called the Asset Management Program.
Public Lands Privatization Under AttarW
Some conservative thinkers, many of the same ideological ilk as Reagan, began to
favor the privatization policy, one of them saying that the new stance was partly because
we ve had to face the fact that the federal government was not going to give one-third of
America to the states for nothing.”^? But not everyone was pleased. Some of the groups
were predictable in their opposition to the proposed policy. Terry Sopher, public lands
specialist for the environmentalist Wilderness Society, summarized the feelings of
environmentalists well; “It is time for the privatization scheme to be revealed for what it
is; a land grab to provide immense profit to a few at the expense of present and future
generations. Some in Congress were also not pleased with the privatization program,
adding the additional concern that the statutory basis for it, the Federal Real Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, “did not apply to lands in the public domain.”39
More damaging to the administration’s efforts was that many ideological
conservatives fi'om the West who would normally favor privatization became unhappy
with the Asset Management Program when it started to involve privatizing lands in their
^^Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12348, 25 February 1982, in Public Papers ofthe Presidents: 1982,
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^^Meiners and Yandle, 144.
^
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state. Some of the sources of opposition were striking, including Reagan stalwart Nevada
Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NV), who suggested that ranchers be given an opportunity to buy
the land first before it went for general sale, and conservative columnist George Will, as
avid a Reagan supporter as there was in journalism, who called the program
“economically improvident” and “environmentally rash.”40
Out of all the opponents of the privatization of public lands policy, surely one
group that could have been brought on board as supporters were the members of the
Departments of Interior and Agriculture. A look at the members of the Property Review
Board as listed in the Executive Order reveals one possible reason for their opposition:
The Counselor to the President; Director, Office of Management and Budget;
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers; Assistant to the President for Policy
Development; Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President; Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs; and such other officers or emplcwees of
the Executive Branch as the President may from time to time designate.^^
Striking about that list is that no board members came from the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior, a very questionable decision since those two departments would
have a great deal of responsibility for implementing the policy. There is probably no
greater manifestation of the Reaganites’ failure to appreciate their policy’s political
consequences than their expecting agencies who had little or no part in developing these
major policy changes to implement them faithfully.
Perhaps none of this opposition would have been enough if there had been even
one major interest group motivated to argue on privatization’s behalf, but save for a small
group of conservative academics, there was not. As a result of this and the Reagan
administration’s unwillingness and inability to lobby effectively for the policy change, the
political challenges of the new policy began to discourage administration officials even
^^George Will, “Protecting the Land,” Bloomington Pantograph, 19 August 1982, sec. A, p. 2.
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before the year was out. At one meeting of the Public Lands Advisory Council, the
Assistant Secretaty of the Interior for Land and Water said he “abhorred the word
privatization and asked that the council members never use it.”'’^
Watt Was He Thinking?
The administration’s public lands program was getting attacked from almost every
comer, and Reagan’s choice to head the department that would have primary
responsibility for implementing the privatization program proved to be a political liability
to a degree seldom seen in national politics. Beyond all the analysis of interbranch
tension, interest group and western resistance, and the rest of the Reagan team’s missteps
that contributed to the proposal’s downfall, some of the President’s political troubles on
the privatization issue could be attributed to Interior Secretary James Watt. Watt was a
public relations disaster, with a genuine gift for offending political friend and foe alike.
To be fair to Watt, the privatization of public lands was a tough product to se, as
we have seen that it attracted opposition from many sides. Ironically, Watt himself was
not as fond of privatization as some other members of the Reagan administration because
he feared the loss of revenue and control over oil and gas leasing resulting from the lands’
sale.43 Fairly or not, he became the person primarily associated in the public mind with
the Reagan land policy, and when opposition to it crystallized. Watt’s image suffered.
But it was not really Watt’s policy views that made him so unpopular. It was his
language. He was never shy about letting everyone know where his political preferences
lay. Less than two months into Reagan’s term. Watt made it clear that the administration
would put increased emphasis on “recovery of strategic and critical minerals” and on
“access to the public lands by the private sector.” Watt also made clear his
^^Hanke, “Privatization Debate,” 661.
^^Robert Durant, The Administrative Presidency Revisited (Albany, N.Y.: State University ofNew York
Press, 1992), 52.
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antienvironmental leanings, saying, “I will err on the side of public use against
preservation.- He even failed to list conservation as one of the four conterstones of his
conservation policy, listing instead “a sound economy, orderly energy development now
to prevent development later in a crisis atmosphere, making resources available to the
people for their enjoyment and use and giving states and the private sector a larger role in
resource management.”'^5
Ever belligerent and bellicose, Watt put his foot in his mouth constantly during his
time in the Reagan administration, saving his most venomous rhetoric for
environmentalists, several times comparing them to Nazis. He also asserted that they
were only out to weaken America and to institute “centralized planning and control of
society” and that they were “the greatest threat to the ecology of the West.”« This was
only a small sample of the plethora of instances in which Watt described his political
opponents in language that most people deemed too divisive.
The environmental movement must have been grateful in a sense for Watt’s
indiscreet behavior. He was certainly one of the single greatest uniters of the
environmental movement during the 1980s, providing it with a powerful adversary on
which to focus its energies. Since he was the person primarily associated with the
privatization effort, his verbal gaffes were surely a major factor in killing the new public
lands policy they abhorred.
Watt tried to keep a lower profile in 1983, but when he did speak publicly, his
comments were as controversial as ever. The final rhetorical straw, in the fall of that
year, was a statement ridiculing Affirmative Action programs in which Watt joked that an
Interior Department Advisory Committee had every sort of “mix you can have. I have a
'^^Kathy Koch, “Reagan Shifts US Policies on Public Land Management,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
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black, I have a woman, two Jews, and a cripple. And we have talent.”« After that
remark, eight of the eighteen Republican senators trom the West either demanded his
resignation or refused to express their support for him."* He stepped down amid a
political furor on October 10. 1983. After Watt’s resignation, the controversy around him
died. But the Reagan administration never regained its political footing on the
privatization of public lands, and one wonders if Reagan would have had more success
with the issue had Watt not been in the picture.
The Idea Begins to Fade
By 1983, the privatization of public lands proposal was in dire political straits.
One political assessment at the beginning of that year intoned:
The administration’s plan has alienated state and local government officials,
cattlemen, sheep raisers, and the millions of people who use the public lands for
recreation, not to mention the environmentalists who recoil when Watt boasts that
federal land sales will turn sheep pastures into industrial sites and deserts into
resorts.'*^
In the summer of 1983, the administration acknowledged as much, with an aide to
Interior Secretary Watt calling the Asset Management Program “a political mistake and
liability to President Reagan.”50 Perhaps this was why Watt started to back away fi-om
calling the AMP “privatization.”^’
The political adjustments made by Watt and the administration were not enough
to save the policy, and in the summer of 1983 the administration took steps to end its
push for the privatization of public lands. On July 15, Watt announced that an agreement
78.
^^Abrahams, “This Land,” 1 8.
^^Shabecoff, “Watt Removes Agency’s Land.”
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had been reached to remove privatization decisions from the jurisdiction of the Property
Review Board. Three days later, without specifying exactly what the mistakes were, Watt
wrote western governors, “The mistakes of 1982 are not being, and will not, be
repeated.”52 Later that month, Watt quietly removed Interior Department lands from
consideration for privatization, striking a death blow to any significant change in policy.
The administration had pledged to raise $9 billion through the sale of Interior Department
property, but fell $8.6 billion short before giving up on the idea entirely. In the end, very
little public land under any department was privatized under Reagan. In fact, more public
land was privatized during any of the single years from 1950 to 1968 than in the entire
period from 1974 to 1983.53
Too Little. Too Late
As the budget deficit grew in the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration was
hopeful that the flowing red ink under which the federal government was operating would
compel Congress to give fi-esh consideration to ideas to cut government, including
privatization.54 Thomas Gale Moore, head of the last White House task force on
privatization, surmised, “I’m optimistic we can succeed now, ifwe get our strategy
thought out. In the past, they’ve been able to thumb their nose at threats to cut subsidized
operations, but under Gramm-Rudman their subsidies may actually be cut, and they’re
now willing to take a new look at it.”55 The administration also began to listen to some
scholars such as Stuart Butler who thought that the reason privatization did not win
people’s hearts was that few had a financial stake in privatizing. With that in mind, in
^^Nelson, Public Lands, 197.
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1986 the Office of Personnel Management attempted a Federal Employee Direct
Corporate Ownership Plan, in which federal employees from agencies in which some
privatization had occurred would have an opportunity to purchase ownership stock in the
companies performing their privatized functions.
Reagan also issued an Executive Order in 1987 cutting department budgets with
the expectation that agencies would achieve savings through privatization.se His budget
for Fiscal Year 1 987 called for substantial privatization, including the sale of the Naval
Petroleum Reserve in California, the Federal Housing Administration, and the Power
Marketing Administration, a government-owned corporation that sells electricity
generated by federally owned dams.« The accompanying budget message named
privatization as one of the centerpieces of a far reaching government reduction program,
saying the government should not compete with the private sector to perform
commercial type operations. ”’58 But without an active presidential push, the issue was
never gripping enough to excite people. Reagan’s support was never more than half
hearted, as his involvement in the issue was almost always in the form of limited
administrative steps. Towards the end of the privatization battle, Reagan did what many
presidents do when they want to give the appearance of taking action while not expending
energy or capital. He appointed commission after committee after study group-six of
them by 1987—to tackle the privatization issue.
Reagan never came close to going out on a political limb for privatization, and not
surprisingly, conservatives were disappointed with his efforts on the issue. Well into
Reagan’s second term, one leading publication wrote, “Uppermost in the thoughts of
policymakers must be the politics of privatization. The Reagan administration appears to
^^Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 1 261 5, 1 9 November 1987, in Private Papers ofthe Presidents- 1982,
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be heading down the path that led to a dead end four years ago.'« Ne^s^eek writer John
McCormick asserted two years after the end of Reagan’s presidency,
“Privatization’s
greatest disappointment may have been Ronald Reagan.’’^i Four years earlier, iVewsweei
had mocked Reagan’s six tries at creating a governmental entity that would promote
privatization successfully. The article cited the millions of dollars spent by the panels,
quoted former Reagan political ally Stuart Butler as saying they have accomplished
nothing, and then ended the article with the sarcastic query, “Still wondering why the
government needs the private sector’s help?’’« Perhaps such cynicism about government
would be pleasing to this anti-government president. But if Reagan wanted to leave the
impression that the government became leaner and more efficient under his leadership, it
is plain from such quotations that his effort was largely unsuccessful.
Reagan’s Record Debated
A number of facts can be cited in President Reagan’s defense. Certainly, any
president can only do so much without congressional approval, and in stark contrast to the
Clinton years. Congress was generally not supportive of privatization during the 1980s.
Many statutes were in fact written to discourage privatization, and sometimes in fact, to
prohibit it.63 Nevertheless, Reagan did record two notable privatization successes with
Conrail and the National Consumer Cooperative Bank. As for public lands, Reagan’s
defenders would note that the administration was hindered by the 1982 recession’s effect
on land prices and by the realization that while some of the land was extremely resource
rich, much of it was not and thus was decidedly unattractive to many buyers.^ The
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Reagan tean, might even point out that complaints about how little land was sold (or
proposed for sale) is vindicating, as it suggests a balance in their policy for which they are
not often given credit.
One could understand why conservatives were frustrated with how little
privatization happened on his watch. Some of the statistics are not kind to Reagan.
Perhaps none ofthem better symbolizes the dashed hopes of conservatives than the bitter
recitation in a 1987 Heritage Foundation report that fewer than 6000 civilian agency
positions had been reviewed by Reagan as potential candidates for privatization after the
conservative Grace Commission report had recommended that over 500,000 could be
contracted out.« Indeed, Ronald Reagan’s second Office of Management and Budget
Director, James Miller, acknowledged,
“Despite the best efforts of those in charge,
between 1981 and 1986, the Reagan administration assessed privatization possibilities in
government programs and activities affecting only some seventy thousand government
positions.”^^
Looking beyond the numbers, Reagan unquestionably changed the basic debate in
American politics as to how much government should do. Despite his failings on the
privatization front in the eyes of many conservatives, even those critics would still credit
Reagan for placing the concept of government reduction high on the national agenda. In
this sense, the Reagan years were a signpost for what lay ahead-serious discussions by
both Democrats and Republicans not about whether, but about by how much, government
should be reduced. Not many would claim that Reagan is entirely responsible for the
increased receptiveness to privatization and government reduction that has occurred over
the last twenty years, but his contribution to the dialogue is undeniable.
65Stephen Moore and Stuart Butler, eds., Privatization: A Strategyfor Taming the Federal Budget
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How It Went Wrong
In his autobiography, former House Speaker Thomas “Tip” O'Neiii wrote about
Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter:
“Uitimateiy, a president is judged by the iegisiation
he initiates, and this is where Carter’s poiiticai probiems come home to roost...The
President just didn’t understand how to motivate Congress.”^ Few said that about
Carter’s successor, as the Reagan administration earned a reputation of being poiiticaiiy
astute in its deaiings with the iegisiative branch. Most of Reagan’s staffers who worked
on the privatization issue, however, were academics who, whiie they possessed strong
and sincere conservative beiiefs, seemed to have a much greater sense of sound
economics than smart politics.
The Reagan administration’s shortcomings were not just another case of a
policymaker failing to realize the ideological consequences of a decision to privatize.
Sometimes Reagan’s team fell into that trap, as when Office of Management and Budget
Director James Miller termed privatization “nonideological...whether your state or local
officials are deep-eyed liberals or rock-ribbed conservatives.’’^* More often, however, the
Reagan administration took tough ideological stances and pursued the project with an
almost religious zeal. Its problems with privatization often stemmed fi-om a failure to
realize the importance of dealing with the political consequences of those choices. It
often did not even try to assuage the concerns of environmentalists, ranchers, western
governors and all others with reservations about the new policy, and at times seemed
almost determined to anger them. Apparently Reagan’s people believed the ideology
behind the policy would sell itself, as they frequently focused on the economics of the
public lands debate rather than its politics.
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This attitude proved to be a crucial miscalculation. Reagan’s team would have
done well to heed the words of Madsen Pirie, President of the Adam Smith Institute, a
prime mover behind the British privatization movement that was so admired by Reagan
and his staff. Pirie, though a tried-and-tme conservative ideologue, still recognized the
importance of political considerations, saying “The first thing you have to remember is
that privatization is primarily apolitical rather than an economic issue.’’® Unfortunately
for their hopes, the Reagan administration’s movers and shakers on the privatization
question failed to appreciate the issue’s political subtleties, seeing it only in budgetary,
economic, and ideological terms.
As the Reagan years went on, many of the conservative academics who had been
in the administration in the early 1 980s resigned, partly out of disillusionment with what
they felt to be Reagan’s lack of attention to the issue. Steve Hanke, the strongest
privatization supporter in Reagan’s administration, turned out to be one of the President’s
sharpest critics, penning scathing criticisms of Reagan’s privatization effort.^o The
disenchantment felt by conservatives fed on itself, as their departure left the
administration without its most ardent privatization backers. However, partly as a result
of Hanke and some others leaving Reagan’s team, the privatization advocates who
remained in the administration near the end of Reagan’s term had a greater sense of
political awareness. Although this development was too little and too late to make a real
difference, it is interesting to note the great difference in tone between the first
presidential commission that dealt with the privatization issue, the aforementioned Grace
Commission, and the last, the Linowes Commission.
Perhaps the most common complaint about the early Grace Commission was that
it was an angry bull in a china shop, as hostile to government as it was clueless of
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political realities. Many correctly predicted that “the Grace Commission proposals will
fail because of their politically unacceptahle consequences.”’' Contrasting that report
with the Linowes one is quite instructive. The anti-government assumptions of the Grace
Commission were still there with the Linowes report, as it spoke in public choice
language: “Self-interested government workers will seek to maximize their pay [and]
reduce their workload.”” But fiery rhetoric aside, the methods suggested by the Linowes
Commission for implementing policies to reduce government are markedly gradual,
centrist, and conciliatory. The report’s introduction sets the tone by saying, “We opt for
incremental approaches...We recognize that the American people are not likely to
embrace initiatives that depart too widely from their traditional experiences.”” For the
Linowes Commission, efficiency concerns did not get in the way ofwhat is good politics,
as it recommended “any staff reduction resulting fi-om the implementation ofcommission
recommendations should be handled through attrition.”'"' Whether or not attrition is the
most sound management tool for job reduction, its recommendation, like much else in the
Linowes report, was in stark contrast to the Grace Commission’s approach in that it
represented an attempt to put political expediency on at least as high a plane as economic
principle.
The Implications of the Reagan Privatization Experience
By the time the Reagan administration learned the hard way how politically
dangerous privatization can be, most of the political momentum Reagan enjoyed in the
early 1980s was gone, and the moment to privatize had passed. One can fault Reagan’s
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team on several fronts for its handling of the issue. Many nrentbers of Reagan’s teanr
were not politically savvy when it came to privatization, and the policy area they chose to
make the focal point for the effort was a political minefield. But the reality of
privatization is that, ultimately, significant amounts of it are very difficult to sell to voters
at the national government level. As explored in chapter one, a tendency among the
populace is to want Hamiltonian government on a Jeffersonian budget. As shown in the
public lands debate, many people like the idea of small government, but not the loss of
benefits or privileges that may accompany it. This presents a political problem for
privatization supporters because, loathe as they are to admit it, privatization frequently
results m cutbacks or, at the very least, changes in a program’s services or benefits.
President Reagan’s failure with public lands policy stemmed in part from the way
he framed the issue of privatization. Unlike President Clinton, who later emphasized a
dialogue about what should properly be considered a public or private sector function,
Reagan tried to win public support by urging the wisdom of a conscious effort to reduce
government.” Convincing people that particular policy direction is wise is undeniably a
great political challenge, one that Reagan’s team was not up to meeting. The
overzealousness of his administration’s approach when it came to privatization
discouraged dialogue, even though debate about government’s proper role is the only way
substantial privatization can occur. Some might use Reagan’s lack of success privatizing
as evidence of the dangers of ideological stridency. It is more accurate to see his failure
to privatize extensively as a good illustration of the paramount importance of compromise
and respectful dialogue with one’s opponents, and of the central reality that being a strong
ideologue does not preclude such necessary steps.
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CHAPTER 5
the CLINTON YEARS
Ifone were to ask even the most astute observer ofAmerican politics which
administration was being described by the conservative Heritage Foundation when it
proclaimed, “The combination of a new commitment to privatization among Members of
Congress and the endorsement and support of the President for many privatization
projects has dramatically altered the political environment and contributed to
unprecedented success,”' most would guess the Reagan administration, and they would
be wrong. Bill Clinton was a more successful privatizer than Ronald Reagan or any other
twentieth century president, and it is important to ask why.
Three primary reasons can be offered. First, the Clinton administration stood in
contrast to Reagan’s in its ability to have a dialogue with political opponents and in its
willingness to compromise. The privatization of the United States Enrichment
Corporation, charged with dealing with spent nuclear tuel, was attempted in the Reagan
administration and met with heavy resistance. It happened under Clinton, largely through
what the Heritage Foundation called “a study in how to win through accommodation.”2
Second, the Clinton team picked less controversial subjects for privatization than did
Reagan s. In contrast to Reagan’s attention to volatile issues like public lands, Clinton
generally stayed away from privatizing in politically divisive policy areas. The third main
factor was contextual - the substantial consensus that existed among Republicans and
Democrats over the wisdom of privatization. While Reagan did not privatize a lot
himself, one could make a strong case that he changed the dialogue about how much
government should do. “It is not government's obligation to provide services,” said one
Ronald D. Utt, “Transferring Functions to the Private Sector,” in Mandatefor Leadership IV: Turning
Ideas into Actions (Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1997), 144.
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leading politician during the Reagan era, “but to see that they are provided ”3 I, would
surprise many to know that the politician in question was liberal icon and New York
Governor Mario Cuomo. Support for privatization had by this time clearly crossed
ideological and partisan boundaries.
One appropriate case study to illustrate the tactical approach of the Clinton
administration as well as the political climate in which it existed is the history of the
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act [FAIR Act] of 1998. This legislation was
designed to minimize (and in its earlier versions to eliminate) government competition
with the private sector m providing goods and services. This had been an issue of varying
intensity for much of the twentieth century, but the election of a Republican Congress in
1994, energized by what many political observers felt to be a conservative mandate,
pushed the issue to the fore.
Many newly elected members, as well as the Speaker who led them, felt the
private sector to be more efficient and effective than government in almost every
instance, and thus early versions of the FAIR bill were given the more aggressive title,
“The Freedom from Government Competition Act” [FGCA]. The act mandated that all
functions not inherently governmental” (a phrase laden with ambiguity) would be
automatically privatized, even if a cost-benefit analysis showed that a government agency
could do the job more efficiently. This provision, striking in its belligerence toward
government and its faith in the private sector, would eventually die under political attack
from Clinton and other Democrats as well as from public sector unions. But the revised
legislation then took only two years from introduction to enactment, a reasonably quick
resolution, given the cumbersome nature of the country’s law making process. Just as
importantly, each side in the end got some of what it wanted. The story of the FAIR
Act’s passage suggests that privatization initiatives, though fraught with much more
-^Martin Tolchin, “More Cities Paying Industry to Provide Public Services,” New York Times, 28 May
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political danger than most realize, are more likely to become law if the particular issue is
not an emotional, divisive one. if both sides are willing to have a dialogue and to
compromise, and if the politieal climate at the time is at least somewhat open to the
privatization idea.
The FAIR Act’s Roots
Most people would not be surprised that the issue of whether “commercial”
functions should be earned out by the public sector had been discussed during the Reagan
years. What is striking is the degree of importance with which the issue was viewed by
many elements of the small business community. One prominent business publication
listed government competition with the private sector as one of the two “best present
prospect[s] for a big-gain issue” to help the small business community (and thus the
chances of whichever party took up the cause) heading into the 1984 election.^
Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), a moderate Republican, not markedly partisan
or ideological, was the primary voice behind the Freedom from Government Competition
Act of 1983. Although the bill never got past the committee hearing stage, it was the
catalyst for debates which would surround the legislation a decade later. Rudman tried to
tackle what would prove to be by far the most vexing of these issues, what could be
considered a legitimate function of government, by asking three questions:
Does a legitimate national defense requirement exist for the production or
provision of the good or service? Is production or provision of the good or
service necessary to the legitimate managerial or fiduciary functions of
government? Are competitive private sources available to supply the good or
service?^
^Milton D. Stewart, “An Open Letter to the National Party Chairman: Your Small Business Advisory
Group Could Make 1984 a Memorable Year for Legislative Issues,” Inc. 5 (1983): 213.
^Warren Rudman, “Putting the Government Out of Business,” Inc. 5 (1983): 16.
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Rudman-s cause failed during his time in the Senate and such legislation would
not be introduced again in Congress until 1995. Once Reagan was out of office, an
administration came to power less friendly to the notion of eliminating government
competition or to almost any other privatization initiative. George Bush, who had spent
many years in federal government service, for a time heading a government agency, was
more supportive of federal government employees than his predecessor, calling them
early in his administration, “the men and women whom I regard as some of America’s
finest.’’^ Bush gutted the federal privatization office and undertook no major initiatives
in the area.’ This combined with the limited results of the Reagan privatization policies
to cause great frustration among believers in small government. One member of the
libertarian Cato Institute bemoaned, “There’s no more privatization under Reagan and
Bush than there has been under Gorbachev.’’^
A president not committed to privatization along with a Democratic congress
stifled any chance that a significantly greater number of duties would be taken on by the
private sector. In fact, much of the Bush years was spent with both the president and
Congress studying whether the private sector was doing too much relative to government.
As one scholar at the time observed, “Clearly the climate on Capitol Hill and in the
administration is shifting fi-om an ideological commitment to contracting out to its use as
a tool only when it is undoubtedly in the best interests of the agency and taxpayers.”^
President Clinton took a similarly practical approach to the issue, never privatizing with
the ideological zeal that Reagan did. But he turned to privatization more as his
administration progressed, and achieved greater success with the issue than had occurred
during the Reagan era.
^George H.W. Bush, “Commentary: ‘To Serve the American People,’” PA Times 12, no. 3 (1989): 2.
'A. Search of Public Papers ofthe Presidents did not reveal any mention of privatization during the Bush
et al., “Taking the Town Private,” 54.
^Naff, “Labor-Management,” 27.
presidency.
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New President. Still T.ittle Privatization
The Bush administration’s policy shift away from privatization was still present
early in the Clinton administration. An Office of Management and Budget press release
less than two months after Clinton’s inauguration raised the possibility that perhaps
government “does too much contracting out.’’ 0MB Director Leon Panetta asked agency
heads to review their privatization policies in order to get a “fresh look” at contracting.”
Three questions were raised by Panetta:
1) Are existing contracts “accomplishing what was intended?”
2) Are there adequate procedures to monitor contracted services?
3) Are any of the contracted services inherently governmental and therefore
inappropriate for contracting outside of government? ’o
One probably could have counted on one hand the number of people who would have
asked such questions during the Reagan administration.
While the political atmosphere of the early 1990s was less hostile to government
and its bureaucracy than during the Reagan years, there was still a great amount of
distrust toward government, and such feelings among politicians and the populace are an
enduring component in the American political psyche. Important to realize, however, is
that President Clinton’s response to the distrust was at first different from Reagan’s.
Rather than putting his focus on reducing government, the Bill Clinton of 1993 was intent
on making it work better.
The 42nd President’s Inaugural Address reveals a telling contrast with the Reagan
years. Americans were not being told, as they were by President Reagan, that government
was the problem. Instead, government was to be reformed and reworked in order to
“make our government a place for what Franklin Roosevelt called bold, persistent
^^Press release, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget,
16 March 1993.
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experimentation.”’
' Consequently, the new president’ s response to people’s discontent
wuh bureaucracy was titled
“Reinvertting Govenr^ent” [REGO] in which the printary
focus was not on reduction but on reform. In fact, a key inspiration for the REGO
initiative, Reinveming Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the
Publie Sector by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, was explicit in asserting that the
challenge was to stay away from debates focusing on more or less government. “Our
fundamental problem today,” they wrote, “is not too much government or too little
government. We have debated that issue endlessly...and it has not solved our
problems...We do not need more government or less government, we need belter
government.”'
2
Opinion polls from the first two years of the Clinton administration revealed that
the president’s efforts to portray himself as a genuine and effective reformer of
government did not win him points with the American public. '3 Few gave the president
much credit for his reform efforts and, according to one report, the proportion of
Americans who said government was too intrusive nearly doubled, from less than half in
1992 to more than three quarters in 1994.”'4 This rejection of the president and the
bureaucracy he led was confirmed in elections that year, as Republicans walloped
Democrats at every governmental level, including taking control of both houses of the
United States Congress.
It did not take long for the administration to react to the conservative tidal wave.
The failure of Clinton’s 1993 health care bill had already started the idea percolating
among A1 Gore and others within the administration that perhaps reduction and not mere
reform was the proper course. The election debacle gave their argument the political
William Clinton, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: 1993 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1 994), 2.
^
^Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, 23-4.
There is also no evidence that Vice President Gore drew much strength as a presidential candidate from
his deep personal involvement as leader of the administration’s “reinventing government” efforts.
National Public Radio, 26 December 1994, transcript no. 1708-9.
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momentum it needed within the White House. Two weeks after the Republican victory.
Vice President Gore sent a memo to each department ordering it to justify each program
under its jurisdiction or risk its being terminated, privatized or given over to state or local
govemment.15 “There’s a more serious intent,” said one Department of Transportation
official at the time, “at looking not just at how (agency) business is done but what
business is done.”'« When in the month after the election. Vice President Gore and 0MB
Director Alice Rivlin negotiated cuts totaling $19.5 billion in the departments of Energy,
Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, it signaled the second phase of the
Reinventing Government effort.
Ihe Case for the Freedom from Government Competition Art
A Republican Congress and an administration newly committed to cutting
government spending inspired renewed discussion and activity regarding the Freedom
from Government Competition Act. Representative John Duncan (R-TN) introduced a
bill in 1995 which was similar to Rudman’s 1980s legislation. It quickly died in
committee, but another legislative effort was made the following year. Perhaps the
primary argument made for the FGCA was that the proportion of commercial jobs being
done by the public sector was increasing, and many believed it would continue to do so.
In an argument that could be taken right from public choice theory, proponents claimed
that the procedure government used to determine the efficiency of the public sector
relative to the private in performing a given job was biased toward government in order to
ensure that its employees get to keep their jobs and government its power.
^
^Michael Kelly, “Rip It Up,” New Yorker, 23 January 1995, 33.
^
^Stephen Barr, “Shaving the Fat, Sparing the Meat: Agencies Grapple with Reinvention Phase II,”
Washington Post, 30 January 1995, sec. A, p. 13.
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One of the act’s proponents claimed that “not one single agency uses A-76
competitions outside of the DOD’’i’ and that one reason for this was the pressure
employees were under not to mittate the process of pursuing privatization. Proponents
wondered if the act’s opponents were so concerned with the fate of government workers
whose duties get privatized (a danger the bill’s supporters said was overblown), why they
were also not concerned with employees “willing to risk their careers, jeopardizing
potential career paths and future promotions”'* by initiating a public/private efficiency
comparison.
Even when analysis was done regarding the efficiency of an agency versus the
private sector in performing a given task, proponents argued, the document on which the
process was based, 0MB Circular A-76, was so full of loopholes as to be rendered nearly
useless. Under A-76, one of the primary defenses agencies had against privatizing a
given function was to claim that it was “inherently governmental.” Senator Craig
Thomas [R-WY] noted with disdain: “The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency claims
that all 1 8,000 of its employees are doing inherently governmental work. However, the
commercial activities EPA provides for itself include environmental laboratory testing,
engineering, and mapping services.”' ^ FGCA supporters angrily cited examples such as
the 1997 ICEMAN [Integrated Computing Environmental Frame and Networking]
incident in which the Agriculture Department won a sizable contract fi-om the Federal
Aviation Administration over the private sector powerhouse Electronic Data Systems to
perform a number of major computer projects. The size of the contract irked some, as did
the fact that it was awarded to a department whose jurisdiction was not computer work
over several bidders who would seem more suited to the task. The FGCA was, in the
^
^“Weakened Government Competition Bill Clears Senate, House Holds Hearings,” Environmental
Laboratory Washington Report 9, no. 15 (1998).
^
^“Senate Hearing Builds Case for Opening Up Government Work,” Environmental Laboratory
Washington Report 8, no. 13 (1997).
'^House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, Committee on
Government Management, Hearings on HR716, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 29 September 1997, 27.
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view of its proponents, an effective way for government agencies to meet the dual goals
of responding to demands on agencies to eliminate jobs while still remaining true to their
core objectives.
The language in support of the FGCA was often strident. Warren Rudman’s
passionate defense of the FGCA contained the startling declaration that to accept the
argument of the act’s opponents “represents an acceptance of socialism, a theory that
advocates governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and
distribution of goods and services.”20 Another supporter spoke of “the cancer of
government competition.”2i The most intriguing aspect about such outspoken rhetoric is
the somewhat ironic motivation behind it. Most of the act’s supporters had such an
enormous faith in the efficiency and efficacy of the private sector that they were willing
to eschew competition if the competition led to the public sector performing activities
they considered to be outside government’s bounds. Supporters went so far as to say that
even if a cost-benefit analysis showed that government could do the job more cheaply, it
should still be turned over to the private sector because, so the act’s supporters
proclaimed, “Numerous studies confirm what we should all know intuitively: private
companies can produce the commercial goods and services...more cheaply than
government itself can.”22 If a given function is available in the private sector and not part
of the government’s core functions, many FGCA supporters felt it is by definition the
business world’s to perform.
The steadfast faith in competition, so much a part of the ideology ofmany FGCA
supporters, withered away when a government agency would follow the advice of
^^Rudman, “Putting Government Out of Business,” 15.
Milton D. Stewart, “An Open Letter to the National Party Chairman: Your Small Business Advisory
Group Could Make 1984 a Memorable Year for Legislative Issues,” Inc. 5 (1983): 213.
^^Rudman, “Putting Government Out of Business,” 15.
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Osborne and Gaebler for the public sector to become more “entrepreneurial.” In fact the
term “entrepreneurial government” became taboo in the minds of government’s harshest
critics:
Under the Clinton administration’s ‘reinventing’ government initiatives, agencies
not only engage m commercial activities for their own use...but have become
entrepreneurial and are marketing their services to other government agencies and
the commercial marketplace.”23
The reasoning that dictated “there ought to be competition, but the competition ought to
exist within the private sector ^4 went against the reinventing government movement,
and thus it was not a surprise that Ted Gaebler was a vocal opponent of early versions of
the FGCA. Even well-known privatizers had their doubts about the legislation.
Republican Stephen Goldsmith, admired by many as a pioneer in privatizing city services
when he was mayor of Indianapolis, was cautious about supporting the FGCA, explaining
that mandated head-to-head competition between the public and private sector”^^ was at
the heart of his privatization policy because in his view, that was the only method for
determining what should be privatized.
The roots of this controversy lay partly in the 1994 Government Management
Reform Act,^’ intended to utilize the Osbome-Gaebler thesis that the power of the market
promotes governmental efficiency. A fund was established that would pay for more
centralized administrative support services for a number of different agencies. Those
agencies were thus encouraged through the law to compete with each other to provide
9 ^
^House Subcommittee, Hearings on HR716, 25.
2^“New Privatization Bill Hits the Senate Floor,” Environmental Laboratory Washington Report 7, no. 10
0996).
^^Two of the primary works from the reinventing government movement are Osborne and Gaebler,
Reinventing Government, and National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a
Government that Works Better and Costs Less (New York: Times Books, Random House, 1993).
^^House Subcommittee, Hearings on HR716, 40.
Government Management Reform Act, Public Law 103-356, 103rd Cong., 2d sess., 13 October 1994.
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services ,o other agencies and then receive payments from the fitnd. Tlte business world
was of course largely composed of believers in the forces of the market, and they were
naturally inclined to support the bill, but only if they could share in its benefits by being
able to win the contracts themselves. Interest groups fonned to support such an idea, and
they got a pronounced political boost when the award of the ICEMAN contract to the
Department of Agriculture produced an uproar. The Government Management Reform
Act, designed to appease pro-market forces, set events in motion which angered them
more than ever.
Ironically, then, some of the groups that often criticized unions for being selfish in
opposing privatization now seemed motivated themselves by self-interest in opposing
government competition with the private sector. Furthering the irony, FGCA supporters
used some of the same arguments unions had used against privatization for years, one
supporter arguing “everyone...knows that procurement based on the lowest cost is not the
best way to do it.”28 While this was a fair point, it was precisely the type of argument for
which unions had been criticized as being interested only in protecting their own jobs.
Taking note of a political group’s self-interested motives should not be grounds to
dismiss its arguments, for often honestly held beliefs are behind them. While it would be
unfair to assume that this was not true in the case ofFGCA supporters, one has to look
no further than this legislation to confirm that boosters of privatization’s cause as well as
its opponents are motivated by more than just their sense of the public interest. While
motivation cannot be proven, economic self-interest, which can be objectively
demonstrated, does seem to be a marker for self-interestedness in many cases.
^°“ACIL Supports Bill, Says Commercial-Type Work Best Done By Private Sector,” Environmental
Laboratory Washington Report 9, no. 8 (1998).
Ill
The Cage Against thg Freedom from Government Competition Act
The forces opposed to the FGCA (a group which included the administration and
for some time the General Accounting Office) argued that the USDA ICEMAN deal with
FAA, far from being evidence for their adversaries’ position, was just the opposite. The
Agriculture Department had won the competition fairly by showing it could do the job
more cheaply, and to deny the outcome was to deny the power of the market, thus
betraying the ideological foundation of the act’s supporters. FGCA opponents suspected
that rather than being motivated by efficiency, supporters were driven by an irrational
hatred toward government and its workers. Opponents ofFGCA were concerned by the
fact that the bill would result in downsized government workers trying to find work with
other agencies at a time when the budgets of agencies around them were also being
reduced.
As further evidence of their argument that supporters were putting ideology ahead
of efficiency, opponents asserted that there were certain situations in which privatizing all
elements of a program made no practical sense. A 1996 GAO report commenting on the
act offered examples of those circumstances. They included situations when
services below a minimum value threshold where contracting would be
cumbersome or inappropriate, a situation where flexibility is essential to the
performance of a function, making it difficult to specify contract requirements in
output form, and when some modicum of government capability would help
provide government employees technical expertise to judge private sector
performance.^^
But the biggest factor encouraging inefficiency, some said, was the very system which
would be created by the FGCA, in which functions would be defined as either inherently
^^Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Federal Contracting: Comments on SI 724, The Freedomfrom
Government Competition Act, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 24 September 1996, 4-5.
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governmental or commercial and, if the latter, privatized automatically. Opponents
claimed the law would lead to perpetual delays, as unions, interest groups, citizens, and
many others haggled endlessly over what qualifies as “inherently governmental.”
There was evidence to believe that on this point at least, FGCA opponents were
right. Bill advocates proclaimed a simple rule, “If it’s commercial in nature, it should be
done by the private sector.”30 There had always had been a belief that, in Warren
Rudman s words, the decision for or against governmental jurisdiction merely involves
establishing a “simple and direct” standard by which to judge.”3i Since agencies had not
used the Circular A-76 guidelines much anyway, the question had not been much of a
distraction before. But when the issue had arisen, terms like “inherently governmental”
proved difficult to define, and a law in place that mandated the privatization of any
function not in that category would surely lead to the issue coming to the fore.
Circular A-76 had been updated constantly since its inception in 1966. When the
first FGCA was proposed in the early 1980s, 0MB through A-76 had offered only two
criteria for what constituted a commercial function; the activity could not be inherently
governmental and it had to be available at comparable quality from the private sector.33
In 1992, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, under the jurisdiction of0MB,
deemed a function “inherently governmental” as being one “that is so intimately related to
the public interest as to mandate performance by government employees. These functions
include those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying
government authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the
govemment.”33
10 .....
“New Pnvatization Bill Hits the Senate Floor,” Environmental Laboratory Washington Report 7, no. 10
D. Stewart, “An Open Letter to the National Party Chairmen: Your Small Business Advisory
Group Could Make 1984 a Memorable Year for Legislative Issues,” 7«c. 5 (1983): 214.
^^Michael Laurie Tingle, “Privatization and the Reagan Administration: Ideology and Application,” Yale
Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 234.
^^Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, “Inherently
Governmental Functions,” Letter 92-123, September 1992.
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Not surprisingly, the standard for what is “inherently govennnental” under the
ongrnal Freedom from Government Competition Act was higher, allowing for fewer
instances m which an agency could make a claim that a function was part of the
government’s core responsibilities. The legislation was explicit in not including as
inherently governmental:
1) gathering information for or providing advice, opinions, recommendations or
ideas to government officials 2) any function that is primarily ministerial or
internal m nature (such as building security, mail operations, operation of
cafeterias, housekeeping facilities operation and maintenance, warehouse
operations, motor vehicle fleet management and operations, or other routine
electrical or mechanical services.^^
The General Accounting Office was correct in concluding, “Activities exempt from the
contracting requirement are likely to be substantially reduced from current practice,”35
and the act’s creators deserved credit for at least attempting to demystify this difficult
question. But honest attempts to define it aside, common sense dictated that opponents
were probably correct in saying that experience, adjudication, and consequent adjustment
would be the primary paths to achieving understanding on the issue.
There were, of course, lines that almost everyone agreed should not be crossed
when privatizing. One obvious example frequently given is high-level international
diplomacy. While no one suggested privatizing that, some proposals were offered and
rejected because the activity was considered too integral to government’s functions.
Proposals to contract out the Internal Revenue Service, for in.stance, received much
criticism, even from right wing camps. The conservative Ludwig Von Mises Institute
was a strong opponent of the plan, arguing:
Freedomfrom Government Competition Act, SI 724, 2 May 1996.
Nye Stevens, United States General Accounting Office. Senate Committee, Federal Contracting:
Comments on S. 1724, The Freedomfrom Government Competition Act, 2.
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Are we not supposed to favor privatization over public provision? Generally vesbut this ,s not the case^The authority to collect an internal tax is anrong he ,;^s
’
dangerous powers of the central government. Contracting out to private provide sonly compounds the problem. A Congress working at the behest of the America^people would restrain taxes, not make their collection more successful. No policygimmick--and privatization certainly qualifies as that-can substitute for
authoritative change in the role of government itself.”36
The Von Mises Institute did not represent the thinking of the entire right wing. One can
take as evidence of that the fact that the bill was proposed at all. But most agreed with
the institute and thought privatizing the IRS was beyond the pale of what was wise or
appropriate. Many of these questions, however, were not as easy to resolve. No
definitive proclamations will be made for either side. But it can be said with certainty
that the line between inherently governmental and not is rarely the straightforward, purely
managerial standard some make it out to be. It is instead a line that people of good faith
draw in different places, frequently reflecting dominant attitudes rather than logical
deduction.
The Search For a Consensus: 1995- 1998. from fgca to fair
Tlie 104th Congress commenced in 1995 with leaders of the Republican majority
believing they had a resounding message from the public to reduce government in any
way possible, and privatization policies were natural outgrowths of this perceived
mandate. Tnie to its nature and due to the strong partisan leadership of Speaker Gingrich,
the House of Representatives quickly became a hub of frenetic conservative
policymaking.
Much time, energy, and debate was expended on the privatization cause during
1995, and fourteen separate bills were circulating in the House in September of that year.
Representative Scott Klug (R-WI) was appointed head of the House task force to
^^Llewellyn Rockwell Jr., “Privatize Tax Collections?” Washington Times, 1 October 1995, sec. B, p. 1.
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coordinate the effort, and, just as Republican icon Ronald Reagan had done, Klug began
working on a plan to slash agency budgets in anticipation of savings they would achieve
from contracting out.^^ Other members tried to build momentum for privatization by
turning over the barber shop and many smaller congressional operations to the private
sector.
The 1996 version of the FGCA was introduced on May 2 and its rigidity,
mandating that all functions not inherently governmental be privatized, drew the ire of
the Clinton administration. Such a provision, testified one key Clinton administration
official, would only “limit competition...and government’s flexibility to seek the most
efficient and cost-effective method of work performance...and thus may result in
increased costs to the taxpayer.”3s One set of voices noticeably muted in criticizing the
act was that of the public sector unions. An explanation for their silence was offered by
one writer at the time, “Privatization initiatives are seen as plausible alternatives to
layoffs.”39 Unions felt backed into a comer and feared that any attempt to oppose the
political phenomenon of privatization and government reduction would be seen as being
motivated purely by self-interest.
With the 1997 FGCA, a noticeable attempt took place to lessen the hostility
toward the national government that had been an integral part of the 1 996 version. A
section was inserted into the new bill making “fairness for federal employees”'*® one of
the objectives. Gone was a provision requiring that if a function had to be performed by
government, a state or local entity had to do it if possible. Most significantly, rather than
a definite privatization schedule being created which an agency was required to follow, a
cost-benefit analysis procedure was introduced that would help determine in what sector a
^^Tom Shoop, “Shrinking Government,” Government Executive 27 (1995): 7.
^^Stevens, Senate Committee, Federal Contracting: Comments on SI 724, The Freedomfrom Government
Competition Act, 14.
^^Lisa Corbin, “Going Commercial,” Government Executive 26 (1996): 5.
^^Freedomfrom Government Competition Act of1997, S314, 12 February 1997, section 4, part A,
subsection 2, part B.
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function was best performed. The new bill still mandated that agencies write regulations
which would “emphasize preference for the provision of goods and services by private
sector sources.”'^’
Despite the attempts at assuagement, the signals regarding how much an agency
was required to privatize were mixed, confusing, and therefore still threatening to the
act’s opponents. The 1997 bill, after all, was still called the Freedom from Government
Competition Act, still had as its primary stated purpose “to require that the federal
government procure from the private sector the goods and services necessary for the
operations and management of certain government agencies” and still mandated in one
part that each agency shall procure from sources in the private sector all goods and
services that are necessary for or beneficial to the accomplishment of authorized functions
of the agency” and that “no agency may begin or carry out any activity to provide any
products or services that can be provided by the private sector.”^2
The contradictory messages of the 1997 version of the FGCA yielded incongruous
descriptions of the legislation’s true intent. The contradictions would in fact sometimes
occur within the same set of comments. Testimony by one official from the General
Accounting Office during a congressional hearing about the bill acknowledged that “S3 14
prohibits agencies from beginning or carrying out any activity to provide any products or
services that can be provided by the private sector,” but two pages later claimed, “S3 14
neither encourages nor prohibits public-private competitions.”'^^
The softer language of the bill was part of an attempt at conciliation, and that
effort met with some success. A meeting that spring between the bill’s Senate champion.
Senator Craig Thomas [R-WY], and representatives of the American Federation of
Government Employees helped make amends. One of Thomas’s aides termed the
^^Ibid., section 4, part A, subsection 2, part A.
'^^Ibid., Introduction, section 3A and section 3B.
Nye Stevens, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S314: Freedomfrom Government
Competition Act, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 18 June 1997, 75, 86.
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gathering very amiable” and said that the union “expressed appreciation for
improvements in the bill,” one of them being “the fact that it would permit agencies to
compete for work against private sector companies.”44 The act received a further boost
that summer when it was endorsed by the General Accounting Office, citing as one of its
reasons its belief that Circular A-76 was not being enforced by the 0MB Despite these
gains, the bill’s contradictory messages undermined its chances. FGCA supporters did
not adequately address concerns caused by the mixed messages. Senator Craig Thomas,
for instance, seemed at a loss to explain why the bill would emphasize competition while
still being called the “Freedom from Government Competition Act,” saying when asked
about the matter only that “bringing in competition perfects last year’s bill.”46
The 1998 version of the FGCA was certainly tamer than its predecessors.
Renamed with the less objectionable titles “The Fair Competition Act” in the Senate and
the “Competition in Commercial Activities Act” in the House, the new legislation stated
that the public sector had at least a right to compete with the private. But there was still a
definite number (20%) ofjobs that agencies were required to turn over to the private
sector, and Senator Thomas still was intent on “remove[ing] the competition of the
federal government in those things that could as well, or indeed, better be done in the
private sector.”"^^
The act’s emphasis, then, was at least partly on mandatory privatization, and still
attracted the ire of unions as well as the 0MB. A key hearing was held on March 24,
1998, in which G. Edward Deseve, Acting Deputy Director for Management in the 0MB,
testified that “the administration policy is to promote competition...not simply to
‘^'^“More Business Groups Rally Behind Thomas-Duncan Legislation,” Environmental Laboratory
Washington Report 8, no. 6 ( 1 997).
^^Paymen Pejman, “Proposed Bill Sets Guidelines for Agencies Selling Software,” Government Computer
News 16(1997): 53.
^^“More Business Groups Rally Behind Thomas-Duncan Legislation.”
^^Thomas Hargrove, “Union Battles Federal Privatization,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 15 July 1998, sec. A,
p. 8.
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outsource” and that “current guidance to promote competition is in place (through
Circular A-76) ” Despite supporters’ attempts to soften the edges of the previous bill, to
the OMB the new act did not recognize that “the complexities of public-public and
public-private competitions must be reflected in any legislation.” In the final analysis, the
administration’s primary objection was what it had been from the beginning for most
every opponent: “Legislation must not require the head of each agency to undertake
competition in accordance with a schedule mandated in law.”48 Some previous objectors
did respond more favorably to the new act. A former aide to Indianapolis Mayor Stephen
Goldsmith, who previously deemed a mandate to contract out as being against the spirit
of competition, saw enough of a change in the new bill to support it. But without the
administration’s support, passage still seemed elusive.
It became doubtful by the middle of 1998 that a bill mandating privatization
would ever survive the legislative process. The response ofFGCA backers was, naturally
enough, to compromise on the legislation. Compromise is something for which
politicians are frequently reviled, but it is almost always necessary given the nature of the
American legislative process. Lyndon Johnson once defended such dealmaking by
proclaiming, “Half a loaf is better than one.” In the case of the FGCA, the bill’s
supporters seemed resigned to having to accept somewhere between a quarter loaf and a
single slice. The most familiar element in the 1998 version was the bill number, S3 14,
but other than that, almost everything was changed.
Gone was the hostile description of purpose: “To require that the federal
government procure from the private sector the goods and services necessary for the
operations and management of certain government agencies.”'’^ The new legislation was
given the innocuous title “The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Acf ’ and had as its
^°Senate, Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998: Report ofthe Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 105th Cong., 2d sess., 1998, S. Rept. 105-269, section 3.
'^Freedomfrom Government Competition Act, SI 724, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 2 May 1996, Section 1.
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stated purpose “to provide a process for identifying the functions of the federal
government that are not inherently governmental functions.”50 Also eventually
eliminated was any notion mandating that agencies not inherently governmental be
privatized. In contrast to the procedure under Circular A-76, agencies would now be
required to publish within a reasonable time a list ofjobs which were not “inherently
governmental” (and thus acceptable to privatize) and have such lists open to debate by the
general public. Agencies also had to use “a competitive process to select the source”
using “realistic and fair cost comparisons.”5> But the fact that agencies had the final say
on what was deemed inherently governmental or commercial left the FAIR Act with
arguably as many loopholes as had been found in the procedure it was intended to
improve.
The Passage of The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of i qqr
With the legislation revised almost beyond recognition, it began to acquire more
support and quickly made it through the Senate by the end of July 1998. The government
employee union lobby, both emboldened by the original bill’s demise and fearful that
legislation encouraging more competition would eventually pass, became more strident in
its opposition. A more aggressive stance was to be adopted by unions in early 1998.
Being “crossed” by the administration on this bill, the AFGE president claimed, would be
“grounds for divorce. In addition to the standard arguments about privatization being
unfair for government employees and inequitable for recipients of government services,
very assertive statements were made based on financial prudence. In the spring of 1998,
for instance, the AFGE claimed that contractors were so wasteful that government, if
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, Public Law 105-270, 105th Cong., 2d sess., 19 October 1998,
section 1.
^hbid., section 3, subsection D.
s?
Hargrove, “Union Battles.”
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given back jobs already privatized, could cut expenditures $50 billion over five years
without hurting service, an argument notable for its mirror image of frequent critiques of
government. 53
Although public sector unions were undoubtedly pleased at the demise of
legislation that mandated privatization of all commercial functions, they did not get their
wish to stop privatization’s encouragement through law completely. The newly titled and
completely redesigned act took an enormous step toward passage in August 1998 at the
final set of House hearings on the matter, when the 0MB supported the FAIR act for the
first time. After that hurdle was crossed, it was only a matter of time before the FAIR act
was made law. It passed the Senate by unanimous consent on July 30, 1998, the House
by voice vote and was signed by the president just 1 1 days later. The AFGE attempted to
save political face by arguing to their members: “In 1998, the AFGE defeated the
contractor-backed Freedom from Government Competition Act and replaced it with the
FAIR Act, which codified existing government regulations. ”5'^
The Implementation Struggle
About one year after the act’s passage, agencies for the first time published lists of
commercial jobs that they considered appropriate for outsourcing. Many long-time
champions of the legislation were disappointed and angered by the lists, arguing that the
released documents had no standard format or central location at which they were
available, and were intentionally opaque in hopes that any potential objector to the lists
would not be able to decipher them, much less react to them, within the required 30 days.
Representative Pete Sessions (R-TX), who had been a key sponsor of the legislation,
CO
•^^“AFGE Rails Against Pnvatization, Mobilizes Federal Workforce to Fight Bill,” Environmental
Laboratory Washington Report 9, no. 8 (1998).
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, “Join the Fight to Clean Up the SWAMP,”
Government Standard 15 (1997): 1.
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complained in a letter to the 0MB: “In trying to get the list of aetivities available for each
of the [agencies], my staff ran into wrong numbers, obstinate staff, and even agencies that
said they were not prepared to release their lists yet.”5s November 1999, 300,000 jobs
had been listed by agencies as possible objects of privatization. But even an agency that
released a lengthy list of commercial jobs was not immune from withering criticism, as
some charged that those agencies’ lists were long only so they could take the heat off
themselves by giving the appearance that they supported privatization.
The Office of Management and Budget, for its part, argued that those who were
complaining should at least be grateful that lists are being published at all, which in the
administration’s view was a significant first step. It was not OMB’s responsibility, the
administration argued, to create a standard format or central document gathering location,
as the agencies were by law the creators and ultimate decisionmakers regarding the lists.
Regardless of who had the better argument, what was clear was that once again
privatization, a reform with a reputation of being an objective exercise in good
management, had turned into a highly contentious, politically charged affair with each
side’s ideological inclination evident.
Clinton Pleases the Privatizers
While supporters of the Freedom from Government Competition Act were in the
end dissatisfied with a bill they had hoped would be a major catalyst for outsourcing,
conservative scholars viewed the privatization efforts of the Clinton administration with
some degree of favor. As many of the act’s supporters were battling the president for his
lack of support for the legislation and the Republican agenda in general, the Heritage
Foundation called Clinton’s 1996 budget “the boldest privatization agenda put forth by
^^Christopher Dorobek, “Agencies’ Outsourcing Lists Draw Stiff Criticism,” Government Computer News,
1 1 October 1 999, 6.
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any American president to date.”56 while some legislators were faulting the
administration for its handling of the FAIR Act, the Reason Foundation, one of the
strongest privatization advocate groups, called the legislation “the highlight of the year
for privatization.”57 We return then to the question posed at the chapter’s beginning; why
would Ronald Reagan, arguably the most conservative president of the 20th century, be
such a disappointment to privatization advocates while Bill Clinton, a president usually
excoriated by those on the Right, have a respectable record of success on the issue? Four
factors may have operated to foster Clinton’s privatization success. These are: (1)
bipartisan congressional support for privatization, (2) the Democratic Party having virtual
immunity from any political charge of being heartless towards the needy, (3) careful
choices by Clinton of relatively noncontroversial areas to privatize and of pragmatic
language supporting the policy and (4) a willingness by Clinton to engage in dialogue and
to compromise with his opponents.
Some of Clinton s success can be attributed to having the good fortune to take
office when Congress was largely behind privatization efforts. He assumed the
presidency at a time when there was agreement among many that government was fat and
wasteful and needed to be reduced. By contrast, while Reagan was successful at
constructing majorities supporting his policies, a significant liberal Democratic voice was
still unabashedly defending government during his time in office. One congressman who
was no fan of President Clinton, Scott Klug (R-WI), acknowledged that in the 1990s both
the executive and legislative branches agreed on the need for privatization.
Clinton was also helped by being a Democrat. Just as it took a Republican
conservative like Reagan to reduce nuclear arms, only a Democrat could reduce
government. Democrats since the early 1970s had been tagged as being softer on defense
“Domestic Policy Issues,” 147.
^'^Privatization 2000:The Fourteenth Annual Report on Privatization (Los Angeles: Reason Public Policy
Institute, 2000), 7.
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than Republicans, and thus would only encourage that label by supporting arms reduction.
Similarly, Republicans had been labeled for just as long as heartless slashers of
government programs that help people and thus had to be careful to be seen as
compassionate as well as fiscally prudent. This was especially true in Reagan’s case, a
man who had a reputation going into office, deserved or not, of being a radical
conservative intent on destroying the social safety net. This may have led Reagan to fear
that extensive privatization would only further that perception.
While Clinton did enjoy some fortunate timing that helped his privatization
efforts, it is clear that our 42nd President also made some of his own luck. Due to his
beliefs as much as political expediency, he shied away from picking areas for
privatization that would cause divisive, ideological battles, and was successful at turning
privatization into a practical, management oriented discussion.^s By contrast, Reagan’s
support for privatizing public lands was a policy position made for division, as it seemed
to call into question a value many Americans held dear, environmental protection, and
was an issue with a number of long established, well organized interest groups ready to
challenge him.
It may be said, then, that Clinton was often more discerning than Reagan about
what the general public considered to be a core government function. But in addition to
being more politically astute on this issue than Reagan, he was also more willing to have
a dialogue and to compromise with political adversaries. Once the FAIR Act dropped its
mandatory privatization provision, the administration was willing to support the
legislation. Although a far cry fi-om what the FGCA was originally, it was nevertheless a
^^David R. Morgan and Robert E. England have said that is why more privatization takes place at the local
level, where the issues addressed tend to be more practical ones. See Morgan and England, “The Two
Faces of Privatization,” 979-87.
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concession by the administration to require government agencies, many ofthem
containing a high proportion of Clinton backers who expected his support on the issue, to
spend the time and effort composing and defending job lists.
The FAIR Act’s Tmportanrp
The FAIR Act’s story, embodying these four factors, is a useful example of the
success the Clinton administration had in employing a delicate and effective balancing act
between toughness and compromise in negotiations about the legislation. But also
helpful to Clinton was that he advocated a small to moderate amount of privatization and,
related to this, succeeded in presenting the issue in very practical terms. Not all
privatization supporters view the issue in this way. Many advocates of a more extensive
privatization policy, like Warren Rudman in 1983 and Craig Thomas in 1993, see the
issue in ideological terms, believing that there are only a few functions government
should perform, and nothing else, even if it can do the job more efficiently. One reason
for Clinton s success relative to Reagan’s in privatizing is that he and other privatization
advocates learned that they were more successful when they presented the issue in
managerial rather than political terms, just as good government gurus Osborne and
Gaebler had in Reinventing Government. Even with the mandate of the Contract with
America, only after privatization advocates toned down their rhetoric and the knee-jerk
nature of their positions did they achieve results.
Viewing privatization as an objective and practical question is extremely common
among advocates of the policy. Harvard Professor Steven Kelman, a privatization
authority, represented this thinking at a major hearing on the subject:
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Professor Kelman testified about the importance of looking at outsourcing as anissue ofgood management and not as an ideological issue. In addition, he
sugpsted that good management practice in a government agency or privatebusiness is to focus on the core competency as an organization.59
Not only is such an understanding of the question widely accepted, it is also smart
politics. In fact, failure to present the issue in this way leads to defeat at the hands of the
majority who are not that comfortable with major reductions in government spending. But
this observation should in no way imply that such political success leads to good policy.
In fact, one could make a strong case that ignoring the politics of privatization has
frequent costs during implementation.
Having a provision in the FAIR Act that had agencies compile lists ofjobs that
could be outsourced, for example, came right out of the Osbome-Gaebler philosophy of
decentralization in the decisionmaking process.^o While this provision resonates with
believers in Total Quality Management and other reforms that stress teamwork between
management and employees, and while it was helpful in getting the FAIR Act passed,
giving agencies the final say completely ignores the practical political realities that come
with privatization. One could strongly question whether it is realistic to expect agencies,
given their obvious stake in the decision, to be fair in their assessment of what should be
privatized. Indeed, the early stages of implementation predictably showed agencies being
uncooperative in providing an honest listing ofjobs of a commercial nature. Political
infighting, anger and suspicion on both sides was the result.
It is true that the Reagan administration did not make much of an effort to
convince people that deep and far-reaching privatization was sound policy, and the
statements the administration did make on the subject were often politically awkward and
at times even embarrassingly belligerent. But the Reagan team’s failings on the issue
^^Senate Report, Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, 105-269.
^^Osbome and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, 250-79.
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aside, advocates of extensive privatization are undeniably caught in a “political
Catch-22.” Attempts to be honest about their desire to reduce government substantially
are politically disastrous once the given objects of privatization become clear. Many in
and out of government talk a good Jeffersonian small-government game, but become
Hamiltonian quickly, pulling back from major cuts in almost any government program.
On the other hand, talking around the issue by portraying privatization as being
something designed only to make the government run better is resented by those who see
it (often correctly) as a strategy to reduce government. Perhaps more importantly, such a
strategy often ends up yielding very little actual privatization, as politics and people’s
basic reluctance to cut government interfere during the implementation process.
The experience of the FAIR Act indicates that the path to extensive privatization
at the federal government level is twofold. Policymakers must define as much as possible
what is not a legitimate government function, and, in doing that, persuade those in and
out of public life that reducing government substantially is sound policy, even ifit results
in cuts in programs on which people depend. President Clinton and the 105th Congress
made a start toward the first task with the FAIR Act. Clinton was never inclined to be a
champion of deep government cuts, but we can look to President Reagan’s experience
and see that people’s squeamishness about government spending cuts poses a
considerable political challenge for any president wanting to achieve significant
government reductions.
Privatization advocates and their opponents should never stop searching for
common ground regarding government’s legitimate duties, even though it may well be
that debates about what constitutes “inherently governmental functions” can never be
fully settled. In a similar vein, it is tempting to indict the General Accounting Office or
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy for not specifying more precisely what qualifies
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as a situation ‘where contracting would be cumbersome or inappropriate”*' or what
duties are so “intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance of
government employees.”® Important to remember, however, is that there is inherent
value in the meaningful dialogue that can result from responsible attempts to interpret
these passages.
It is impossible to develop neat and tidy rules that proclaim with certainty the
instances “when flexibility is essential to the performance of a function.”63 Attempts
such as those found in the original Freedom of Government Competition Act to specify in
great detail what government should and should not do come across as overreaching.
Listing so many conditions under which a duty is not “inherently governmental” does not
settle the issue, as functions will fall through language’s inevitable cracks, but still invites
political conflict over the functions that are listed. By contrast, the elaboration offered in
the 1992 Office of Federal Procurement Policy document, while not too detailed, still
gives enough meaning to “inherently governmental” to provide a basis for dialogue.
Privatization observers from both sides of the debate should hope for such an outcome,
because only through the grand and perpetual debate about government size can the
privatization question be meaningfully addressed. Just as the framers envisioned, it is
only through careful, consistent and persuasive dialogue that change can occur.
Senate Committee, Federal Contracting: Comments on SI 724, The Freedomfrom Government
Competition Act, 4.
^^Executive Office of the President, Letter 92-123.
^^Emphasis added. Senate Committee, Federal Contracting: Comments on SI 724, The Freedomfrom
Government Competition Act, 4.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE MANAGEMENT/POLITICS NEXUS
When tracing the scholarly history of the privatization debate, Peter Drucker,
Charles Schultze, and E.S. Savas are correctly noted as primary advocates. Drucker was
one of the first to utter the word “privatization.”i A decade later, Schultze became one of
the primary contributors in pushing public choice theory into the mainstream.^ During
the Reagan era, E.S. Savas established himself as the privatization guru of the academy.^
There is no doubt that Drucker, Schultze and Savas were pivotal figures in
privatization scholarship. Another academic contributor in this area, just as key but less
appreciated, is Bruce L.R. Smith, whose 1975 volume. The New PoliticQl Economy, may
offer the single best early chronicle of the spread of third party government. Smith opened
his book by writing;
The sharing of authority with private and quasi-private institutions is a central
feature ofmodem government. Novel administrative arrangements have emerged
which present intricate new problems for the public and private sectors. Indeed,
the intermingling of functions, the relationships of financial dependence on the
government, and the interpretation of highly skilled manpower cadres have
obliterated many of the traditional ‘public-private’ distinctions. A new type of
public sector has emerged, drawing heavily on the energies of society outside of
the formal government.'^
This was the first of many prescient observations in the book. Twenty-five years
later. Smith’s vision (and that of some other scholars)^ that the public use of the private
sector would increase significantly has been borne out. Although until recently a state
^Drucker, Age ofDiscontinuity.
^Charles Schultze, The Public Use ofPrivate Interest (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1977).
^ Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector.
^Bruce L.R. Smith, New Political Economy, 1
.
^For example, see Murray Weidenbaum, Modern Public Sector: New Ways ofDoing the Government’s
Business (New York: Basic Books, 1969) and Drucker, Age ofDiscontinuity.
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and local phenomenon, privatization is being used with more frequency by the federal
government. 1 996 was the most active year to date for privatization at that level, as the
Naval Petroleum Reserve, the Alaska Power Administration, the nation’s helium program
and the United States Enrichment Corporation were all privatized.^
Privatization: Here to S;tay9
Pnvatization has been on the rise, especially at the state and local level, yet one of
the more mteresting and less examined questions of this phenomenon is whether it will
last. The answer would seem to be only a qualified “yes.” While privatization has
yielded policy success in areas such as trash pickup and road work, in which efficient
service delivery is widely seen as the only policy goal, it is less certain that the private
sector will be seen as being an acceptable solution to ambiguous and vexing policy
challenges in areas like health care, the environment and education.
It IS a perpetually arduous challenge for government to define its goals precisely in
those areas, never mind assure that they are accomplished, especially when dealing with a
private sector motivated almost entirely by profit. While anecdotal evidence can always
be cited ofpublic sector officials having unscrupulous motives, the mission of
government in its proper role is the welfare of its citizenry. The private sector, by
contrast, is motivated primarily by self interest, as profitmaking is legitimately a main
concern of business corporations. While it is certainly possible for self interest and
public service to coincide, in some cases they do not, and it is perhaps those instances that
call for government production.
Despite its potential dangers, it is clear that there has occurred a remarkable
rejection of governmental provision of services, products, and regulation. The
^Utt, “Transferring Functions,” 1 30.
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governmental bureaucracy so praised by scholars like John Rohr and Charles GoodselR is
rejected as inefficient and unnecessary. The market has now been elevated in the minds
of many to the status of most responsible provider of public services and the true
embodiment ofAmerican regime values, and market competition has replaced the public
interest as the mantra ofAmerican government in daily action. Against this political
backdrop, it is difficult to make the case that the practice of privatization is simply a
policymaking fad.
Ihg Movement Toward Ffficiencv and Govemmp^t
Privatization would fade away only if there were a substantial rebirth of faith in
government as a legitimate and positive force in people’s lives. While citizens often
condone government’s mvolvement whenever market forces prove insufficient, they
frequently do so reluctantly and with suspicion. As mentioned in chapter one, part of the
reason for this is cultural, which would seem to underscore the unlikelihood that such
cynicism would change significantly. Additionally, we have seen in chapter two that in
contrast to the arguments of its opponents, the anti-government message is a neat and tidy
gospel.8 It is easy to comprehend and thus is a good fit for a public dialogue that is
increasingly soundbite driven and thus not conducive to more subtle, complex arguments.
Although in its effect the privatization movement is a very conservative one, its
message gives the appearance of being nonpartisan and even nonideological, concerned
only with science-based efficiency. The ability of privatization advocates to present their
arguments in those terms has given them an extremely powerful advantage, since during
the twentieth century, efficiency has risen to the top of the list of priorities for
policymakers in almost every issue area. Efficiency had, of course, always been a prime
JSee John Rohr, To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy ofthe Administrative State (Lawrence, Kans.:
University of Kansas Press, 1986), and Goodsell, Casefor Bureaucracy, 1994.
^Robert B. Reich, “Toward a New Public Philosophy,” Atlantic Monthly 255 (1985): 68-79.
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concern of policymakers and public administration scholars.9 But much unlike during the
progressive era, the concern for efficiency at the twentieth century’s end was explicitly
arguing against the notion that government would be a good source for effective service
delivery. The public choice movement had in fact argued just the opposite - that
government services thrive on inefficiency. Public choice theory held that when not
using their resources well, government workers received what they were after in the first
place - more money and personnel. Such a cycle created an intolerable incentive for the
public sector to waste whatever it was given without concern for the public interest.
Part of the reason why a small government argument has received increasing
support in the last thirty-five years is the ability of its supporters to offer a clear, mostly
unified vision for governing. Easy to forget, however, is that the anti-government
movement is not entirely composed of conservative political forces. Government’s
traditional supporters have in fact been sharply divided since the 1960’s in their feelings
toward the public sector, as some groups that had previously been among government’s
most ardent defenders became some of its harshest critics. E.J. Dionne notes that some of
the themes of 1960’s liberalism were used to great political effect by conservatives:
The notion that small is beautiful, which grew out of the New Left’s fascination
with small communities, was used by conservatives to defend entrepreneurship
and the creativity of small business. Decentralization of power, long a
conservative theme, was lent new legitimacy when cast in the language of the left.
The New Left’s attack on bureaucracy was conveniently used to attack ‘big
government. ’...Thus did the New Left wage war against the paternalistic liberal
state. The [RJight picked up the pieces.
This caused a decline in faith among the public sector’s traditional champions that
government bureaucracy could be an effective voice for the disenfi-anchised and the
good exploration of this is Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study ofthe Political Theory of
American Public Administration, 2d ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1984).
^
^Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics, 53-4.
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public interest m general. This disillusionment with government has now become so
great that statements alleging government incompetence and corruption are as common
coming from the Left as from the Right.n With no one remaining to defend government,
It IS only natural that the business world is increasingly seen as the source for honest,
efficient public administration.
Privatization’s Political Nature
Most people feel that the private sector has the greater ability to implement policy
in an objective, efficient manner. But frequently a private sector producer must grapple
with the reality that administering a program often involves questions that are more
complex and divisive than simply how to deliver a given service most efficiently.
Privatization can also be hard on the given government entity, nowhere more so than at
the national level. Any national government policymaker wishing to privatize has to
work his proposal, often involving divisive issues with ideological overtones, through a
complex policy structure, often with multiple, well-organized interests and diverse
constituencies involved. It is therefore imperative that, whether they be public or private
sector participants, those pursuing such a policy recognize that almost any substantial
amount of privatization is not a mere exercise in objective management, but is rather full
of political and ideological decisions rich in policy consequences.
Recognition of this most crucial of facts often yields a willingness to have a
respectful dialogue with those who hold a contrary position. Of course, one does not
always lead to the other. There were instances when Reagan’s team recognized the
ideological nature of what they were proposing and still did not take opponents’ concerns
^
^ One example of a conspiracy theory offered by the political left is that Clinton administration Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown was murdered by the United States government, and that the government then led us
to believe he was killed in a plane crash. See Mark Hosenball and Gregory L. Vistica, “The Life and Times
of a Rumor: The Unlikely Alliance Behind a Ron Brown Conspiracy Theory,” Newsweek, 19 January 1998,
31.
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into account. Clearly, though, failure to recognize the politics of privatization almost
always hinders its achievement because few privatizing policies can be implemented
without antagonizing some major political interest group.
Not bemg attuned to privatization’s potential political pitfalls both reduces the
amount of privatization and its quality. President Clinton and the 105th Congress
succeeded in getting the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act passed, but apparently
failed to recognize the conflict of interest inherent in agencies deciding what in their
bureau should be privatized, a misjudgment that could prove devastating to the law’s
impact. This connection between political awareness and implementation success is not
recognized by most privatization scholars, as most “how to” guides in the field portray
accountability as an exercise in having one objective government overseer ensure that the
producer of the service is faithful to the contract’s terms.>2 In reality, there usually exists
a complicated evaluation and oversight process, involving multiple political actors,
monitoring a third party who is frequently forced to deal with divisive and difficult policy
choices left to it by government. Ironically, this means that despite the anti-government
ideology that generally underlies it, privatization depends on a competent, honest
administrative machine to administer it. Although privatization promises less
government, as scholars have warned eloquently, it requires special governmental
competence to oversee such devolution. There is a danger, therefore, one that even its
friends may recognize, that privatization may gain efficiency at the price of
accountability. If governmental agencies are somehow weakened or not aware of the
potential pitfalls of implementation, the possibility increases that privatized public
administration will be inadequately controlled by public purposes.
1
2
For example, see Donald Kettl, Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets (Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1993).
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RolitiesrJ^iQLJjLislJ^ecess^ hulilealthy
It IS tempting to bemoan the necessity of recognizing the “politics” of any
privatization policy. Why can people not judge a policy simply on its merits rather than
through a self-interested, subjective, or ideological lens? This question is certainly one
coming from every political corner. “Politics as usual” as decried by politicians across
the ideological spectrum translates into letting one’s political beliefs get in the way of
sound judgments about policy. Even liberals, who in many policy areas desire a bigger
government, in fact inspire cynicism about it, implying that if politicians were not so
self-interested, problems would get solved. What public official from either of the two
major parties has never vowed to be “above politics” when addressing a particular issue?
Traditional public administration theory would also call for the privatization
question to be decided purely on its merits. The politics/administration dichotomy,
though it was seldom as simplistic as modem critics tend to characterize it, was the
foundation of the public administration discipline before World War II.'3 Although post
World War II political science taught that public administrators share in making
important policy,*'’ the notion that a strict separation should exist between political
questions and administrative ones still has a hold on many in and out of academia,
sometimes in rather crude form. But in spite of decades of effort by people of every
political stripe, no one has yet found a way to have the “best” policy choice made in a
given situation with any degree of consistency.
1 1
-’Some of the primary proponents of this view were Frank Goodnow, Leonard D. White and Luther
Gulick. A good exploration of this school of thought is Alan Altshuler, “The Study of Public
Administration,” in Nicholas Henry, ed., Public Administration and Public Affairs (Rnglewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1989).
^
^Some of the important .scholarly figures for this movement include Norton Long, Paul Appleby and
Herbert Simon. A good resource for these thinkers’ main ideas is James W. Fesler, “Public Administration
and the Social Sciences: 1 946 to 1 960,” in Frederick C. Mosher, ed., American Public Administration: Past
and Present (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1975).
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Part of the reason for the failure of this effort lies in the complex nature of most
issues, as there is rarely a single clear answer to policy questions. Discussion of the best
com subsidy policy is not a debate that leaves most people bubbling with emotion, and
yet it can involve complicated problems that are not easily solved. An additional factor in
the mix is human nature. Often those working on an issue care about it a great deal and
thus are far from being psychologically detached from it. The fact is that people almost
always decide an issue, at least in part, on the basis of ideological bias, no matter what a
knowledgeable or objective observer (if it is possible to find one) believes is the correct
course. Vital to any sophisticated understanding of politics is a recognition that one’s
ideology leads to honest and well-intentioned differences of opinion which are inherent to
policymaking. The reason why people will forever have political disagreements is that,
despite efforts to objectify and quantify policy choices, human beings will always weigh
differently what are often elusive and conflicting policy goals.
Self-interest is also an undeniable part of the policymaking equation. As one
small example of this, even good government gums David Osborne and Ted Gaebler,
who often in their volume Reinventing Government seem unaware of the political realities
of management reform, gmdgingly acknowledge that ifpublic employees’ job security is
at stake, they will oppose competition efforts. And lest one think government
employees are the only ones who allow self-interest to get in the way of good decisions, a
major conference on scientific research in the year 2000 concluded that increased
privatization during the preceding decade had resulted in a failure on the part of private
sector researchers “to protect both patients and scientific integrity.” A major contention
of the gathering was that the “financial stake in the outcome” of the given inquiry
frequently hindered the researcher’s objectivity.'^
^
^Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government, 84.
^^Alice Dembner, “Research Integrity Declines,” Boston Globe, 22 August 2000, sec. E, pp. 1-2.
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These observations may seem obvious, but they are frequently muffled by those
who seem to consider efficiency the only test of good policy. In and out of the academy
the cry has gone out to run government “like a business,” the implications being that
businesses are by nature efficient and that efficient production is the only aim for the
public sector. This concern with efficiency left many with an intolerance for the
subtleties and complexities ofmodem problems. By the end of the 1990’s, Ross Perot
had faded from the political landscape. But surviving and thriving after him was his
impatient desire to “get under the hood and fix” whatever policy challenge arose, ignoring
the intricacies of the given problem.
As willing as so many have been to give the policymaker only the charge of
efficiency, many have realized the need to add other goals into the mix. In one of the
definitive histories of American public administration, Frederic C. Mosher makes a
convincing case that while a concern with efficiency is a large part of public
administration scholarship, other goals like political democracy were almost always held
in at least as high regard. Even Woodrow Wilson, who is often cited as a prime
example of a scholar who believed that administration was to be purely scientific and
objective, was in reality keenly aware that the work of both the politician and the
administrator involved more than just efficiency. is That belief stayed the predominant
one in twentieth century public administration scholarship. The contributions of Paul
Appleby, Dwight Waldo and many others throughout the century recognized efficiency’s
merits, “but only within a framework of consciously held values.”i^ The problem with
only concerning oneself with efficiency, as they saw it, was that such an approach
1 7
Frederic C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
^
^Daniel W. Martin, “The Fading Legacy of Woodrow Wilson,” Public Administration Review 48 ( 1 988):
633.
^
^Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study ofthe Political Theory ofAmerican Public
Administration (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1948), 203.
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eschewed normative questions involving other values like equity and fairness, questions
that are mevitable for the public administrator exercising the discretion inherent to
governance.20
The problems inherent in having efficiency be one’s sole policymaking guide is
shown in Reinventing Government. In the book, Osborne and Gaebler heartily endorsed
privatization, assertmg, “We have also found that once public employees find themselves
m competition - if their job security is not at stake - they enjoy it.”2i One cannot help but
wonder how genuine competition could possibly exist in an atmosphere in which there is
no danger ofjob loss. Given the right circumstances, competition between providers
could well be a sound fiscal notion. But the current providers of that service will be
unhappy if asked to compete, creating a political problem. The reason it would be a
problem is because in the mind of government employees, that would constitute unfair
treatment. Whether or not their viewpoint would be correct, their belief at the very least
indicates that policymakers have to choose between efficiency and other values all the
time. Making efficiency the only goal is unrealistic.
One can go back another century and discover a fact surprising to some; efficiency
was far down on the list of the framers’ policy aims. While an effective national public
administration was important to them as necessary for securing public attachment to the
government, their constitutional design intentionally yielded a convoluted political system
with multiple policy roadblocks. This sent a powerful signal that far from placing a
premium on efficiency, the framers recognized that many different goals and interests
would have to be balanced to yield acceptable policy. The presence of many different
centers of power encouraged by the constitution necessitated political dialogue and
compromise, especially with those with whom a policymaker disagreed. Such
70One of the hallmark explanations of this view is Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (Tuscaloosa,
Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1949).
Appleby, Policy and Administration, 84.
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disagreement and debate inevitably slowed down the process, but was considered by the
framers not only to be natural, but healthy, as it made it more likely that no interest would
be cast aside.22
The Consequences of Not Recognizing the Politics of Privatisation
The realization that privatization is a political act should not be seen as
unfortunate by either side of the debate. The framers liked politics because at its best it
gives people an opportunity to debate fundamental questions of governance. The
privatization debate should be seen in that light, as a chance to have a dialogue about the
policy areas in which the country wants the public sector to be active. The Clinton
administration’s efforts through the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act to establish
lists of inherently governmental function was a step in that direction. By contrast.
President Reagan’s perpetual, scathing attacks on the public sector brought the issue of
government size to the table, but not in a manner that revealed the willingness to
compromise and respect for opponents that are necessary ingredients to substantive
discussion.
If policymakers see privatization as a purely managerial decision with no political
or policy consequences, or as one so obvious that no debate is necessary, the dialogue
about government size and function will not occur, ensuring no resolution of questions
regarding how big the public sector should be and what duties it should perform. Citizens
and public officials will then continue to rely on privatization and other such managerial
decisions as some sort of magic pill that will eliminate for us all the difficult questions
about government’s role. Such thinking has a cost, as the private sector is often no more
able than govermnent to make the more vexing policy problems go away. It is not
^^The best source for the framers’ thinking on this subject is The Federalist Papers. See in particular
Clinton Rossiter.ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961).
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reasonable to expect, for example, that the multifaceted and deeply rooted causes of the
rise m health care costs are going to disappear if that industry is privatized further. On
the contrary, unless the population stops aging, we allow the poor to suffer and die
unaided, industry technological advances cease, and unworthy medical malpractice suits
disappear, there will be forces pushing costs up.
Attempts to deny public policy’s complexities invite disappointment down the
road, and thus more c)micism when a private sector producer fails to meet the
unreasonable expectations we have set for it. This cycle of high expectations being
followed by disillusionment has been dubbed “The Panacea Phenomenon” by James
Finckenauer,^^ but Bruce L.R. Smith saw such a phenomenon in The New Politicol
Economy, as he speculated that privatization was simply another way of “financing public
services in hidden and disguised ways, often creating arrangements which erode public
confidence in government over the long run.”24 Later in the work. Smith wonders
prophetically if the anti-institutional mood, which at the time was just beginning to grip
the polity, will make all service delivery arrangements, including privatization, suspect.
Smith feared that this would lead to a decreasing governmental capacity and eventually to
instability.25
Smith is, of course, not the first to worry about such matters. One can again think
of the framers, who thought there was a direct link between attachment to a government
and its ability to administer the laws. There are those who dislike the public sector
enough to say that anything that reduces the government’s capacity is positive. But those
subscribing to that belief should consider the response of Reagan Environmental
Protection Agency Administrator William Ruckelshaus to constant attacks by
environmental groups during his tenure:
^^James Finckenauer and Patricia W. Gavin, Scared Straight: The Panacea Phenomenon Revisited
(Prospect Heights, 111.: Waveland Press, 1999).
^"^Bruce L.R. Smith, New Political Economy, 41
.
25lbid., 42.
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[Tjhe cumulative effect of [the attacks] is to cause the essential trust of the societyto be so eroded-it [the agency] can’t function...When you don’t distinguish
between individuals with whom you disagree, or policies with which you
isagree, and the agencies themselves...you risk destroying the very institutions
whose success is necessary for your essential goals to be achieved.”26
Surely such a quote from an official in the twentieth century’s most
anti-government administration should tell us something. One does not have to like
government to realize that even government ’s ability to reduce itself undercut whenever
there is a loss of the citizenry’s faith in it. Unless the public sector manages to escape
from the black cloud of suspicion which hangs over almost every policy move it makes,
any decision to increase, change, start, decrease, eliminate or privatize a government
program will be viewed with cynicism. Little meaningful dialogue about government’s
proper role can occur in such an atmosphere. Without such dialogue, simplistic
managenal answers to complex policy questions will continue to abound, and Americans
will feel disenchanted with the results.
^'^“Environmentalists Warned to Ease Attacks on EPA,” Bloomington Pantograph, 9 December 1984, sec.
A, p. 7. Cited in Gordon, Public Administration, 530.
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